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1 Introduction  
Biodiversity1 offsets are conservation2 activities intended to compensate for the residual, 
unavoidable harm to biodiversity caused by development projects. Recent experience with 
regulatory regimes, such as wetland and conservation banking in the USA, tradable forest 
conservation obligations in Brazil and habitat compensation requirements in Australia, Canada 
and the EU, has been supplemented by growing interest in the potential of voluntary biodiversity 
offsets. This experience suggests that biodiversity offsets may be of value to business, 
government, local communities and conservation groups alike. For example: 
Benefits to business: Biodiversity offsets can strengthen companies’ license to operate by 
encouraging regulators to grant permission for new operations and by securing the support of 
local communities and non-governmental organisations. For companies, investment in 
biodiversity offsets can provide a cost effective means to demonstrate that society should 
continue to trust them with access to the land and sea needed for their operations.  
Benefits to government: Biodiversity offsets offer regulators a mechanism to encourage 
companies to make significant contributions to conservation, in many cases without the need 
for new legislation and at less cost than alternative policies. Offsets can also help to ensure 
that development projects intended to meet growing demand for energy, minerals, metals, 
crops and transport are planned in the context of sustainable development, and accompanied 
by counterbalancing measures to secure the conservation of ecosystems and species affected 
by development. 
Benefits to conservation groups: Conservation organisations can use and influence 
biodiversity offsets to secure more and better conservation and obtain additional funding for 
conservation, for instance, to establish properly financed ecological corridors or strengthen 
networks of protected areas. Offsets could also help ensure that national or regional 
conservation priorities are integrated into business planning. 
Benefits to communities: Local communities can use biodiversity offsets to ensure 
functioning and productive ecosystems during and after development projects, not only with 
properly rehabilitated project sites, but with additional conservation outcomes outside the 
project’s borders, to support livelihoods and amenity. 
While the benefits of biodiversity offsets are potentially large, several significant hurdles need 
to be overcome to realise them. Chief among obstacles is the need for a shared vision of the 
meaning and standards required of offsets among companies, governments, communities and 
conservation NGOs. In addition, there is a need to secure consent and build trust among key 
stakeholders for the approach, to strengthen the business case needed to motivate companies 
and to establish the policy frameworks to underpin offsets. Some question the benefit of 
offsets to conservation and to business. Their views need to be taken seriously and they 
                                                 
1
 Biological diversity – or “biodiversity” for short – is a general term for the diversity of genes, species and 
ecosystems that constitute life on earth. It is defined in Article 2 of the Convention on Biological Diversity as 
"the variability among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other 
aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, 
between species and of ecosystems.” 
2 According to Article 2 of the Convention on Biological Diversity, “In-situ conservation means the conservation 
of ecosystems and natural habitats and the maintenance and recovery of viable populations of species in their 
natural surroundings and, in the case of domesticated or cultivated species, in the surroundings where they 
have developed their distinctive properties.” The range of conservation activities that might be involved in a 
biodiversity offset is described in chapter 6.5 of this report. 
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should be involved in discussions on whether and how biodiversity offsets should be 
conducted. 
This report is a joint effort by Insight Investment and IUCN-The World Conservation Union; both 
of which have an interest in exploring biodiversity offsets.  
Insight Investment is a fund management company based in the City of London managing 
approximately £75 billion of assets (as at 30 September 2004) on behalf of some 300 
institutional investors and millions of retail customers of the HBOS group. Insight has both a 
financial interest and a moral responsibility to engage with companies in which it is invested to 
encourage them to adopt high standards on, and manage risks related to, key social, 
environmental and ethical issues, of which biodiversity is one.  
IUCN is a union of 77 nation states, 114 government agencies and over 800 non-governmental 
organisations dedicated to the vision of “a just world that values and conserves nature”. IUCN 
seeks to influence, encourage and assist societies throughout the world to conserve the 
integrity and diversity of nature and to ensure that any use of natural resources is equitable 
and ecologically sustainable. As part of this effort, IUCN encourages dialogue with industry and 
debate among its membership to clarify the concepts and practices on issues such as 
biodiversity offsets. 
The authors’ aim in conducting the interviews with companies, regulators and biodiversity 
experts that form the basis of this report was to explore the potential and limitations of 
biodiversity offsets: to consider the concepts involved, such as “net benefit” and “no net loss”, 
as well as why, where, when and by whom biodiversity offsets might be used, and what issues 
remain to be resolved. 
In the report, we discuss these issues and draw preliminary conclusions regarding the 
potential and limitations of biodiversity offsets, and what steps are needed to develop the 
approach further. 
1.1 Methodology 
This report contains a synthesis and interpretation of a series of semi-structured interviews 
about biodiversity offsets conducted by the authors with 37 interviewees from around the 
world between March and August, 2004. The authors have also drawn on shorter discussions 
with some 20 other people.  The report does not pretend to offer new empirical findings from 
the analysis of specific biodiversity offsets, nor to establish the balance of opinion in society for 
and against offsets.  Nevertheless, many of the people interviewed for this research have 
carried out such analysis in the past, and the views expressed here are informed by their 
practical experience of designing, implementing or evaluating biodiversity offsets in a range of 
contexts. 
The main steps involved in carrying out this research were: 
? Agree Terms of Reference 
? Develop questions and guidelines for conducting interviews  
? Identify interviewees (listed in Appendix 1) 
? Conduct interviews including follow-up with additional interviewees identified in the 
course of the interviews 
? Supplement interview data with selective review of literature  
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? Analysis of interview notes 
? Synthesis of results and drafting of report 
? Peer review  
1.2 Structure of the report  
This report comprises eight chapters. Following this introduction, chapter 2 reviews the 
different ways that people define biodiversity offsets, including the role of offsets in the 
environmental mitigation hierarchy and their relevance to wider aspirations for sustainable 
development.  The report continues, in chapters 3, 4 and 5, to examine the reasons why 
different stakeholder groups are motivated to undertake biodiversity offsets. Chapters 6 and 7 
explore the challenges of implementing offsets, including technical issues as well as 
consideration of who needs to be involved.  Finally, chapter 8 offers brief conclusions and 
describes the next steps required to move forward, including activities planned by Insight 
Investment and IUCN. 
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2 What is a biodiversity offset?  
Our interviews revealed a number of interpretations of the term “biodiversity offset”, partly 
because “offset” is a particular mechanism in other contexts such as carbon trading and 
perhaps because terms such as “mitigation” have different meanings in Europe and North 
America.  Compared with other forms of offsets, the limited experience with the relatively new 
concept of biodiversity offsets has grown in different contexts around the world with little co-
ordination, comparative analysis or international debate, so a consistent, globally accepted 
terminology has yet to emerge.  
This chapter will look at the different interpretations of the terms “biodiversity offset”, 
“mitigation” and “no net loss” and “net benefit”, touch briefly on their use in regulatory 
regimes around the world, and conclude (see Box 2 on page 13) by setting out the definition of 
biodiversity offsets that we will use for the purpose of this report. 
? Offset or mitigate? 
In some contexts – particularly in Europe– the term “mitigate” means to minimise harm or to 
make it less severe, whereas in the US, it is often used to refer to activities designed to 
compensate for unavoidable environmental damage.  In the US, therefore, it is generally 
interchangeable with, and often preferred to, the term “offset”.  The relationship between 
offset and the linked issues of “no net loss” and “net benefit” is described below.  
? Offset and the environmental mitigation hierarchy 
Definitions of biodiversity offsets are often couched in terms of existing principles of 
environmental management.  Sachin Kapila of Shell, for instance, describes offsets as a 
complement to (and not a substitute for) the traditional environmental impact mitigation 
hierarchy of “avoid, minimise, mitigate.”  Although different meanings are ascribed to the 
terms used here, we understand “minimise” in this context to mean designing a project in such 
a way as to reduce harm, and “mitigate” to mean alleviating the residual harm, to the extent 
possible.  “Offset” is thus interpreted as an activity to compensate for residual, unavoidable 
harm.  
Similarly, Chris Spray of Northumbrian Water notes that the first priority is to minimise 
environmental damage.  He describes offsets as a supplementary means to address the 
residual environmental impact of projects.  Understood as firmly within the context of this 
mitigation hierarchy, biodiversity offsets cannot be used to reduce a developer’s obligation to 
avoid, minimise and mitigate harm. 
Moreover, biodiversity offsets are not appropriate in circumstances where development 
should not proceed in the first place.  More detailed consideration of the controversial issue of 
“no go” criteria is beyond the scope of this report.  However, it is an issue on which further 
dialogue between conservation groups, government and companies is urgently needed.  
? Offset or compensate? 
The term “offset” is often used interchangeably with “compensate”. “Compensation” itself has 
several meanings, however.  It can mean financial payment for damage, often associated with 
legal liability and damages, or it can mean activity designed to counteract harm.  As this report 
concerns agreed activities designed to counteract the harm to biodiversity caused by 
development activities, and does not focus on judgements and payments, whether voluntary 
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or associated with legal liabilities, we use the term “compensate” in the sense of concrete 
conservation actions rather than the simple transfer of funds.  We also recognise, however, 
that the actions involved in a biodiversity offset may be conducted by organisations or 
individuals who are paid to do so. 
? Onsite or offsite?  
Does “offset” refer to conservation activity undertaken on the development site itself, or 
elsewhere?  “Offset” can be distinguished from “set-aside” or “rehabilitation”, which refer to 
avoidance and mitigation, respectively.  In general, the term “offset” is understood to refer to 
conservation activity that takes place outside the geographic boundaries of a development site 
in order to compensate for unavoidable harm, in addition to any mitigation or rehabilitation 
that may take place on that site.  However, some developers may own large plots of land and 
in some circumstances, it could be appropriate for biodiversity offsets to be undertaken on 
land that would not otherwise be conserved within a plot, as a way of offsetting development 
activity on another part of the plot.  These and other issues relating to the most appropriate 
location of biodiversity offsets are discussed in chapter 6.3. 
? The value of biodiversity and conservation in the context of sustainable 
development 
The principle of compensating residual damage to natural habitat implies that biodiversity is 
valuable and needs to be conserved, a proposition we take for granted in this report.  The 
need for conservation was re-emphasised by the world’s heads of state in their commitment at 
the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002 to the “achievement 
by 2010 of a significant reduction in the current rate of loss of biological diversity”.3  It is also 
enshrined in several international treaties such as the Convention on Biological Diversity and in 
national law and policy around the world.4  
It is well known that biodiversity loss results mainly from habitat conversion and disturbance, 
often caused by activities associated with economic development.5  However, just as the 
international community supports the conservation of biodiversity, international law and policy 
equally allude to the need for sustainable development and poverty alleviation.  This implies 
that further conversion and disturbance of natural habitat is probably inevitable, due to 
population growth and economic development.  Still, while habitat loss cannot be avoided 
entirely, the effects of development on biodiversity may be offset through the mitigation 
hierarchy as well as compensating efforts to protect, restore and enhance natural ecosystems.  
Many of those interviewed for this study appealed to broader principles and the context of 
sustainable development as they spoke of biodiversity offsets.  They referred to the notion of a 
“social contract” between business and society, according to which companies are allowed to 
operate in sensitive areas if they can demonstrate a commitment to “best practice” including 
                                                 
3  United Nations, 2002.  Page 39, paragraph 44. 
4 One hundred and eighty-seven countries and the European Union have ratified the Convention on Biological 
Diversity. At the Johannesburg World Summit in August 2002, biodiversity was identified as one of five key 
issues and a global target was set of significantly reducing its loss by 2010. See http://www.unep-
wcmc.org/gbc/press_release.htm. For treaties related to biological diversity, see 
http://www.biodiv.org/convention/partners-websites.asp. 
5 Biodiversity is generally considered to be declining worldwide, due to loss of habitat, pollution, the spread of 
invasive alien or “exotic” species, and adoption of an increasingly narrow range of crop and animal varieties for 
human use (see: IUCN, 2000, Biodiversity is life, http://www.iucn.org/bil/bioloss.html; SCBD, 2000, 
http://www.biodiv.org/doc/publications/cbd-sustain-en.pdf; IUCN, 2002, Red List, Major threats, 
http://www.redlist.org/info/major_threats.html; Global Biodiversity Outlook, Chapter 1, Status and Trends of 
Global Biodiversity, http://www.biodiv.org/gbo/chap-01/chap-01.asp). 
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the concept of “no net loss” and the need to find “win-win” solutions that can provide net 
benefits for biodiversity and people. 
? No net loss (or net positive impact) 
What is the goal of biodiversity offsets?  How much conservation is enough?  The principle of 
offsetting unavoidable harm naturally raises questions about the desired outcome of the 
compensatory conservation measures, discussed briefly here, as well as questions about 
measurement and equivalence, discussed in chapter 6.  
The aim of biodiversity offsets is described in some legal systems and expressed by many of 
our interviewees as “no net loss”.  Sometimes, this principle is enshrined in law, as discussed in 
chapter 4.2.  Sometimes, it is voluntarily adopted by companies, as chapter 5.3 shows.  An 
example of the former is the policy of “no net loss” of wetlands formalised by the US federal 
government in an attempt to reconcile the requirements of the Clean Water Act with 
continuing pressures to drain and fill wetlands for economic uses (see chapter 4.2).  
 
Box 1: No net loss in Uganda 
According to Alice Ruhweza of Uganda’s National Environment Management Authority, 
NEMA sees biodiversity offsets as a means of ensuring “no net loss” of habitat, while until 
recently, development projects in the country resulted in loss of biodiversity.  Projects were 
established in sensitive wetlands or other gazetted areas but little was done to address 
impacts on biodiversity.  In such cases, even when mitigation measures were included in 
the project agreements, Environmental Impact Assessment Condition of Approval 
Certificates and the Environmental Compliance Agreements between government and the 
developer, the relevant clauses did not explicitly require the purchase of land or support for 
a protected area as a form of compensation. (See section 4.3.1 of this report.)  As she 
explains, “Today, for the first time, NEMA is more actively pursuing alternative restoration 
measures than the traditional on-site mitigation of the past.  NEMA is basically saying that 
you can't have a project without trying to do compensation. Now, when NEMA gives out 
concessions, there are conditions.  For example, telling developers that they need to buy 
land and plant trees or gazette land as a Protected Area or take some other action to 
compensate for the damage caused to biodiversity by the development project.  That's the 
new part. NGOs involved in environmental advocacy have also played a huge role in raising 
awareness of the dangers of unquestioning commitment to huge projects, without taking 
into consideration the effects on the environment or setting up adequate alternative 
restoration or compensation measures.” 
 
The precise meaning of “no net loss” in the context of American wetlands continues to be a 
subject of considerable scientific effort and some legal dispute.  The effectiveness of the 
system to deliver “no net loss” has been broadly questioned (National Research Council, 2001).  
Indeed, some observers have argued that, far from ensuring “no net loss” of wetlands, the 
system may have unintentionally led to the destruction of some important wetlands. These 
criticisms are considered later in the report (see chapters 3 and 4.2).  While the 
implementation of “no net loss” will inevitably be complex, the concept is intuitively simple.  In 
the context of US law governing wetlands, it implies that development can proceed only if a 
total “amount” of wetland habitat is maintained.  What results is a form of “cap-and-trade” 
system for wetland acreage. 
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“The no-net-loss approach is a good one. It can be challenging, 
but is more widely applicable to more companies than first meets 
the eye. It is a good goal to aim for.” 
Leah Haygood, Environmental Consultant and former employee of Waste Management. 
 
Some companies and many conservation groups aim to achieve a net positive outcome, in 
terms of biodiversity quality, rather than simply restoring the status quo ante.  In this context, 
offsets may be seen as a means to achieve net improvements to biodiversity quantity and 
quality, going beyond the notion of no net loss.  For instance, BP’s CEO has committed to 
having “a real, measurable and positive impact on the biodiversity of the world” and in the 
realm of public policy President George W. Bush recently advocated moving from a “no net 
loss” approach to wetland conservation, to one based on “net gain” of wetlands (Coyne, 2004). 
Before assuming that offsets can indeed achieve a net positive impact, it is important to note 
that many conservation organisations and scientists have argued that wetland banking and 
trading in the US has not resulted in “no net loss” of wetlands, and that, far from net gain, 
wetlands are still being lost.  They are therefore sceptical about the likelihood of success of 
President Bush’s “net gain” policy (Julie Sibbing, personal communication).   
With respect to whether the goal for offsets should be “no net loss” or “net gain”, Robert 
Goodland’s sourcebook for the World Bank’s Extractive Industry Review supports the 
proposition that any compensation for biodiversity loss should leave the environment “better 
off” than before the project. This implies “informed agreement of stakeholders that the 
proposed offset is more extensive in area, greater in environmental value (less disturbed, less 
damaged, more biodiversity, greater environmental service value), and under a more secure 
level of protection, such as by financing in perpetuity” (Goodland, 2003).  The Energy and 
Biodiversity Initiative also discussed positive contributions to biodiversity beyond the 
“minimum requirement” of biodiversity offsets (EBI, 2003). 
? Biodiversity offsets compared with carbon and other offsets 
Many interviewees associated the term “offset” with “carbon offsets”, since the term has been 
used widely in the context of greenhouse gas trading and negotiations to reduce emissions of 
carbon dioxide.  Davis (2000) and others point out, “The term ‘carbon offsets’, though often 
used as a term of art, has no uniformly accepted meaning.” However, offsets used in the 
context of carbon trading are usually taken to refer to mechanisms “by which the impact of 
emitting a ton of CO2 can be negated or diminished by avoiding the release of a ton elsewhere, 
or absorbing a ton of CO2 from the air that otherwise would have remained in the atmosphere” 
(Janson-Smith, personal communication).  Although there are similarities between carbon and 
biodiversity offsets in their conception and intent – equal and opposite activity to address 
harm – there are many differences. Greenhouse gases are a more uniform (and therefore 
internationally tradable) commodity than biodiversity (see chapter 6.1).  Carbon offsets are 
also part of an intergovernmental framework, whereas biodiversity offsets are generally 
implemented domestically and voluntarily (see chapter 6.3). 
Beyond carbon, there are also a number of other contexts in which the concept of offsets has 
been put to use.  For instance, one of the first emissions trading regimes to be instituted at the 
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national level was the sulphur dioxide (SO2) trading scheme in the US.  As with carbon, this is a 
cap-and-trade scheme that sets limits on emissions and requires those who emit more than 
their share to buy allowances from those who emit less.6  Similarly, a number of water pollution 
trading regimes are emerging around the world.7  These, too, use concepts similar to those 
involved in biodiversity offsets, but their number and variety place them beyond the scope of 
this report.  
 
Box 2: The definition of “biodiversity offset” 
For the purposes of this report, we define biodiversity offsets as conservation actions 
intended to compensate for the residual, unavoidable harm to biodiversity caused by 
development projects, so as to ensure no net loss of biodiversity.  Before developers 
contemplate offsets, they should have first sought to avoid and minimise harm to 
biodiversity. 
 
 
                                                 
6
  For more information on the US SO2 market see http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/arp/.    
7
  See http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/news/article.feat.020.php. 
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3 Why biodiversity offsets? The 
conservation case  
Having understood offsets as activities designed to compensate or counteract any 
unavoidable harm to biodiversity that may result from development activities, the question 
then becomes: what benefits might biodiversity offsets deliver, particularly for conservation? 
Companies, governments, NGOs and communities may envisage a number of different reasons 
for undertaking biodiversity offsets.  In this chapter, we will explore the strongest arguments 
that our interviewees made in favour of the conservation potential of biodiversity offsets and 
outline some of the associated risks or arguments against them.  In addition to these 
arguments, which focus mainly on advantages for conservation, a number of benefits for 
companies – the business case for biodiversity offsets – are discussed in chapter 5. 
3.1 More conservation  
If we accept that some development activity will and should take place within the context of 
sustainable development, that government regulates on behalf of society whether, when and 
how this should happen, and that it is often the private sector that undertakes this 
development work, the question then arises as to how to minimise the social and 
environmental damage to which development activities give rise and to optimise the 
conservation outcomes.  
Interest in biodiversity offsets is sometimes spurred by their potential to trigger more and 
better conservation outcomes than would otherwise arise when development projects take 
place.  Alice Ruhweza describes how, in the past, development projects sometimes went 
ahead in Uganda in wetlands and gazetted areas without any specific restoration of 
compensation measures (see Box 1).  Now, Uganda’s National Environment Management 
Authority is requiring developers to go beyond basic environmental compliance clauses in 
concession agreements and is granting concessions for development projects subject to 
conditions requiring compensatory conservation activities.  “Offsets can deliver biodiversity 
conservation that simply didn’t take place in the past”, she says.   
Rich Mogensen, Director at Earthmark, and Jason Coccia, Mitigation Program Manager at the 
Conservation Fund, a US-based environmental non-profit, point out that –in the US at least– 
law that requires mitigation (or offsets) has led to the creation of thousands of acres of 
wetlands and protected sites and considerable biodiversity protection, that would not have 
existed had the law not required developers to offset their impacts on wetlands in this way.  
Jessica Fox, a researcher at the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) in California, has 
conducted a study on the overall impact of conservation banking across the US.8  “What we 
found,” she says, “is that there are about 40,000 acres [a little over 16,000 hectares] of 
conservation banks across the US.”  Her research also indicates that 75% or more of this land 
area would likely have been developed if it had not been for conservation banking.  “In many 
cases,” she points out; “the developer has actually become the conservation banker.”  In 
addition, legislation may require offsetting activities to be larger in scale than the areas 
                                                 
8 The term “banking” is used in the US to refer to the way offsets are created and approved prior to 
development. The resulting conservation benefits are “banked” with the regulator and later sold as mitigation 
credits to future development projects. One of the aims of banking is to avoid any temporal loss of ecosystem 
benefits (see section 6.4). 
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damaged by development.  Laws on wetland mitigation in the USA (see section 4.2.1 below), 
for instance, often state that developers who damage one acre of wetlands need to protect or 
restore a multiple of that area of similar wetlands (sometimes as much as three acres 
protected for every one acre destroyed).  
While biodiversity offsets do offer the prospect of achieving more conservation outcomes than 
typical with development projects hitherto, they are no panacea and the argument that they 
can produce more conservation results masks a number of assumptions.  There is 
considerable debate within the US, for example, as to whether development in certain 
wetlands should have been allowed at all and whether the mitigation has genuinely offset the 
impacts of developments in them.  
Some observers have argued that, in practice, wetland mitigation in the US has come nowhere 
near achieving the goal of “no net loss”.  For instance, Julie Sibbing, of the National Wildlife 
Federation in the US, states that figures which show a gain of three acres of wetlands for every 
acre destroyed are “wholly misleading”.  She points out that the database on which some of 
these figures are based “includes in the ‘mitigated’ column, not just wetlands restoration and 
creation but even acres of wetlands [destruction] avoided by projects, preservation of existing 
wetlands and preservation of upland buffers around wetlands.”  She believes that, as a result, 
the database does not adequately match an acre of wetland destroyed with an equal acre of 
wetland created.  Additionally, she claims that “the Corps [the US Army Corps of Engineers, 
which oversees the development of wetlands in the US] does not even keep meaningful figures 
on mitigation that enable one to tell if they are achieving a real “no net loss”, although they are 
bringing a new database online this year that may begin to allow them to do this.”  Sibbing also 
cites an article (Turner et al, 2001) which, she feels, shows that “America’s top wetland 
restoration scientists believe that about 80% of the wetlands built for mitigation in this country 
[the US] do not succeed in becoming fully functional.” 
The significance of the contribution made by conservation banking in the US can also be 
questioned.  The additional area of 40,000 acres conserved by conservation banking in the US 
is very modest, when compared to the overall area affected by development.  In other 
countries, too, the question arises as to whether paying more attention to biodiversity 
conservation by building biodiversity offsets into the project approval process –as is now 
customary in Uganda– will indeed lead to genuine conservation outcomes greater than those 
achieved by normal environmental impact assessment processes in the past.  After all, 
concession agreements in countries such as Uganda have contained environmental clauses for 
decades and these may not have achieved adequate results for biodiversity conservation for a 
range of reasons.  For instance, biodiversity as a specific sustainable development issue may 
have been overlooked compared to other “environmental” issues such as emissions to air and 
water.  Or environmental requirements may not have been specific about the intended 
biodiversity results and public and private sector representatives may not have had sufficient 
skills in the field of biodiversity to do it justice.  Or companies may not have placed sufficient 
emphasis on ensuring biodiversity outcomes and governments may not have enforced 
legislation and environmental clauses in concession agreements.  In addition, monitoring and 
follow-up has often been inadequate.  Even if biodiversity conservation measures generally or 
offsets specifically were stipulated, structures have rarely been put in place to check whether 
such provisions were implemented. 
Clearly, biodiversity offsets will only achieve results for conservation if they are adequately 
designed, implemented and enforced. 
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3.2 Better conservation 
Another common argument for offsets is that they help conserve areas of higher biodiversity 
value than those being lost.  For instance, if a company wants to develop an area of relatively 
minor biodiversity value, the offset it undertakes could create or protect an area of greater 
biodiversity value.  Whether this can be achieved in practice will depend, among other things, 
on how flexibly offsets are interpreted and on whether all relevant stakeholders agree that 
what is being gained is of equal or greater value than what is lost.  
One observer with experience in conservation and mitigation banking in the US says that 
offsets can, and often do, create opportunities for “trading small blocks of degraded 
ecosystems for large chunks of functioning ecosystems.”  With the wetland mitigation laws in 
the US, and with the conservation banking that takes place there, others believe that these 
sorts of biodiversity “trade-ups” are happening all the time.  Michael Bean, a senior attorney at 
Environmental Defense, a US-based conservation non-profit, explains that he has seen at first 
hand how the judicious use of biodiversity offsets can help achieve better conservation, at 
least as concerns one endangered bird species: the red cockaded woodpecker. In order to 
thrive, he explains, these birds need specific types of habitat: 70-80 year old pine trees that are 
regularly ravaged by fire to clear out the under-story, and between 75 and 150 acres of land on 
which to feed. Currently, red-cockaded woodpeckers survive in a few large populations in the 
southeast of the US together with a large number of smaller, more fragmented populations on 
very degraded habitats.  Over time, these small, isolated populations are unlikely to survive. 
Faced with this threat, coalitions of private companies, independent landowners, the 
government and conservation groups have used offsets to trade smaller, unmanaged habitat 
for larger, managed habitat that can support larger bird populations.  Similarly, wetland 
mitigation banks often sell credits to numerous customers, some of whom may be harming 
relatively small areas, enabling the banks to create larger, consolidated conservation areas, 
rather than large numbers of highly fragmented, isolated habitats that may not be able to 
ensure long-lasting conservation results. 
The geographic flexibility offered by offsets could also enable conservation efforts to be 
focused on areas where long-term conservation benefits are more likely.  There are cases 
where a restored mine site, for instance, appears as a small oasis in highly degraded 
surrounding area.  A specialist in the area argues that “protecting 2 acres of wetland 
surrounded by highways has very little ecological value.”  Involving local communities and 
biodiversity experts in a dialogue with the company and government at the outset of the 
project could foster agreement on the best use of the money.  According to Geoff Burton of 
Environment Australia, “the concept of offset is invaluable because it allows the community to 
achieve the best possible biodiversity outcome.”  
A number of interviewees highlighted the opportunity for biodiversity offsets to contribute to 
ecological corridors as a significant factor in achieving better conservation.  “A lot of people 
are talking about conservation corridors,” observed Chris Herlugson from BP, and this was 
borne out from other interviews.  “In Mexico, we intend to target projects in biological 
corridors”, said José Carlos Fernandez.  In the less biologically diverse environment of the UK, 
Northumbrian Water is looking for the best conservation opportunities, and is guided by 
government and NGO strategy.  “In the UK, there is not much land that remains unaffected by 
development,” explains Chris Spray.  “Our biggest advantage is that we have the opportunity 
to create ecosystems that are more biologically diverse than the heavily modified land where 
we operate.  We can see the national priorities in the UK Biodiversity Strategy and the 
accompanying suite of habitat and species action plans.  We talk to government to establish 
the best options to focus on the most useful conservation outcomes”. 
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Biodiversity offsets could also contribute to better conservation by extending the kind of 
conservation activities companies undertake from the realm of good management on their 
own plot to contributing to biodiversity conservation outside it.  They could raise the thresh-
hold so that companies’ conservation activities go beyond on-site restoration, to compensate 
for the residual damage caused by companies that remains after their basic mitigation 
activities.  
For the argument of better conservation to be sound, a number of things are necessary.  The 
policy framework must be sufficiently flexible to enable offsets to result in additional, 
prioritised conservation.  In this regard, some legal requirements, such as the Habitats 
Directive in the EU, have been criticised for offering relatively little room for flexibility and 
requiring developers to recreate exactly the same habitat as that destroyed. (See Box 3) 
Others, such as the UK law on Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSIs), allow more room for 
flexibility and the possibility that conservation budgets are spent to best effect.   
It must also be clear that the priority biodiversity to be conserved would indeed have been lost 
otherwise (as discussed in chapter 6.5 on “additionality”), and of course society must deem the 
loss of the “less valuable” biodiversity acceptable as part of the compromise inherent in 
sustainable development.  NWF’s Julie Sibbing adds that, while preserving existing, intact 
ecosystems as mitigation may lead to some areas being protected, it does have pitfalls. These, 
she says, include: (1) the fact that this, in the end, does not support “no net loss” goals; (2) that 
it “may be used as an excuse to allow development of areas that could be avoided”; and (3) 
that governments may simply “use mitigation money to replace funds they would have 
otherwise spent on acquisition of key properties for biodiversity”. 
 
Box 3: Ten newts and their £250,000 pond 
Great crested newts are protected under the EU Habitats Directive, although they are fairly 
common in many reconstructed water ecosystems.  In the UK, companies could be fined up 
to £5000 per newt lost through development.  When Northumbrian Water was upgrading its 
water treatment works in Darlington, it found that 10 great crested newts, which had not 
been present on the site before the waterworks were built, had moved into the concrete 
lagoons the company used to settle and drain sludge. In order to meet its legal obligations, 
Northumbrian Water built the newts an adjoining pond and, two years later, when this new 
ecosystem was ready, hired someone to collect each newt and transfer them to the new 
pond. The newts are now breeding happily in the new pond.  The exercise cost the 
company £250,000.  As Chris Spray, formerly Environmental Director at the company 
explains, “If I were to ask conservationists how they would like to spend £250,000 for 
biodiversity conservation, they would not say “on 10 newts”. Conservationists would have 
had other priorities.” 
 
Finally, there must be a basis for establishing that biodiversity in one place is truly of higher 
value than in another, thus ensuring that the sacrifice results in net gain.  In other words, there 
needs to be agreement on the basis for valuing biodiversity and clarity on conservation 
priorities.  Some countries establish their conservation priorities in National Biodiversity 
Strategies and Action Plans, but in others, the situation is less clear.  Conservation 
organisations with expertise in the field do not always agree, so it can be difficult for 
companies to find consistent advice on conservation priorities.  
In fact, offset discussions can sometimes stimulate debate on conservation priorities, involving 
key stakeholders and can even help to rationalise conservation efforts. One of our interviewees 
who has explored these issues over many years argued that society at large needs to engage 
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in some discussion of what it wants conserved and at what cost. He added that if such 
discussions were held, “there could be cases when people are willing to say ‘These sites are 
doomed. Let’s protect somewhere else.’” The issues of conservation prioritisation and 
equivalence are discussed further in chapter 6. 
3.3 Cost effective conservation 
In addition to more or better conservation, offsets could help make the best possible use of 
money spent for conservation.  For instance, some development projects already require on-
site restoration activities.  It is fairly common for a concession agreement between a 
government authority and an extractive company to contain a clause that obliges the company 
to restore and rehabilitate the land disturbed to a status as close as possible to that prior to 
the development.  Indeed, a significant budget is often set aside by companies at the start of 
extractive projects to cover these restoration obligations when the activities cease.  But the 
cost of restoring the ecology of the disturbed area to a “less than perfect” state, one that 
nonetheless delivers functioning ecosystem services and a landscape and species mixture 
similar to the pre-project state, is often considerably less than the investment needed to re-
establish, on a species-by-species basis, a site that is, to all intents and purposes, 
indistinguishable from the original.  This begs the question of whether society would prefer 
this money to be spent in aiming for “perfection” in the area disturbed, or whether it would 
rather see that budget used to protect more biodiversity or biodiversity of higher conservation 
value. 
Defining the optimum conservation outcome may involve a review of the emphasis put on 
each stage of the mitigation hierarchy.  As Geoff Burton of Environment Australia explains, 
“There is a trade-off between remediation obligations and the best biodiversity outcomes. You 
need a balance.  It is important to ensure that, when a company has finished its activities, there 
are no lasting environmental effects.  The purists feel remediation should be done down to the 
third decimal point, but I think we should optimise the results in the context of the surrounding 
landscape. What is the opportunity cost of sticking to 100% remediation on-site?”  David 
Richards of Rio Tinto concurs. “Does the conservation community really want a company to 
chase the last decrement of restoration at the site if some of that money could be better spent 
on really significant conservation outcomes not a million miles outside the site?”  
Under the Clean Water Act, US developers are obliged to offset any unavoidable damage they 
cause to wetlands.  The opportunity cost of forgoing development in order to save or create 
wetlands varies enormously.  It is considerably higher in an area where there is already 
development and strong pressure for further development than in comparative wilderness 
areas.  Consequently, a market has arisen in which developers can seek to fulfil their offsetting 
obligations in the least expensive manner possible. Often this takes the form of buying 
“wetlands credits” from “wetlands mitigation banks”. (See chapter 4.2.) 
A similar dynamic has developed in Brazil, where developers must set-aside a proportion of 
their land for conservation activities.  This is inconvenient for certain planned land-uses where 
land values are high, so some developers have preferred to pay other landowners to conserve 
more than their share on another plot, enabling them to develop their entire plot.  The area 
conserved may have at least as high biodiversity value but lower real estate value, being of less 
development potential. (See chapter 4.2.) 
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Box 4: Cost-effectiveness arguments in New South Wales 
In its public consultation paper, “Green offsets for sustainable development”, the State of 
New South Wales government explains that “offsets can often achieve environmental 
improvements at lower costs than regulation alone.  They allow resources to be used where 
they can achieve the greatest environmental improvement…. The cost of reducing 
environmental impact increases dramatically as we approach zero additional impact.  The 
law of diminishing returns is at work.  At some point, the cost of further on-site impact 
mitigation is greater than the value provided to the environment.  Stricter controls can 
increase the cost of development dramatically but may only provide limited gains for the 
environment.  However, worthwhile environmental gains can be made if the resources used 
for mitigation (or a fraction of them) are used to reduce environmental impact at other 
sources.  That is, once all economically feasible on-site measures have been used to reduce 
environmental impact, further cost-effective impact reduction is still possible using offsets.” 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: New South Wales Government, 2002. 
 
There may be tensions between the interests of business and conservationists on cost-
effectiveness.  Saving money may be a key motivating factor for businesses, while some 
conservation organisations may want to ensure that companies dedicate all the money they 
are obliged to contribute to meet their on-site rehabilitation obligations.  A solution to this 
apparent conflict may lie in conservationists agreeing to concede a marginal saving on the part 
of companies in order to secure more valuable conservation activities than on-site 
rehabilitation alone.  And the business case for companies extends well beyond cost cutting.  
Some companies may be content to see the full sum they would commit for rehabilitation 
spent in the most effective way for conservation, even without cost savings.  Another issue 
that must be faced when examining the potential cost-saving advantage of offsets is the fact 
that this argument often involves some trade-off between the standard (and thus cost) of 
rehabilitation and investment in offset.  This weakens the mitigation hierarchy argument made 
earlier and, if taken too far, could lead to the perception of offsets as a “license to trash”. 
Finally, there is a risk that companies may consider certain habitats to be particularly difficult 
and thus costly to offset, leading to a temptation to focus instead on less complex ecosystems 
that may be cheaper to conserve. This highlights the importance of considering the principle 
and basis of ecological equivalence; an issue we discuss in section 6.1.2. 
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3.4 Giving value to conservation: creating value for 
undeveloped land 
Another benefit of offsets is their potential to address a negative and unintended consequence 
of conservation legislation. For instance, by making it illegal to harm endangered species, one 
effect of laws such as the Endangered Species Act in the US and similar legislation in Europe 
and elsewhere, has, from the perspective of some landowners, been to turn endangered 
species and biodiversity into potential financial liabilities.  In these circumstances, the moment 
an endangered species (or protected biodiversity) is discovered on someone’s land, their 
development options, and thus the value of their land, becomes limited.  They may no longer 
be able to build houses, golf courses, or anything else on that land without satisfying 
processes that some consider cumbersome and expensive for securing the necessary permits 
from government agencies, and occasionally these permits are denied.  In the US “perverse 
incentives” of this kind may have led to cases of landowners killing endangered species on 
their land before government agencies knew they were there.  Others cite cases of landowners 
intentionally burning forests on their land for fear of attracting protected species.  Conversely, 
the ability to sell endangered biodiversity as offsets gives it a value.  The creation of a market 
for biodiversity offsets –as in the US– can turn a potential environmental liability into a financial 
asset that can be sold.  
Additionally, biodiversity offsets might offer a mechanism for increasing the value of land under 
conservation. Candace Skarlatos, Senior Vice President of Environmental Initiatives at Bank of 
America, believes that conservation banking can offer an innovative way for society to put a 
value on conservation. “Every time that we look at a possible development”, she says, “we need 
to decide whether to develop and mitigate or not to develop on that land. And if we decide not 
to develop, the landowner may need to be compensated for forgone development, depending 
on the circumstances. “ She believes that conservation banking and the sort of offsetting 
systems that exist in California can be a way of giving real value to biodiversity and conservation. 
“And,” she adds, “the bottom line is that if it has a value it will be taken care of.” An added 
benefit, she says, is that the offsetting approach can “create new business opportunities as 
developers out-source mitigation and thus create new companies.” Skarlatos points out that, as 
with all real estate, land value will fluctuate based on demand and supply in the market. 
Conservation banks work best, she believes, when data is available to show the varying 
ecological values of different plots of land; when the developer can obtain credits from any of the 
approved conservation banks; and when, once the details of the conservation banking system 
have been established, the market is allowed to operate freely without interference. 
The potential advantage of offsets in terms of increased value of land, like the other potential 
advantages, however, is subject to a number of caveats and risks.  There are doubts about 
whether the economic benefits of forgoing development and conserving biodiversity would 
match the economic gains of developing the land.  This problem is partly met, in the US, by a 
strict regulatory framework that prohibits the development of land without offsetting activity, 
thus making the economic exploitation of such land illegal.  The opportunity cost for 
landowners to offer land for purely voluntary biodiversity offsets may not be acceptable, 
however.  Second, in order for land to gain value from conservation and thus to create an 
economic incentive for landowners to offer it as an offset, there would need to be sufficient 
demand for biodiversity offsets.  Another set of concerns surrounds the ability of markets to 
work for conservation and problems of market failure.  While the issue of market failure lies 
beyond the scope of this report, it has been addressed in related literature.  See, for example, 
Baumol and Oates (1988). 
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4 Why biodiversity offsets? The 
regulatory case  
The preceding chapter discussed a number of potential advantages – mostly in terms of 
conservation outcomes – of biodiversity offsets; advantages which would only materialise if a 
number of pre-requisites were met and risks addressed.  
This chapter will provide an overview of the development of policy related to biodiversity 
offsets over the last couple of decades, and then discuss one of the two key motivations for 
developers to undertake biodiversity offsets: legal compliance.  In a few countries, there are 
legal requirements to offset while in many others, the law does not explicitly require 
biodiversity offsets, but facilitates them by providing a conducive policy framework. (The 
second main motivation is the business case for companies to undertake offsets on a purely 
voluntary basis and this is discussed in chapter 5.)  Section 4.4 ends with some observations 
about the relative advantages and disadvantages of mandatory and voluntary policy 
frameworks for biodiversity offsets. 
4.1 The policy context for biodiversity offsets 
The idea of compensating for environmental damage has been around for a long time. (See, for 
example, Barbier et al. 1990.)  Moreover, compensation forms the basis of one of the most well 
established instruments of environmental policy, namely tradable rights (Baumol and Oates 
1971, 1988; Montgomery 1972; Tietenberg 1980).  The rationale for both compensating 
projects and tradable rights is that by allowing firms to provide compensation for activities that 
damage the environment, or transfer their environmental obligations to third parties, it is 
possible to reduce the costs of achieving a given environmental target very significantly. 
Tradable rights or tradable permits have been used successfully around the world, including for 
the control of industrial pollution as well as for the management of water resources and 
fisheries (OECD 1999; Stavins 2003; Tietenberg 2002; US EPA 2001).  A similar approach is 
currently in use or under discussion in some countries to limit the loss of natural habitat due to 
land use change (Chomitz et al. 2003; Gardner 2003; Johnston and Madison 1997; Landell-Mills 
and Porras 2002; Pagiola et al. 2002; Weber 2003).  Under the rubric of tradable development 
rights, compensatory mitigation or biodiversity offsets, the latter experience further suggests 
that significant financial resources can be generated from land developers for biodiversity 
conservation, while limiting habitat losses within a region.  The use of tradable development 
rights or offsets to finance biodiversity conservation at an international level remains 
undeveloped, although there have been proposals along these lines (Cervigni 1993; Graßl et al. 
2002; Panayotou 1994; Swanson 1995). 
Policy guidance and practical experience of biodiversity offsets has emerged in different ways 
and in many different places around the world.  Only recently have people begun to compare 
and contrast policies and experience across sectors and regions (Johnston and Madison 1997; 
NRC 2001; Wilkinson and Kennedy 2002).  While the scale and scope of biodiversity offsets is 
difficult to ascertain, it seems clear that various forms of offset are being used in an increasing 
number of countries and sectors.  This includes both mandatory offsets (i.e. those required by 
legislation) and voluntary ones.  Legal precedents and triggers for biodiversity offsets are 
described in the following pages and a comparison of mandatory and voluntary approaches is 
provided in section 4.4. 
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4.2 Law requiring offsets  
Legal provisions in a number of countries, outlined in Box 5, require the re-creation of habitats 
or in situ conservation to compensate for the damage to be caused by development activities.  
 
Box 5: Legal requirements for biodiversity offsets and 
compensatory conservation activities 
? Wetland Banking in the US 
under the Clean Water Act 1972 Chapter 404(b)(1) and the US Army Corps of Engineers 
regulations (33 CFR 320.4(r)) 
(See Boxes 6 & 7) 
? Conservation Banking in the US 
under the Endangered Species Act 1973 and the Guidance on Establishment, Use and 
Operations of Conservation Banks (http://endangered.fws.gov/policies/conservation-
banking.pdf) 
(See Box 9) 
? Habitats and Birds Directives and implementing regulations in the EU                   
under Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural 
habitats and of wild fauna and flora and Council Directive 79/409/EEC 
(See Box 3) 
? Offsets in Brazil under the Forest Regulation and National System of 
Conservation Units 
under Lei No 4771 of 1965; Lei No 14.247 of 22/7/2002, Lei No 9.985 of 18/7/2000, 
Decreto No. 4.340 of 22/8/2002 
? Federal Law for the Protection of Nature and Landscape in Switzerland 
? Offsets in Australia 
(see Box 12 in chapter 4.3)  
? No net loss of fisheries habitat in Canada under the Fisheries Act 
under R.S. 1985, c. F-14, Policy for the Management of Fish Habitat (1986), and the 
Habitat Conservation and Protection Guidelines, Second Edition (1998) 
(See especially Subchapter 35(l) and Subchapter 35(2) of the Fisheries Act) 
4.2.1 Wetland Banking in the US 
Under the US Clean Water Act 1972 Chapter 404(b)(1) and the US Army Corps of Engineers 
regulations (33 CFR 320.4(r)), developers whose plans call for damage to wetlands need to 
obtain permits from the US Army Corps of Engineers.  In granting these “wetland permits” the 
Corps follows a sequencing approach:  First, developers must prove that the damage to the 
wetlands is “unavoidable”.  If this is done, they must then seek to minimise any adverse 
impacts on those wetlands that cannot reasonably be avoided.  Finally, they must provide 
“compensatory mitigation” (which is the closest analogue for the term “offset” in the US) for 
unavoidable adverse impacts that remain after all minimisation measures have been exercised.   
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A developer that has convinced the Corps that no reasonable alternative exists to the 
development of a wetland, and that the design minimises harm, must demonstrate that other 
wetlands, of “similar functions and values”, and in a specified “service area” (determined by 
the Army Corps of Engineers), have been “protected, enhanced, or restored” to compensate 
for those that will be damaged (compensatory mitigation). (See Salzman & Ruhl, 2002; Bayon, 
2002; Bayon, 2004.)  In theory, for every hectare of wetland destroyed, a hectare (and usually 
more) of comparable wetland must be restored or recreated within the defined “service area”.  
The law and its attendant regulations further state that developers can fulfil their 
“compensatory mitigation” obligations themselves (usually at or near the development site), or 
they can pay third parties to do this in their stead.  If they decide to pay someone else to do the 
work, they have several options: (1) They can buy “wetland credits” from a mitigation bank, a 
(usually) for-profit entity that “creates, enhances, or restores” a wetland and then is allowed by 
the Corps to sell credits for these wetlands –measured in acres– to needy developers; or (2) 
they can pay fees established by the Corps to public entities or private not-for-profit 
organisations that, in agreement with the Corps, use the money to “protect, enhance, or 
restore” wetlands (these are known as “in-lieu-fee” arrangements); or (3) They can pay a third 
party that is neither a mitigation bank nor an in-lieu fee provider to undertake the mitigation 
(these are referred to as “ad-hoc” arrangements). (See Bayon, 2004.) 
 
Box 6: Growth of wetland mitigation banking in the USA 
     1992/93  2001/02 
Approved banks    46   219 
Wetlands restored   17,664 acres  139,896 acres 
Participating states   18   40 
Size of banks (% > 100 acres)  35%   57% 
Private commercial banks  1   135 
Source: Wilkinson and Kennedy (2002). 
 
In the US, these laws have led to the creation of a whole new industry, with dozens of new 
businesses making a living by fulfilling the wetland mitigation obligations of developers.  
Indeed, recent studies show that wetland mitigation banking in particular has grown rapidly 
over the last decade (see Box 6).  As we discussed in section 3.1, it is important to note that 
some organisations question these figures.  There are many critics of wetlands trading and 
mitigation banking in the US.  They believe that, not only has the policy failed to achieve its “no 
net loss” goal, but that it may be hiding a continued loss of these important ecosystems.  
NWF’s Julie Sibbing, for instance, points out that, while the US Clean Water Act requires 
developers to seek to “avoid and minimise” damage to wetlands before considering offsets, in 
practice “this is simply not happening and nor do I think it ever really will”.  She also says that 
many wetlands regulators in the US will “readily admit that they allow wetlands to be 
destroyed that could have been avoided because they feel it is just easier to require mitigation 
than to say ‘no’.”  In support of this, she states that, “currently, 99.9% of permits to fill wetlands 
are granted, proving that avoidance is not being applied. Yet all those wetlands are being 
destroyed with only 20% of the mitigation succeeding. How,” she asks, “is this a win for the 
environment?” 
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In terms of mitigation banks, Sibbing argues that “wetland mitigation banks have yet to be 
evaluated for ecological success, but there is absolutely no reason to think that they are any 
more successful ecologically than project-specific wetlands mitigation.  They are typically 
providing different wetland types and are far from the impact project, making the chance that 
they are successfully compensating for project impacts extremely remote.”  She is, however, 
quick to point out that her organisation, the National Wildlife Federation, “certainly does not 
oppose all offsets”, but rather believes it is important to recognise their many pitfalls. 
 
Box 7: The Inland Sea Shorebird Reserve: a wetland offset to 
mitigate on-site habitat losses associated with Rio Tinto's 
Kennecott Utah Copper mine  
Kennecott Utah Copper mine, a wholly owned subsidiary of Rio Tinto Plc, is North America’s 
largest copper mine. Until the mid-1990s, Kennecott focused its efforts on producing copper, 
molybdenum, gold and silver from the Bingham Canyon Mine that lies 28 miles southwest of 
Salt Lake City, Utah. But at that point, the company needed additional storage capacity for 
“tailings” wastes: sand-sized mineral particles that are an uneconomical by-product from the 
milling of copper ores. After exploring a number of options, the company purchased an area 
of degraded saltpans and industrial land adjacent to its main tailings impoundment along the 
south shore of the Great Salt Lake.  However, this property contained designated wetland 
habitat and, as described in Box 7, Kennecott was required by U.S. law to offset, or mitigate, 
the loss of wetlands by creation of an agreed number and value of habitat units.  In the event, 
Kennecott Utah Copper Corporation went beyond its regulatory obligations to create a 2,500-
acre (1,011-hectare) shorebird and waterfowl refuge.  
A wetland mitigation plan was developed in coordination with a Technical Advisory 
Committee (TAC), comprising representatives from the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources, 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Environmental Protection Agency, the Nature Conservancy, 
National Audubon Society and the US Army Corps of Engineers.  The plan established 
Kennecott’s obligations for mitigation construction, operation, maintenance and 
monitoring. The TAC felt Habitat Evaluation Procedures (a modelling system developed by 
US Fish and Wildlife Service) would provide the basis for replacement of habitat function 
and value to wildlife.  HEP results in Habitat Units (HU) as the currency for project/mitigation 
exchange.  A one-to-one HU ratio was determined to be adequate for this site.  
The mitigation plan was based upon providing similar or enhanced wetland habitats as 
compensation for impacts to wetlands covered by the Clean Water Act on the tailings 
impoundment project site.  Nesting and migratory shorebirds and waterfowl were identified 
as the key elements requiring mitigation due to the project site’s proximity to Great Salt 
Lake, which is part of the Western Hemispheric Shorebird Reserve Network.  
Although 1,055 acres (427 hectare) of wetlands were impacted by the project and the 
regulator had settled on a one-to-one ratio, Kennecott decided on a larger voluntary offset, 
aiming to enhance and restore a landscape within which the wetlands would be more likely 
to succeed in conservation terms.  The company initially identified and purchased 2,500 
acres (1,011 hectares) for the wetlands mitigation less than a kilometre from the project 
site. The site’s suitability was based upon the criteria of sufficient acreage, geographical and 
ecological similarity to the impacted area, water availability to sustain aquatic communities 
and adequacy of food support.  
Construction of the wetland mitigation site started in May 1996 and was completed in 
January 1997. Water flowed into the mitigation site in February 1997 and the property 
officially became referred to as the Inland Sea Shorebird Reserve (ISSR). More than 100 
species, including avocets, egrets, curlews, cinnamon teal and snowy plovers, a species 
that is becoming scarce, now use the wetlands that inundate a landscape that was formerly 
used for grazing and salt evaporation ponds.  Results from a five-year monitoring against 
baseline data indicate that the mitigation plan has increased wildlife values substantially. 
Bird surveys point to a 1,000-fold increase in bird use over the baseline numbers for the 
same site.  
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In 1997, because of the initial success, the site was expanded from 2,500 acres (1,011 
hectares) to more than 3,600 acres (1,460 hectares) and four ponds were added that will 
remain as a bird reserve in perpetuity as well as act as a wetland mitigation bank for impacts 
from other projects affecting wetlands in the same watershed.  In 2004, Great Salt Lake-
Gilbert Bay was identified as an Important Bird Area for National Audubon where the ISSR is 
a significant contribution to bird use. In the long-term, the company plans to hand the site 
over to National Audubon to become part of its large bird reserve and eight-mile (14-
kilometre) contiguous shoreline habitat.  
Sources: http://biodiversityeconomics.org/business/handbook/hand-01-30.htm, 
http://www.audubon.org/bird/iba/utah/ and http://www.kennecott.com/library_reports_rpt7.htm; 
http://www.manomet.org/WHSRN/viewsite.php?id=36; and personal communication with Ann Neville 
Senior Environmental Specialist Kennecott Utah Copper Corporation and David Richards, Principal 
Advisor, Environment, Rio Tinto, August 2004. 
 
4.2.2 Conservation Banking in the US, under the Endangered Species 
Act 
Also in the US, at the level of species, a similar process is evolving as a result of certain 
provisions of the 1973 Endangered Species Act (ESA).  
Under the ESA, it is illegal to undertake any development activity that will “take” (i.e., harass, 
harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any 
such conduct) a species listed as endangered or threatened under the ESA, without first 
obtaining “incidental take authorization” through section 7 or 10 of the ESA from the Fish and 
Wildlife Service (FWS) or the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). Section 10 of the ESA 
requires the landowner to prepare a Habitat Conservation Plan that, among other things, must 
“minimize and mitigate the impacts” of the activity to receive an incidental take permit. Many 
of these project applicants seeking “take” through both section 7 and section 10, propose to 
mitigate the impacts of their activities through what are essentially biodiversity offsets. 
(Personal communication, Deblyn Mead, USFWS.) 
Within this context, the system in the US allows developers that damage an endangered 
species to mitigate that damage by buying species-specific credits from what have become 
known as “conservation banks”.  Like the wetland mitigation banks discussed above, 
conservation banks are essentially private (usually for-profit) entities that protect specific 
species with a view to selling species mitigation credits to needy developers in the future. 
These two have become profitable businesses. 
Jessica Fox, a researcher at the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) in the US, estimates 
that there are now about 40,000 acres-worth (16,000 hectares) of conservation banks in the 
US, most of them in California, where enforcement of the ESA has been especially rigorous. 
What’s more, at the level of private businesses, many companies – including industry giants 
such as International Paper – are looking at how they can take advantage of these laws to 
make development possible at the same time that they create their own conservation banks. 
(See Box 8 on the potential benefits of conservation banks and Box 9 on International Paper 
and the Red Cockaded Woodpecker.) 
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Box 8: Potential benefits of conservation banks 
Summarising many of the potential benefits of conservation banks (benefits that could 
apply to other forms of biodiversity offsets), Bauer, Fox, and Bean (2004) write that 
“Conservation banking has a number of potential advantages over traditional approaches to 
mitigation. By completing necessary mitigation prior to project impacts, banking assures 
that the mitigation is done and done properly.  Further, in theory, banking allows mitigation 
on a larger scale, providing advance mitigation at a single large site for multiple future 
projects that would otherwise be mitigated at several smaller sites.  In addition, banking 
creates the opportunity for some landowners to turn endangered species on their property, 
or restorable habitat for such species, into assets. That turns on its head the conventional 
wisdom of many landowners that endangered species are a liability to be avoided because 
of the land use restrictions that can accompany them.  Finally, since the number of credits 
that some banks earn is a function of how successfully species or habitats are restored, 
bankers have a compelling economic incentive to do the best restoration job possible.” 
 
 
Box 9: International Paper and the Red-Cockaded Woodpecker 
In the United States, the red-cockaded woodpecker (Picoides borealis) is listed as an 
endangered species under the federal Endangered Species Act.  This means that any 
activities that might harm the birds are strictly regulated.  If you are an environmentalist, 
this is a good thing.  If you are a developer, on the other hand, this can be a problem.  As a 
result of the bird’s protected status, there are limited development options for any land 
blessed with woodpeckers, so they are something of a liability for landowners. 
Without large stands of old-growth pine forest that is regularly cleared of understorey by 
fires, the woodpeckers do not multiply and may eventually disappear.  Before the use of 
offsets, this dynamic was bad news for the woodpeckers.  If you were a landowner with no 
woodpeckers but with good potential habitat for the birds, you had an incentive to get rid of 
that habitat as soon as possible before any troublesome birds arrived on your land.  If, on 
the other hand, you already had woodpeckers on your land, your incentive was to leave the 
land alone, try to prevent fires and wait for the habitat to become unsuitable and the birds’ 
numbers to dwindle. Finally, if there were woodpeckers on your land that nobody knew 
about, there was a strong financial incentive for you to get rid of the birds before anyone 
found out they were there.  "The incentives and disincentives", says Michael Bean, a Senior 
Attorney at Environmental Defense, "were really skewed." 
To address these perverse incentives, the US Fish and Wildlife Service set up a programme 
known as "Safe Harbour".  This programme allowed landowners to work with the US 
government to determine the extent of endangered species on their land, to establish a Habitat 
Conservation Plan (HCP), and to reach an agreement with the government that would limit their 
liabilities as a result of endangered species to an established baseline.  The Safe Harbour rules 
also set the stage for the creation and use of offsets and mitigation.  Landowners who increase 
the number of woodpeckers on their land beyond their baseline can obtain credits that the 
government has decided can be sold or transferred to others falling below their baseline.  What 
was once a potential liability had now become a potential asset. 
In 1998, International Paper (IP), one of the world's largest pulp and paper companies and 
one of the largest private landholders in the US, took advantage of the Safe Harbour 
legislation and completed a Habitat Conservation Plan for red-cockaded woodpeckers on 
the company's land.  They found that IP's timberlands across five states in the US Southeast 
were inhabited by 18 red-cockaded woodpecker (RCW) clusters (the common term used to 
measure the bird's populations since it nests in family groups). These populations were 
sometimes located in small, degraded and fragmented forests, making their long-term 
survival questionable.  Through discussions with the US Fish and Wildlife Service, 
Environmental Defense and others, IP realised that it might be able to take advantage of 
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offsets to manage its woodpecker problems.  If the company could somehow aggregate its 
18 groups of woodpeckers onto one plot of land, it could free up some of its other 
woodpecker-inhabited lands for development. But moving woodpeckers is not an easy 
proposition (many birds don't survive the voyage or simply fly away once they have been 
re-settled) so IP decided that the best way to achieve its goals was to breed woodpeckers in 
a new location and use the new birds to offset any harm that might befall the other 
woodpeckers on its lands.  IP therefore decided to look around for a suitable place to set up 
a "woodpecker conservation bank".  It found the perfect spot in the Southlands Forest 
Preserve, southwest Georgia.  
The Southlands Forest Preserve site comprises 5,300 acres of suitable woodpecker habitat, 
with large stands of 70-90-year-old longleaf pines and a relatively sparse under story that is 
kept clear by regular managed fires.  The company has also built nesting cavities for 
woodpeckers and transplanted woodpeckers from government-owned nature reserves in 
Georgia and Florida.  According to Environmental Defense, "The plan will benefit the 
woodpecker by proactively managing for a single large, viable RCW population at 
Southlands, and conserving the largest contiguous block of longleaf pine in the company's 
land base.  Such expanses are increasingly uncommon: only about 3 million acres remain of 
the longleaf pine ecosystem that once covered 74-92 million acres across the southern 
coastal plain.  IP's conservation bank also addresses another critical need of the RCW and 
the longleaf ecosystem: the survival of both requires active management by landowners in 
the form of prescribed fire or other means of hardwood control.  Without some 
replacement for the wildfires that once swept the Southeast, the longleaf forest becomes 
overgrown and the woodpeckers abandon it." 
In 1998, when IP began turning Southlands into a woodpecker conservation bank, there 
were only three birds on the property, all of them male and doomed to extinction.  By the 
beginning of 2003, the number of woodpeckers on the property had increased to 42, in 11 
viable "clusters".  And in July 2001, the National Audubon Society's Atlanta chapter 
designated Southlands as an Important Bird Area, making IP the first industrial landowner in 
Georgia to be so recognised.  
Since IP had 18 woodpecker clusters on company land before 1996, IP's target for 
Southlands is to have at least 18 clusters on the preserve.  When this happens, it will be able 
to offset any damage that might be done to the other to woodpeckers on its timberlands 
across the US Southeast.  In fact, it has already used existing clusters at Southlands to offset 
damage it is causing to woodpeckers on some of its other lands.  But beyond its legal 
responsibilities for offsetting, IP hopes one day to have more than 18 groups at Southlands.  
It believes the reserve can hold as many as 30 viable woodpecker clusters.  If and when that 
happens, IP will be able to sell as many as 12 excess woodpecker credits to other 
individuals or companies.  As woodpecker credits can be worth from US $150,000 to US 
$250,000 each, the red-cockaded woodpeckers at Southlands could generate from US $1.8 
million to US $3 million dollars for IP. On top of that figure could be added the financial 
benefits the company will receive from its ability to develop its original sites where 
woodpeckers were found. A bird that was once considered a financial liability is now 
perceived as an opportunity. 
 
 
Box 10: Conservation Banking in California 
Conservation banking in the US was born in the early 1990's, when the state of California 
became concerned with the fate of one particular songbird, the coastal California gnatcatcher. 
Because of increased development on the bird's preferred habitat, coastal sage scrub, it was 
shortly to be placed on the state's endangered species list.  Developers, meanwhile, were 
concerned that if this happened, their activities and a real estate boom would be curtailed, 
particularly around San Diego County, where coastal sage scrub is common.  Environmentalists, 
on the other hand, were concerned that unless gnatcatchers were protected by conservation of 
the dwindling remnants of their habitat, the bird would disappear. 
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The State of California decided that the solution was to protect those areas of coastal sage 
scrub that, because of their size, location and ecology were particularly valuable for the 
gnatcatcher.  The problem then became how to finance the acquisition of such land on the 
State’s very limited budget, which would not stretch to cover all the areas identified as 
crucial.  At the same time, local governments were prohibited by a state-wide provision 
from raising property taxes to pay for this sort of initiative.  Californians needed to find 
creative ways of financing the conservation of gnatcatcher habitat.  
In 1993, a number of coinciding events led to the innovation of conservation banking.  The 
gnatcatcher was added to the state's endangered species list at the same time that Bank of 
America - one of the world's largest banks - foreclosed on a 263-acre site in San Diego 
County known as the "Carlsbad Highlands".  This property was important habitat for the 
gnatcatcher and the bank found that its development options for the site (and therefore its 
ability to sell the land) were limited.  If it wanted to build on the land, it would have to pay 
large sums to mitigate its damage to gnatcatchers.  The return would not necessarily cover 
the bank’s costs.  So Bank of America decided to look for other ways of obtaining value from 
its land.  Also at this time, the California Department of Transportation (CalTrans) found that 
it, too, had a problem with gnatcatchers.  It was building a highway on prime gnatcatcher 
habitat and, given the bird's new endangered status, the agency was obliged to mitigate 
the damage its project might cause. The stage was set for a deal. 
CalTrans agreed to pay Bank of America an undisclosed sum to put a conservation 
easement (so that the area would never be developed) on 83 acres of its property, in return 
for a number of gnatcatcher mitigation credits.  By 1995, the Carlsbad Highlands became 
the state's first conservation bank.  It has since sold all of its available mitigation credits 
(about 180) at between US$10,000 and US$15,000 a piece. Today, in San Diego County, 
similar mitigation credits sell for upwards of US$25,000 each. 
Since the creation of the Carlsbad Highlands Conservation Bank, Californians have created 
more than 40 conservation banks on a wide variety of species and habitats.  There are even 
multi-million dollar businesses (for instance, a company called Wildlands Inc.) that specialise 
in the creation of conservation banks and the sale of mitigation credits. 
Bank of America is happy with the outcome of this process.  Candace Skarlatos, senior Vice 
President for Environmental Initiatives at Bank of America, says that, for the Bank, the 
experience was "a good one".  They were finally able to re-coup the money they had leant 
to the original owners of the Carlsbad Highlands. 
 
4.2.3 Habitats and Birds Directives and implementing 
regulations in the EU  
(See Boxes 3 and 21)  
Sources: Personal communication with James Marsden, John Finnie & David Harrison, 
English Nature, July-September 2004 
The EC Habitats Directive requires EU Member States to introduce a range of measures, 
including protection of 623 species and 169 habitats listed in Annex I and II respectively, by 
means of an ecologically coherent network of “Sites of Community Importance” (SCIs) to be 
designated as “Special Areas of Conservation” (SACs). Together with Special Protection Areas 
(SPA) classified under the Birds Directive, these sites make up the Natura 2000 network of 
European sites.  Following amendments to the EC Birds Directive, the provisions described 
below apply to SPAs as well as to SACs. 
Where a developer wants to undertake an activity which may affect a Natura 2000 site, whether 
it is to be undertaken within or outside the site, the consenting authority, which, in the UK may 
be the local planning authority or, for important or controversial decisions, the Secretary of 
State, must decide whether the project “either alone or in combination with others” (thus 
allowing cumulative effect to be taken into consideration) is likely to have a “significant effect” on 
the Natura 2000 site.  If so, a more detailed “appropriate assessment” is undertaken on the 
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implications for conservation of the features of European importance on the site.  The consenting 
authority may agree to the plan only if it can ascertain that the development will not lead to 
“adverse effects on the integrity of the site”.  
Where there will be no such adverse effect, the requirements of the Habitats Directive are 
satisfied, and the issue becomes one of national planning and conservation law.  Permission 
for the project may yet be rejected on landscape grounds or for reasons unconnected to 
conservation.  As described in Box 11, planning authorities and companies may agree 
biodiversity offsets as a form of “planning gain”.  
Where the authority is unable to establish that the proposed development will not have an 
adverse effect on the integrity of the site, it must consider whether the project could be 
changed – for instance, through relocation, use of different materials or seasonal restrictions, 
so as to avoid adversely affecting the integrity of the site.  The developer may also be able to 
show that, while the project site will be harmed, it will offset the harm by positive conservation 
measures elsewhere within the Natura 2000 site, so that it is possible to conclude that its 
integrity will not be adversely affected or there is a net positive effect.  In this case, the 
Habitats Directive is satisfied. 
However, if the developer cannot change its project through mitigation or an offset within the 
Natura 2000 site itself, thus avoiding an “adverse effects on the integrity of the site”, the 
project may proceed only in the (extremely rare) circumstances that there were no alternatives 
available and “ imperative reasons of overriding public interest” why it should do so.  In such 
cases, another form of offset is required by the Habitats Directive.  In the UK, this inevitably 
involves a decision of the Secretary of State, who must secure compensatory measures to 
replace the habitat affected.  The government expects the developer to bear the costs of these 
measures.  The aim of the compensatory conservation measures is “to ensure that the overall 
coherence of the Natura 2000 is protected”.  
The Directive is not explicit that the replacement habitat must be as near to the site from which 
the habitat is lost as possible or that it should be exactly the same in all respects as that lost.  It 
does state that the measures must "ensure that the overall coherence of Natura 2000 is 
protected".  It would appear to be easier to satisfy this requirement if the replacement habitat 
is of the same type, equivalent in quality and quantity and as near as possible to the damaged 
site (coherence being judged not just by extent but by distribution).  In the case of location, if it 
is not possible to find or secure a suitable location for the recreation of the habitat required in 
the immediate vicinity, there is nothing in the Directive to prevent those concerned from 
widening the search further, presumably even to other EU countries, subject to the 
"coherence" point.  With respect to the similarity of the replacement habitat, the Directive 
does not appear to leave much scope in "ensuring overall coherence" for replacing ancient 
woodland with saltmarsh, for example. 
4.2.4 Offsets in Brazil under the Forest Regulation and National 
System of Conservation Units  
(Sources: Lei No 4771 of 1965; Lei No 14.247 of 22/7/2002, Lei No 9.985 of 18/7/2000, 
Decreto No. 4.340 of 22/8/2002, Brazil’s First national report for the Convention on 
Biological Diversity http://www.mma.gov.br/biodiversidade/doc/ and personal 
communication, Juliana Rudich Rehfeld, Anglo American, Brazil) 
Two Brazilian laws are particularly relevant to biodiversity offsets: trade in forest set-asides 
and industry contribution of a share of investment budgets to government, to support 
Conservation Units. 
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Trade in forest set-asides 
The Brazilian Forest Code of 1965 (Law 4771) requires at least 20% of the native vegetation on 
each property larger than 50 hectares in the eastern, central-west and southern regions to be 
set aside and preserved as a Legal Forest Reserve, where only sustainable forestry practices 
are permitted.  The law classed forests in the north and northern central-west (Amazonia) as 
“primitive”, where at least 50% (increased to 80% in 1996) of natural vegetation must be 
preserved in this way.  The vegetation conserved must be representative of the area.  
In the areas where the 20% rule applies, if a landowner does not wish to set aside the relevant 
proportion of the land within the property, the owner must buy similar land in the 
neighbourhood.  If this offset area is outside the original “microregion” or “hydrographic 
basin”, the area that the landowner must acquire increases (in the first category of regions) to 
30%.  Detailed provisions at the state level encourage landowners in these cases to establish 
vegetation corridors. 
Industry contribution to Conservation Units 
A system of national and state laws, referred to as the “National System of Conservation Units” 
(SNUC) states that, where the competent environmental authority licensing a project proposed 
by an enterprise considers that the enterprise will have a significant environmental impact, the 
enterprise must compensate for the impacts of the project by supporting the SNUC. 
Enterprises must pay “no less than 0.5%” of the total anticipated investment costs.  The exact 
sum will be fixed by the competent environmental authority, based on the degree of 
environmental impact the development project will cause.  Case-by-case negotiations have 
discussed 2-3% of investments, and in rainforest areas, this proportion may be above 6%.  The 
sum will be used at whichever Conservation Units within the category “Units of Complete 
Protection” the authority decides.  
At the national level in Brazil, there are 45 million hectares of Conservation Units, in 31 Federal 
Environmental Protection Areas, 25 extractive reserves, 25 biological reserves, 29 ecological 
reserves, 60 National Forests, 19 Areas of Relevant Ecological Interest, 51 National Parks and 
364 Special Reserves of Natural Patrimony (on private land) and 22 million hectares more of 
land in various kinds of Conservation Units at the State level. 
Within the Goiás State law, for example, which establishes a State System of Conservation 
Units (SEUC), a “Unit of Conservation” (UC) is defined as land and its environmental resources, 
including water, legally instituted by the State with the objectives of conservation under a 
special administrative regime. UCs are of two kinds, various categories of “Units of Complete 
Protection” (including ecological stations and state parks, national monuments and forest 
refuges), are subject to various conditions and restrictions established in each UC’s 
management plan; and other categories of “Units of Sustainable Use”.  The objectives of the 
State system include establishing criteria and rules for the creation, implementation and 
management of State UCs.  The SEUC will be organised by rules that secure representative 
samples of ecologically significant different populations, habitats and ecosystems of state 
territory to safeguard the biological patrimony.  Society is to be involved in policy development 
on UCs, with local populations and stakeholders and interested sectors of society involved in 
the implementation of UCs.  The SEUC will seek the support and cooperation of NGOs and 
private organisations and individuals to develop studies, research, environmental education, 
ecotourism, monitoring and maintenance and other activities associated with managing UCs.  
Local communities and private organisations are encouraged to establish and run UCs within 
the state system. The State will seek to protect large areas of land by integrating together UCs 
of different categories that are nearby or contiguous and their respective buffer zones and 
ecological corridors, integrating different conservation activities with sustainable use of 
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natural resources, restoration and recuperation of ecosystem services and respecting 
property rights.  When appropriate, ecological corridors will be established. 
4.2.5 Federal Law for the Protection of Nature and Landscape in 
Switzerland 
Sources: www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/451/a18.html) and personal communication, Raymond 
Lebeau, Head of the Ecological Compensation chapter, Swiss Agency for Environment, 
Forests and Landscape, September 2004. 
This law mandates “reconstitution” or “replacement” of protected biotopes where impacts are 
unavoidable.  Article 18 concerns the protection of animal and plant species and provides that, 
if, having taking all factors into consideration, it is impossible to avoid harm to protected 
biotopes, the author of the harm must take special measures to assure the best protection 
possible, its reconstitution, or, if this is not possible, “adequate replacement”.  
4.2.6 No net loss of fisheries habitat in Canada under the Fisheries Act  
Source: http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/canwaters-eauxcan/infocentre/guidelines-
conseils/guides/fhmcons/fishac_e.asp 
The Canadian Fisheries Act (1985) and associated policy guidelines prohibit the destruction of 
fish habitat, including spawning grounds and nursery, rearing, food supply and migration areas 
on which fish depend, directly or indirectly.  However, the Act also recognises that harm to fish 
habitat cannot always be avoided or mitigated.  Based on the principle of no net loss, the 
Canadian government has developed guidelines to allow development to take place while 
conserving and protecting fish habitat. These guidelines include the legal requirement for 
developers to specify mitigation and/or compensation measures proposed to alleviate 
potential impacts, and/or to compensate for any loss in the capacity of habitat to produce fish.  
A hierarchy of preferred options has been identified which includes (in descending order of 
preference): 
? relocation - physically moving a project, or part of a project, to eliminate adverse impacts 
on fish habitat; 
? redesign - so that a project no longer has negative impacts on fish habitat; 
? mitigation - where relocation and redesign are not possible; and 
? compensation - replacing damaged habitat with newly created habitat or improving the 
productive capacity of some other natural habit. 
“Compensation” is the least preferred option. Moreover, there is a hierarchy of compensation 
options, which include (again, in descending order of preference): 
? create similar habitat at or near the development site within the same ecological unit;  
? create similar habitat in a different ecological unit that supports the same stock or species;  
? increase the productive capacity of existing habitat at or near the development site and 
within the same ecological unit;  
? increase the productive capacity of a different ecological unit that supports the same stock 
or species; and 
? increase the productive capacity of existing habitat for a different stock or a different 
species of fish either on or off site. 
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4.3 Facilitating law and policy that can trigger 
negotiations on offsets 
In addition to regulations that specifically require offsets, other laws and policy can trigger 
negotiations between developers and regulators that lead to compensatory conservation 
activities. This section will start by exploring how biodiversity offsets can arise from 
discussions associated with environmental impact assessments, planning law and negotiation 
of the terms and conditions in concession agreements between developers and host 
governments. It will then describe the likely scenario that policy-makers may draw on a range 
of enabling legal provisions to bring about biodiversity offsets. We illustrate this point with the 
example of Australia. 
4.3.1 Environmental Impact Assessments 
Many of our interviewees felt that Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) provide ample room 
for negotiation of biodiversity offsets.  As José Carlos Fernandez of the National Ecology Institute 
in Mexico explains, “EIA gives you lots of room to manoeuvre.  It is generally used to negotiate 
compensation with developers in Mexico.”  
In Uganda, there is a similar situation.  The Investment Code requires all developers to carry out 
an EIA on proposed projects.  The Uganda Investment Authority (UIA) puts developers in touch 
with registered practitioners who carry out the EIA and send it to the National Environment 
Management Authority (NEMA) for approval.  NEMA and other relevant lead agencies review the 
report and decide whether or not to approve the project.  Upon approval, the developer receives 
an EIA Certificate of Approval accompanied by an Environmental Compliance Agreement that 
stipulates the conditions of approval.  According to Alice Ruhweza, “These are used to require 
on-site remediation.  Now we require developers also to offset the harm that they cannot avoid 
by on-site remediation through off-site conservation measures.  You don’t necessarily need a 
special law on offset.  The policy framework for biodiversity offsets is there.”   
From companies’ perspective, the detailed site environmental management plan is generally 
linked to issues that arise during the EIA.  As Steven de Bie of Shell explains, “the rehabilitation 
activities that Shell undertakes depend on what was found in the EIA. That’s a good time to 
establish which compensation activities would work best.”  
While there was general agreement that EIA can stimulate biodiversity offsets, several 
interviewees suggested that some basic conditions need to be in place for EIA to work as a 
trigger.  They felt that supplementary guidelines would be helpful and raised some caveats.  
Firstly, the EIA system itself needs to be robust and transparent, so that biodiversity offset 
negotiations take place, and so that offsets are not seen as attempts to “buy-off” officials.  
Secondly, it would help for policy guidance to be available to provide a clear basis for offsets.  
This would not only clarify to regulators and companies what was expected of them, but also, as 
José Carlos Fernandez put it, “embed the concept in their thinking and make it real”.  
Additionally, it was pointed out that EIAs are conducted on a timescale that frequently does not 
synchronise with the biodiversity being studied.  For instance, it may take more than a year to 
understand potential seasonal impacts and to consider which aspects of a site’s biodiversity are 
priorities for conservation efforts.  By contrast, EIAs are often completed within a period of six to 
nine months.  Finally, some conservation organisations have expressed concerns that, since EIAs 
are usually paid for and approved by the companies causing the environmental damage, they 
may underestimate the damage caused or the offsets needed to compensate for said damage. 
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4.3.2 Planning law 
In many countries, the planning process, with its formal system of applications and enquiries, 
offers another potential trigger for dialogue on biodiversity offsets between developers and 
regulators.  Indeed, environmental and social conditions are often required as a condition for 
planning approval, or as a form of “planning gain”.   For instance, in the UK, section 106 of the 
Town and Country Planning Act has often been used by authorities to require developers to 
undertake compensatory conservation activities. (See Box 11).  
Just as with EIAs, however, certain underlying conditions may be needed for this trigger to 
work.  As one interviewee put it, “any weaknesses in the underlying systems would make a 
credible system of biodiversity offsets difficult”.  
 
Box 11: Using chapter 106 for biodiversity offsets in the UK 
A lake in perpetuity and £1m saved 
Northumbrian Water wished to develop a new sewage treatment works for Newcastle on 
land that was not protected, but was of recognised conservation value, even though it was 
subsequently found to be contaminated with asbestos.  In its planning application, the 
company showed survey works and proposed to create a wetland, including a 200m long 
lake with a bird hide and access arrangements enabling bird species to be monitored.  It 
also planned to cap the asbestos with the clay that was excavated for the sewage works.  
Under chapter 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act, the planning authority wrote the 
creation of the lake into the planning permission, and has a seat on the management 
committee in perpetuity.  The additional costs to the company of building the lake and 
bearing the costs for its maintenance in perpetuity were covered under the operational 
budget and were not particularly significant relative to the costs of the project as a whole.  
Indeed, the use of the clay to cap the asbestos saved the company over UK£1m, as it was 
not necessary to remove and dispose of 14,000 lorry loads of clay from the site.  
Voles and grouse in the Pennines 
Chapter 106 discussions have also led to off-site conservation measures.  In the Pennines, 
Northumbrian Water hoped to build a water treatment works on land within one of the UK ‘s 
designated “Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty” (AONB).  English Nature, as the statutory 
compensation body, recognised that the conservation benefits that could be generated on-
site were limited, so the parties agreed to conservation measures including the recreation of 
habitat for water voles on-site, and a £50,000 offset for the conservation of black grouse in the 
Pennines.  English Nature were able to satisfy the authorities that the entire package being 
offered by the company merited planning permission, when this is rarely allowed in AONBs. 
 
4.3.3 Concession agreements 
In many countries, laws related to mining, energy and utilities require developers in these and 
other industry sectors to obtain permits and licenses from particular government 
departments.  Going by a range of different names, “concession agreements”, “host 
government agreements” and “production sharing agreements” are contracts between 
governments and developers that predominantly address the scale of the operations and the 
financial benefits for the government, but that often address applicable environmental laws 
and standards. Biodiversity offsets can form part of such agreements.  In many jurisdictions, 
mining concession agreements between host governments and companies require 
rehabilitation of mine sites to an ecological status close to that before the concession was 
granted. In some cases, companies agree to undertake conservation activities to offset or 
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compensate for the difference between the best possible rehabilitation and the pre-mine state 
(i.e. to offset any environmental damage that cannot be avoided, minimised and remediated). 
In other cases, companies have proposed to host country governments that funds earmarked 
for rehabilitating the mine-site to a ‘pristine’ state would better be dedicated to conservation 
of a larger area around the mine (e.g. supporting a national park), combined with less 
adequate but less stringent rehabilitation of the mine site itself.  Similar agreements can (and 
have) been struck with companies extracting oil, gas, and timber. (See ten Kate, 2003.) 
4.3.4 Policy that builds on a number of legal provisions 
Policy-makers wishing to promote biodiversity offsets may not need to restrict themselves 
to  just one policy or regulatory trigger for offset negotiations.  Indeed, governments that 
wish to encourage developers to conduct biodiversity offsets without introducing a 
specific piece of legislation may draw on a range of legal and policy provisions, embracing 
environmental impact assessments, planning law, the law concerning concessions and 
conservation law.  Box 12 describes how different Australian states are using this 
approach to promote biodiversity offsets.  In Uganda, the National Environment 
Management Authority is using not only law and policy on investment and environmental 
impact assessment to promote biodiversity offsets (see section 4.3.1), but also provisions 
relating to the management and conservation of wetlands, land-use planning and 
protection of natural heritage sites within Uganda’s 1995 National Environment Act 
(Ruhweza, personal communication).  
 
Box 12: Summary of some recent policy on offsets in Australia  
Commonwealth law  
Various pieces of legislation in Australia (including the Commonwealth Environmental 
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999) that make provision for approval of 
activities that will result in damage to biodiversity (such as the clearing of vegetation or 
taking of specific species of fauna and flora) include conditions that relate to making good 
that damage which could be used as the basis for establishing biodiversity offsets.  
New South Wales 
A State-wide scheme of “Green offsets” to ensure net environmental improvement as a result of 
development for water and air pollution and for clearing native vegetation (taking into 
consideration the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997).  In addition, the National Parks and 
Wildlife Service has been working with Planning-NSW to offset the impact of major government 
infrastructure projects such as highway and railway construction.  And the NSW Fisheries has a 
policy of “no net loss” for developments that damage aquatic habitat.  (See Box 13). 
Victoria 
Victoria’s Minister for Environment and Conservation, Sherryl Garbutt MP, explains “We 
have adopted the policy of achieving a Net Gain in extent and quality of native vegetation” 
(Victorian Government, 2002).  She goes on to explain that “a priority for implementing Net 
Gain is to avoid clearing.  Where flexibility is required to support landholders as they move 
towards more sustainable land use and limited clearing is permitted, a rigorous process of 
ensuring achievement of the Net Gain principles must be pursued through strict application 
of the offset requirements.” (See Box 22). 
Western Australia 
The recently amended Environmental Protection Act, relating to the clearing of native 
vegetation, makes specific reference to environmental offsets. Section 51H (1) states that 
“A clearing permit may be granted subject to such conditions as the CEO considers to be 
necessary or convenient for the purposes of preventing, controlling, abating or mitigating 
environmental harm or offsetting the loss of the cleared vegetation.” The holder of a 
clearing permit may be required to take specific measures to “establish and maintain 
vegetation on land other than land cleared under the permit in order to offset the loss of the 
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cleared vegetation, or make monetary contributions to a fund maintained for the purpose of 
establishing or maintaining vegetation” (section 51 I (2)(b)). In July 2004, Western Australia 
released a Preliminary Position Statement (no.9) on Environmental Offsets, to provide 
advice to stakeholders about the intent and appropriate use of environmental offsets.  
Southern Australia 
The Native Vegetation Act 1991 states that the Native Vegetation Council (NVC) established 
by the Act may impose conditions when consenting to native vegetation clearance. If native 
vegetation is cleared, then a “set-aside” formula of 10 hectares for every hectare cleared is 
applied. The NVC may also grant consent and impose conditions in some circumstances 
only if it is “satisfied that the environmental benefits that will be provided by the vegetation 
significantly outweigh the environmental benefits provided by the vegetation to be cleared” 
(chapter 29(11)).  In addition, the NVC has adopted a general policy that any consent given 
will be accompanied by conditions requiring action to significantly offset the effects of 
clearance.  A “Point Scoring System” is applied to clearing assessments of scattered trees in 
order to establish the set-aside formula. (See Baird, 2003.) 
Sources: www.dlwc.nsw.gov.au/acre/salinity/offsets.html; www.epa.nsw.gov.au/licensing; 
www.epa.nsw.gov.au/air/actionforair/index.htm; www.dlwc.new.gov.au/care/water/sharing/; 
www.dwlc.nsw.gov.au/care/es_scheme.html; www.npws.nsw.gov.au/wildlife/biodiversity_defn.html; 
www.planning.nsw.gov.au; http://www.epa.wa.gov.au/docs/1863_Offsets%20PS9.pdf; 
New South Wales Government, 2002; New South Wales Government, 2001; Victorian Government, 
2002; McCarthy et al, 2004; Parkes et al, 2004; 
http://www.calm.wa.gov.au/biocon_act_pubsubs_summary.pdf 
Personal communication with Ken Atkins, Department of Conservation and Land Management, 
Western Australia, Marc Carter, Department of the Environment and Heritage, Australia and Tony 
Baird, Western Power, Australia 
 
 
Box 13: Principles for Green Offsets in New South Wales 
Australia’s New South Wales government aims to harness market forces through economic 
instruments to promote sustainable development in the state.  In 2002, the state 
government produced an information paper on “Green Offsets”, and introduced the first 
five Green Offset initiatives in the same year.  Green offsets for water and air pollution and 
for clearing native vegetation are defined as “an action taken outside a development site 
(but near to it) that reduces pollution or environmental impacts. The developers either take 
the action themselves or pay for others to do it on their behalf”. The aim of the scheme is to 
ensure that there is a net environmental improvement as a result of development. Several 
criteria are described for Green Offsets: 
Principles of offsets: 
? Environmental impacts must be avoided first by using all cost-effective prevention and 
mitigation measures. Offsets are then only used to address remaining environmental 
impacts. 
? All standard regulatory requirements must still be met. 
? Offsets must never reward ongoing poor environmental performance. 
? Offsets will complement other government programmes. 
? Offsets must result in a net environmental improvement. 
Offsets must be: 
? Enduring – they must offset the impact of the development for the period that the 
impact occurs. 
? Quantifiable – the impacts and benefits must be reliably estimated. 
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? Targeted – they must offset the impacts on a “like for like or better” basis. 
? Located appropriately – they must offset the impact in the same area. 
? Supplementary – beyond existing requirements and not already being funded under 
another scheme. 
? Enforceable – through development consent conditions, licence conditions, covenants 
or a contract. 
 
4.4 Mandatory or voluntary systems? 
Our interviews revealed a range of views as to the viability of voluntary biodiversity offsets and 
the respective advantages and disadvantages of mandatory and voluntary policy frameworks.  
Regulatory frameworks such as the Clean Water Act and the Endangered Species Act in the US 
are powerful incentives for offsetting behaviour and they have certain key advantages – as well 
as a few disadvantages – over a more voluntary approach to biodiversity offsets.  The 
purported advantage of such laws is that developers are clear about the nature, scope, and 
sometimes even the cost, of their obligations.  Likewise, developers and businesses know that 
these laws apply equally to all businesses and competitors, so that engaging in offsets need 
not put them at a competitive disadvantage.  However, the prescriptive nature of some laws 
limits flexibility and may remove the chance for the parties involved to design offsets that are 
most beneficial for biodiversity. (See Box 3). 
Several interviewees pointed out that a legal requirement for biodiversity offsets exist in so 
few countries that “the voluntary approach means [the company] can make a contribution with 
respect to a much larger area, in terms of hectares”, as Chris Herlugson of BP put it.  
However, the US interviewees were almost unanimous in their scepticism that biodiversity 
offsets would work on a voluntary basis. Several felt that regulatory intervention was needed 
to trigger conservation banking and create a market.  As Doug Lashley of Greenvest put it, 
“People stop at intersections only if there is a stop sign”.  Bob Brumbaugh, of the Army Corps 
of Engineers, expands the point: “The system is predicated on demand.  And that is only there 
because of government regulation”.  David Brand of Hancock Natural Resources in Australia 
concurs.  “In these areas, change will not happen voluntarily.  It will be driven by government 
regulation.  If there is no regulation, then there is no incentive to buy offsets”. Furthermore, 
clarity on policy helps create markets, as the wetlands example shows. Another 
knowledgeable observer explains that “on wetlands, there are federal laws, but in other areas, 
the legal regime is diffuse and not co-ordinated, with a bifurcation between federal and state 
governments.  California has well-defined laws that create the infrastructure for species 
banking.  Therefore it has fifty endangered species/habitat banks while the rest of country has 
ten.”  Robert Bonnie of Environmental Defense spoke for several interviewees who felt that 
regulation was needed to create markets.  “A lot of the voluntary mitigation is actually 
anticipating forthcoming regulatory regime.  There are specific examples of this in carbon 
offset projects (e.g. those done in Mississippi by Entergy and AEP). Without any risk of future 
regulation, most of these would probably not have happened.”  
Additionally, US interviewees felt that without regulation to back it up, offsetting activity is 
likely to be fickle, and the first thing to go in hard times.  As Richard Herd, a consultant who 
used to work for Allegheny Power, explained, “When we were all making money, there was 
room for all of this [conservation].  Now, there is not.  It is ‘back to basics’: survival.  There is a 
dramatic difference between legal offsets and voluntary conservation.  One is driven by 
regulation and to save money.  The other is generally driven by Public Relations.”  In the US, he 
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concludes, doing offsets has required having proper regulation, but, adds that “there may be a 
cultural difference [on this] between the US and Europe.” 
A cultural difference may indeed explain the noticeable difference in approach between the US 
and other interviewees, who were generally more ready than their US counterparts to voice 
the business case for voluntary biodiversity offsets. 
However, another explanation may be found in their areas of experience and thus vision for 
how biodiversity offsets might work in the future.  Most of the US interviewees were 
representatives from companies involved in conservation banking, wetlands trading and 
carbon offsets, or regulators who have established and administer these systems.  Their 
picture is one of “buying and selling offsets” and a formal system of trading at the state, federal 
or even international levels. They tend to view regulatory systems as linked to profit and 
voluntary initiatives as not-for-profit and linked to public relations. The interviewees from other 
parts of the world were mostly of two kinds.  Some were policy-makers in jurisdictions without 
formal conservation or wetland banking and trading systems. Others were from multinational 
companies, whose operations have an impact on biodiversity and for whom license to operate 
– both formal concessions from governments and social license from communities – are key to 
business success. Their view of biodiversity offsets is that best practice on biodiversity – 
possibly including offsets, whether mandatory or voluntary – is important to access land, 
maintain reputation and operate efficiently, with motivated staff, shareholders satisfied that 
the business model is viable in the long term, and the avoidance of interference and disruption 
from NGOs and local communities.  
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5 Why biodiversity offsets? The 
business case 
Chapter 2 outlined biodiversity offsets as activities designed to compensate for unavoidable 
harm to biodiversity that may result from development activities. Chapter 3 described some 
potential advantages of biodiversity offsets.  Chapter 4 examined one of the two main 
motivations or triggers for organisations to undertake biodiversity offsetting activities: 
regulations that mandate offsets and law that facilitates but does not require them.  
In the absence of a legal requirement to do so, what is the motivation for a company 
voluntarily to choose to offset its unavoidable impacts on biodiversity?  After all, undertaking 
offsetting activities will involve time and money.  In the absence of specific legislation, this cost 
may not be borne by companies who do not see the business case for getting involved.  
Volunteer companies could arguably find themselves at a potential competitive disadvantage.  
In addition, companies that undertake biodiversity offsets on a voluntary basis expose 
themselves to the difficulty of reaching agreement on a complex and novel issue and to the 
reputational risks associated with failure.  
This chapter will explore the various components that make up this “business case” for 
biodiversity offsets and some of the barriers that prevent them from doing so more frequently.  
It also provides examples of current practice in this field by a variety of companies. 
5.1 The business case  
Companies may be motivated to offset the harm they cause to biodiversity on a purely 
voluntary basis, simply because it is good for business.  
5.1.1 License to operate, reputational risk, and regulatory goodwill 
The first component of the business case for biodiversity offsets is that they can contribute to 
a company’s license to operate, to regulatory goodwill, and to the company’s reputation.  
Core to the success of any company that needs access to land – whether for extraction, to lay 
cables, farm or construct roads or buildings – is the need to gain permission from relevant 
authorities to conduct business.  Additionally, they need consent from local communities that 
they will not disrupt the company’s activities and, sometimes, that they will be willing 
customers of the facilities in the future.  As one BP spokesperson put it, “Whatever we do – 
whether it is something initiated at the local or corporate level – will impact our reputation in 
some way.  Reputation is definitely related to strategic issues.  The whole perception of what 
we are and how we do things is related to the success of the company.   That’s the business 
we are in.  We have to have access to exploration areas, access to people and access to 
markets.  Reputation is a key issue”.  
Steve Botts, a representative of Antamina, a multi-stakeholder mining project in Peru, 
expressed the same thought:  “Reputation is important for new mining projects, to get state 
concessions.  If you don’t have a good reputation, you won’t get concessions.  You won’t get a 
foot in the door.” 
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“We have to have access to exploration areas, access to people 
and access to markets… Reputation is a key issue.” 
Chris Herlugson, BP 
 
But the issue goes beyond reputation.  Botts explains that one of the primary drivers for his 
company to engage in offsets is maintaining his company’s social license to operate.  “We 
need to keep stakeholders satisfied that they are deriving benefits,” he says, “or they could 
revoke our social license.  They could write letters, stop work, or encourage NGOs to make 
negative publicity against us.”  
Linked to the issue of building trust and enhancing a company’s reputation to facilitate future 
business is the whole concept of regulatory goodwill.  Many interviewees noted that an 
important benefit of voluntarily undertaking conservation measures such as biodiversity 
offsets is that it builds trust with regulators and, in the long-run, helps the companies obtain 
permits more speedily.  Steve Botts from Antamina explains: “If we do things right, this open 
doors elsewhere.  The most important driver for us is to build relationships with countries.   We 
want to show them we have a track record on the environment [in order to help secure future 
concessions].” 
Northumbrian Water described how it built trust by showing good practice over time, working 
with the National Parks and the Broads Authority for several years.  It is soon to sign a 
Memorandum of Understanding with English Nature on biodiversity conservation.  As Chris 
Spray puts it, “We have a good relationship with the regulators and they know we'll treat these 
issues seriously.”  
Rich Mogensen of Earthmark in the US has had a similar experience.  “Regulatory goodwill,” he 
says, “is an important factor [driving good environmental behaviour and offsets].  If we do 
good work and are perceived to be doing things right, we will have an easier time getting 
permits next time.”  Leah Haygood, a consultant who used to work on these issues for Waste 
Management in the US, says that best practice on conservation improved Waste 
Management’s relations with regulators and helped them obtain the necessary permits.  “It 
helped demonstrate to regulators that we did more than just minimum compliance. Obviously, 
we could never get permit writers to say this explicitly, but we received feedback from 
managers that our policy was very helpful in demonstrating goodwill [and in helping to secure 
future permits].” 
All this adds up to huge potential savings for the companies concerned.  By avoiding costly 
delays and legal expenses, and by speeding up the permit negotiation process, the companies 
save both time and money.  For instance, if the regulator, conservation agencies and NGOs are 
familiar with a company’s good practice, public enquiries can be concluded far faster than if 
evidence is contested and the company’s reputation is in doubt.  “It is much cheaper if the 
authorities say ‘we will work with you’, rather than fighting you tooth and nail”, says Chris 
Spray.  The same goes for NGOs, local communities, and other stakeholders. 
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5.1.2 Access to capital 
In addition to generating trust and increasing “regulatory goodwill”, offsets (coupled with a 
good track record on environmental issues) may also help companies gain access to the capital 
they need to finance their projects. In today’s world, where the World Bank, the IFC, the export 
credit agencies, and even a wide array of private banks (see box 14 on the Equator Principles) 
all pay attention to environmental issues when making financing decisions, a strong 
environmental track record can sometimes help in getting a loan in the quickest, easiest, and 
cheapest way possible.  
Antamina’s Botts puts it another way:  In the future, he says, those companies with the best 
technologies –and in this he includes social and environmental technologies– are the ones that 
will get the concessions and the financing. “I have no doubt,” he says, “that there will be a 
competitive advantage for companies in looking at these issues.  When looking for financing,” he 
adds, “it is important to show the financiers what capabilities your company has to make the 
project happen.”  A key part of this, he explains, is showing that the company has the ability to 
manage social and environmental issues.  To back up his point, he cites the case of Camisea, a 
large natural gas project in Peru, where, he says, one of the major financiers, the US Export-
Import Bank (US Ex-Im), is believed to have left the project in part for environmental reasons. 
 
Box 14: The Equator Principles 
The Equator Principles (“an industry approach for financial institutions in determining, 
assessing and managing environmental & social risk in project financing”) were drafted by 
ABN Amro, Barclays, Citigroup and WestLB in collaboration with the International Finance 
Corporation, the private-sector arm of the World Bank.  Six other banks - Royal Bank of 
Scotland, Credit Lyonnais, Credit Suisse First Boston, Westpac, Rabobank and HVB - also 
adopted the principles in June 2003.  In 2002, these ten banks together underwrote 
$14.5bn in project finance.  By August 2004, 27 financial institutions in over 14 countries 
have adopted the principles. 
Banks that adopt the principles, which apply to projects with a total capital cost of $50 
million or more, undertake to review carefully all proposals for which customers request 
project financing and will not provide loans directly to projects where the borrower will not 
or is unable to comply with the principles’ environmental and social policies and processes.  
Projects are assessed according to categories of risk.  For projects which fall into categories 
A and B according to IFC guidelines for environmental and social screening criteria, the 
borrower must have completed an Environmental Assessment (EA), addressing to the 
lender’s satisfaction key environmental and social issues identified during the 
categorisation process.  Among many such issues that must be addressed is “the 
protection of human health, cultural properties, and biodiversity, including endangered 
species and sensitive ecosystems”.  The EA must have taken into account the applicable IFC 
Safeguard Policies (see Box 15).  For all Category A projects, and when the lender considers 
appropriate for Category B projects, the borrower or a third party expert must have 
prepared an Environmental Management Plan (EMP) which draws on the conclusions of the 
EA, and this plan must address mitigation, action plans, monitoring, management of risk 
and schedules. The borrower covenants to comply with the EMP in the construction and 
operation of the project, provide regular reports on compliance and, where justified, 
decommission the facilities in accordance with an agreed Decommissioning Plan.  
In circumstances where a borrower is not in compliance with its environmental and social 
covenants, such that any debt financing would be in default, the lender will engage the 
borrower to seek solutions to bring it back into compliance with its covenants.  
Sources: http://www.equator-principles.com/; Demetri, 2003 
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He also believes that the Equator Principles (see Box 14) will only enhance this dynamic.   “The 
Equator principles will play a big role,” he explains. “Companies will be forced to pay attention 
[to social and environmental issues], and these things will make a difference.”  On the flip side, 
he adds, “If we do things right, we can use projects like Antamina to open doors for us 
elsewhere; as an example of how things can be done well.”  
 
Box 15: IFC and offsets: From Safeguard Policies to Performance 
Standards 
In order to ensure that projects financed by the International Finance Corporation (IFC, the 
private sector arm of the World Bank) are socially and environmentally appropriate, the IFC 
has established Safeguard Policies that, among other things, provide the framework under 
which to minimise and mitigate a project’s environmental and social risks. Based largely on 
the World Bank's operational policies, IFC adopted the Safeguard Policies in 1998 to manage 
social and environmental issues surrounding private sector businesses in emerging markets.  
In 2001, IFC management requested a review of the Safeguard Policies and they are currently 
being updated. The aim is for the policies to state clearly the IFC's minimum requirements 
applicable to all IFC projects and to make sure that the policies are streamlined and easy to use. 
As a result, the current proposal is to move away from safeguard policies and focus instead on 
performance standards. Gaps in the scope of the existing safeguards are to be addressed and 
the revised standards are to emphasize private sector considerations while ensuring 
compatibility with World Bank policies. A draft of the proposed performance standards was 
made available in August of 2004 for public consultation prior to revision and submission. 
The 10 original Safeguard Policies and the 9 proposed Performance Standards are as follows: 
 
1998 Safeguard Policies (10) 2004 draft Performance Standards (9) 
Environmental Assessment (OP 4.01, October 
1998)  
1. Social and Environmental Assessment  
Natural Habitats (OP 4.04, November 1998)  6. Conservation of Biological Diversity and 
Sustainable Natural Resource 
Pest Management (OP 4.09, November 1998)   
Forestry (OP 4.36, November 1998)   
 
Safety of Dams (OP 4.37, September 1996)  
 
International Waterways (OP 7.50, November 
1998)  
 
Indigenous Peoples (OD 4.20, September 1991)  7. Indigenous Peoples and Natural Resource 
Dependent Communities  
Involuntary Resettlement (OD 4.30, 8. Cultural 
Heritage June 1990)  
5. Land Acquisition and Involuntary 
Resettlement  
Cultural Property (OPN 11.03, September 1986)  8. Cultural Heritage  
Child and Forced Labour Policy Statement 
(March 1998)  
2. Labour and Working Conditions 
 3. Pollution Prevention and Abatement 
 4. Community Health and Safety 
 9. Social and Environmental Management 
System 
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Provisions on project design and implementation in the 1998 Operational Policy on Natural 
Habitats include the following: “Wherever feasible, IFC financed projects are sited on lands 
already converted (excluding any lands that in IFC’s opinion were converted in anticipation 
of the project.) IFC does not support projects involving the significant conversion of natural 
habitats unless there are no feasible alternatives for the project and its siting, and 
comprehensive analysis demonstrates that overall benefits from the project substantially 
outweigh the environmental costs. If the environmental assessment indicates that a project 
would significantly convert of degrade natural habitats, the project includes mitigation 
measures acceptable to IFC. Such mitigation measures include, as appropriate, minimizing 
habitat loss (e.g. strategic habitat retention and post-development restoration) and 
establishing and maintaining an ecologically similar protected area. IFC accepts other forms 
of mitigation measures only when they are technically justified.” 
The Annex on definitions notes that “appropriate conservation and mitigation measures 
remove or reduce adverse impacts on natural habitats or their functions, keeping such 
impacts within socially defined limits of acceptable environmental change. Specific 
measures depend on the ecological characteristics of the given site. They may include full 
site protection through project redesign; strategic habitat retention; restricted conversion 
or modification; reintroduction of species; mitigation measures to minimize the ecological 
damage; post-development restoration works; restoration of degraded habitats; and 
contiguity. Such measures should always include provision for monitoring and evaluation to 
provide feedback on conservation outcomes and to provide guidance for developing or 
refining appropriate corrective actions.” 
The proposed “Performance Standard 6 - Conservation of Biological Diversity and 
Sustainable Natural Resource Management” explains that “This Performance Standard is 
designed to ensure that clients avoid or mitigate adverse impacts to biodiversity and 
natural resources throughout the life of the project and identify opportunities to protect 
and conserve biodiversity.”  A “Requirement” on Natural Habitats states that “The client will 
not significantly convert or degrade natural habitats unless: there are no technically and 
economically feasible alternatives; the overall benefits of the project substantially outweigh 
the social and environmental costs; and any conversion is appropriately mitigated.”  
Interviews with IFC officials indicate that they understand “mitigation” to include offsets and 
other compensatory measures.  A further requirement relates to critical habitats and other 
ecosystems.  This states that the client will not (i) significantly convert or degrade critical 
natural habitats, including (a) legally protected areas; (b) areas officially proposed for 
protection; and (c) areas of known high conservation value; (ii) reduce populations of any 
recognised critically endangered or endangered species, or (iii) significantly reduce the 
ecological services provided by an ecosystem.  Any lesser or non-significant impacts on 
critical natural habitats, ecosystems or other recognized threatened or near-threatened 
species, must be appropriately mitigated.  In circumstances where the proposed project is 
located in a legally protected area, clients will, in addition to these requirements, “ensure 
that the proposed project use of the area is consistent with the national management or 
use criteria; consult protected area sponsors, local communities and key stakeholders on 
the proposed project; and implement programs designed to achieve net conservation 
improvement for the protected area as compared to the without-project scenario.” 
Clearly, the IFC views offsets as a fundamental part of the way it does business. 
Source: http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/policyreview.nsf/content/home 
5.1.3 Lower costs of compliance 
While many of the people interviewed cited increased trust, enhanced reputation and 
regulatory goodwill as the key components of the business case for offsets, there are other 
important factors that deserve mention.  Foremost among these is the issue of the cost of 
compliance with environmental regulations.  Depending on how offsets are established, 
managed and regulated, it may be possible to meet regulatory requirements for biodiversity 
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protection by offsetting damage in areas where real estate values are high but conservation 
values comparatively low.  In some cases, this could help conserve unprotected areas where 
the opportunity cost of forgoing development is comparatively low.  
This can work as follows: by giving companies some level of choice as to how they can meet 
their regulatory obligations vis-à-vis biodiversity, offsets could help them find the cheapest 
possible means of achieving (or even going beyond) a set biodiversity target.  For instance, 
instead of re-introducing species lost as a result of a mining project in one particular location 
(which might be prohibitively expensive and stand little chance of long-term conservation 
success), a mining company could help protect the same number of individuals of the species 
or the same area of habitat (or indeed a multiple of the number of individuals of the species or 
several times the area) somewhere else where that protection might be much cheaper.  This 
would not only reduce the cost of compliance for the company, but, if done correctly, could 
also maximise the biodiversity benefit obtained by the company’s compliance. 
 
Box 16: EBX: Making a Business out of Offsets 
In the US, legislation requiring offsets for damage to wetlands and to endangered species 
has lead to the creation of a number of new businesses.  Some of these create wetland or 
species mitigation banks, some broker deals, some provide scientific advice and some do all 
of the above.  The largest of these businesses have now become multi-million dollar service 
providers. One such is the Environmental Banc and Exchange, better known as EBX. 
EBX was founded in 1998 with the goal of “using capital market mechanisms to achieve 
both meaningful environmental benefits and attractive economic returns for its 
shareholders.”  To do this, the company operates through three distinct business units.  
According to George Kelly, a Principal at EBX, what is common to all of these units is “the 
creative use of capital market techniques to achieve meaningful environmental benefits.”  
The units are: 
1.  The Environmental Asset Management Division, which helps property owners to unlock 
the value of their property by “identifying, assessing and managing a very broad range of 
environmental assets.”  These assets include wetland mitigation and other offset potentials; 
2.  The Resource Mitigation Division which “develops and manages wetland, stream, forest 
and habitat mitigation projects; water resource projects; renewable energy projects; and 
brownfield re-development projects, both for its own accounts and in partnership with 
landowners”; and 
3.  The Environmental Investment Banking Division which “invests in environmental 
technologies and projects and provides advisory services and management resources to 
companies” on environmental, offset and other issues. 
After being created in 1998, EBX obtained its first major contract –a US$7 million dollar, full- 
service wetland mitigation contract with the North Carolina Department of Transportation– 
in 2000.  In 2002, that contract was increased to US$11 million. By 2002, the company had 
become profitable, and by the end of 2004 it was projecting revenues of US$5.7 million, net 
income of US$0.5 million, and a contract backlog of US$19 million.  To date, the company 
has entered into contracts for US$37 million, comprising 1,900 acres of wetland mitigation 
(essentially offsets) and 115,000 linear feet of stream restoration. 
EBX, like several of its peers, such as Wildlands Inc., Greenvest and Land and Water 
Resources Inc., is occupying a new market niche based on offsets in the USA.  
5.1.4 New market opportunities  
Beyond cost-effective regulatory compliance, the use of offsets can also create new market 
opportunities for companies.  For example, if a market for biodiversity offsets develops, 
landowners may find that land which was previously considered useless, or at least not very 
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financially productive, can now generate income through the sale of offsets and/or other long-
term conservation measures.  This, at least, has been the case through the use of conservation 
banking and wetlands mitigation in the US (see Box 9).  
Dale Heydlauff, Senior Vice President for Environmental Affairs at American Electric Power 
(AEP), one of the largest utilities in the US, says that as a result of wetland mitigation banking, 
companies such as his with large land holdings have found that they have a business 
opportunity and a core capacity in a variety of new and emerging businesses.   
5.1.5 First mover competitive advantage and the power to influence 
regulation 
The use of offsets may also give a company that moves quickly a “first mover advantage”, as 
other, more reactive, companies find themselves dealing with high entry costs, unforeseen 
regulatory hurdles and fully developed and complex regulatory regimes.  
Indeed, part of this “first mover advantage” comes from the very ability of early entrants to 
influence the emerging regulatory regime.  Several interviewees felt experience with voluntary 
offsets would help them shape policy, and possibly legislation, in the future.  Dave Richards of 
Rio Tinto says that his company “can gain experience and develop best practice fast in an 
evolutionary process, so that when regulation catches up, there are examples and case 
studies - and probably horror stories - to use to guide us in making choices.”  
Chris Spray, of Northumbian Water, pointed to an example where this had already happened. 
The company piloted the use of the government’s internet-based Biodiversity Action Reporting 
system, which is to be launched in 2004.  AEP’s Heydlauff, meanwhile, explained that his 
company has become increasingly involved in carbon trading “partly because we want to 
inform the public policy debate [on greenhouse gas trading].”  A similar dynamic may be 
developing on biodiversity offsets. 
5.1.6 Clean break 
Companies are regularly involved in mergers and acquisitions at the group level and may wish 
to dispose of particular assets and liabilities.  As discrete, agreed packages, with project 
budgets paid up-front to cover implementation by third parties such as NGOs, biodiversity 
offsets may help companies hand over assets more cleanly.  “They would offer a clean solution 
from which you can walk away, knowing the project and money are in place, implementation is 
underway, and the stakeholders are happy with the outcome,” says Chris Spray.  
Experience with mitigation banking in the US has shown that developers often prefer to use 
conservation banks rather than conducting their own conservation activities, as this allows 
them to cleanly transfer liability to another, more specialised entity.  John Ryan, the President 
of Land and Water Resources Inc., a US-based wetland mitigation bank, says that one reason 
that developers in the US like going to wetland banks such as his is that they transfer over a 
regulatory requirement – a liability – and then they can get on with doing what they do best. 
“They like the fact,” he says, “that they can just sign a cheque and know that their wetlands 
responsibilities will be taken care of, and done right.  They have no liability and this is no longer 
one of their worries.”  He also adds that it makes transferring the land that much cleaner and 
easier. 
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5.1.7 Employee satisfaction and retention 
For several interviewees, a significant advantage of their companies’ conservation activities 
and policies on biodiversity is the pride, satisfaction and allegiance to the company this 
engenders with employees.  AEP’s Heydlauff says that his company’s employees love the fact 
that AEP is undertaking conservation projects and that they are concerned with issues of 
climate change and biodiversity.  “Their feedback on all of this has been terrific,” he says. 
5.2 Barriers to more voluntary offsets  
In chapter 3 we described the conservation benefits and above we have described the 
business and conservation benefits that could motivate companies, communities, NGOs and 
governments to establish biodiversity offsets.  But, as with most business decisions, every 
potential reward carries with it some level of risk.  Biodiversity offsets are no exception.  This 
chapter will explore some of these risks, including: the risk that voluntary offset efforts will be 
unappreciated given the high levels of suspicion of companies’ motives; the increased scrutiny 
that involvement in innovative projects of this kind is likely to generate; the risk of offset 
projects failing to meet their objectives; and a range of other potential liabilities.  
5.2.1 Suspicion of companies’ and governments’ motivations 
Among our interviewees, representatives from both companies and governments described 
how they have forgone opportunities to undertake biodiversity offsets for fear of criticism.  As 
one policy-maker said, “I remember a case coming up in public debate.  The extent and cost of 
the remediation by the company raised in the minds of government representatives whether it 
was the best thing to require the company to spend all that money for relatively limited 
biodiversity outcomes.  Still, there was a lack of enthusiasm for flexibility at the time because of 
the objection anticipated from NGOs.  They thought the NGOs would say that the focus should 
be on the quality of remediation and that offsets would be perceived as a ploy to get out of 
this.”  
As Geoff Burton puts it, “In an environment where there is distrust, the focus tends to be on 
making sure the company is seen to be fixing the damage it is doing, rather than on doing 
something genuinely more beneficial to biodiversity but which seems to involve some degree 
of false altruism.”  For this reason, many companies interviewed felt biodiversity offsets could 
only proceed as a powerful tool for conservation if the concept generated support from the 
conservation community, scientists and –most critically– local communities.  “There’s not 
much point in biodiversity offsets unless they are seen as credible and have the support of key 
stakeholders,” says Ian Wood of BHP-Billiton.  “If local stakeholders don't care and flatly want 
the original ground to be protected totally, there will be no room for the flexibility offset 
implies.”  This implies that some of the potential benefits of offsets may likewise be lost. 
Many of our interviewees indicated that companies are ready to move forward with 
biodiversity offsets, provided they can have a reasonable level of confidence that they won’t 
be shot down by too many critics for making the effort.  
Public suspicion is not confined to companies.  In some cases, there is a mistrust of 
government.  Ismid Hadad of the Indonesia environmental NGO, Kehati, believes that public 
mistrust and suspicion in some resource-rich developing countries is related to the 
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fundamental problem of poor governance.  In countries where there has been poor public and 
corporate governance, the lack of transparency, participation and accountability in the 
management of natural resources means that the public may not trust government and 
corporations in sectors such as forestry or mining.  Hadad believes that good governance 
needs to be a pre-condition before concepts such as biodiversity offsets can be introduced in 
such countries, otherwise “only those who hold power and money will ultimately benefit from 
biodiversity offsets, while the poor public and the environment will remain losers”.  
Some steps that could be taken to address these issues are described in chapter 8, below. 
5.2.2 Increased Scrutiny 
Linked to the issue of distrust, companies may not relish the additional scrutiny they are likely 
to attract as NGOs, the public and the media, begin to pay close attention to experimental and 
leadership projects such as biodiversity offsets.  Why bother, they ask themselves, attracting 
more attention and criticism than strictly necessary by volunteering for involvement in a 
potentially controversial exercise when no one is forcing you to do so?  Not only may such 
projects attract attention from those outside, but partnerships with NGOs, communities and 
government inevitably mean that these potential critics are on the inside, gaining an insight 
into the company’s goals, policies and practices.  They may be stern judges of what they see.    
Gone are the days when criticism arising from problems at a particular site could be contained.  
Rapid communication and global networks of organisations now mean that an incident in some 
remote location soon attracts attention all round the world.  Such was the case of the OCP oil 
pipeline in Ecuador and the Chad-Cameroon pipeline mentioned below. (see boxes 17 and 18). 
 
Box 17: The Chad-Cameroon pipeline 
A 1,070 km (660 miles) pipeline from oil wells in landlocked Chad to the ports of Cameroon inspired 
a heated environmental controversy that has led to some interesting lessons in terms of offsets. 
In order to mitigate the possible environmental damages of the US$3.5 billion dollar project, 
particularly in Cameroon (where most of the pipeline was constructed), the project partners 
(ExxonMobil, Petronas, and Chevron), together with the World Bank, created an environmental 
foundation (known as the Foundation for Environment and Development in Cameroon, or 
FEDEC), two new national parks, and an “Indigenous Peoples Plan” to “provide long-term 
benefits to the Pygmy population that is affected by the project .”  These three initiatives will be 
funded through a US$3.5 million contribution from the Cameroon Oil Transport Corporation 
(COTCO), the joint venture created by the three companies and the government of Cameroon 
to construct and manage the operations of the pipeline and oil-loading facilities in that country.  
Of this money, US$600,000 will go to the Indigenous Peoples Plan and related activities, 
US$1.4 million for the creation and management of a national park in the Campo Reserve near 
Cameroon’s Atlantic Littoral forest area, and US$1.5 million for the creation and management 
of a new national park in the Mbam Djerem area to the west of the Deng Deng forest. 
The projects were designed to address the two main criticisms of the pipeline in mind: its 
contribution to environmental damage, particularly in Cameroon’s Atlantic Littoral forest; and 
the significant social impacts on the indigenous peoples of Cameroon, particularly the 
Bagyeli/Bakola people.  
Acknowledging that the various funds and national parks were a form of compensation for the 
environmental and social damage caused by the pipeline, the World Bank web site related to 
the Chad-Cameroon project explicitly states: “A wide range of steps has been taken to 
minimize the social and environmental risks of pipeline construction and operation.  In 
consultation with engineers, environmental experts and local people, the pipeline route was 
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altered to protect biodiversity, human settlements, indigenous peoples, and cultural heritage.  
The pipeline will be buried, rather than above-ground, and mainly follow existing infrastructure.  
Only a small area of tropical forest in Cameroon will be affected.  To compensate for this, two 
large new national parks have been created in Cameroon.”  There may not be a one-for-one 
calculation of damage caused and benefits created, but the concept of compensation for 
residual damage is clearly embedded in the design of this project. 
World Bank Economist Robert Goodland felt the offsets undertaken to compensate for damage 
caused by the pipeline were more than sufficient (Goodland, 2003). He notes that the national 
parks created as a result of the pipeline were many times the size of the area it impacted.  He 
writes: “The Presidentially decreed National Parks exceed 4000 sq. kms of essentially intact 
ecosystem, while the converted areas total less than 100 sq.kms, mainly following existing 
roads, hence disturbed.”  He does, however, add a caveat:  “In practice,” he says, “there have 
already been difficulties.”  He notes that “A new road was fast constructed inside the main 
offset, namely the Campo-Ma’an National Park, contrary to agreements” and explains that 
there have been numerous other problems with the offsets and the project as a whole.  Still, he 
concludes, “The important lesson is that even when best practice is sought, much can go 
wrong while new methodologies are being tested.” 
From the point of view of the three companies, it is interesting to consider why COTCO agreed to 
contribute US$3.5 million to the foundation.  According to an article in Fortune magazine (April 
15, 2002), “While Exxon hasn't exactly gotten religion, it has gotten wise to the perils of what 
Harvard Business School professor Debora Spar has dubbed the ‘spotlight phenomenon.’  Using 
the Internet and mass media as cudgels, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as 
Greenpeace, Human Rights Watch, and Friends of the Earth have grown increasingly adept at 
singling out multinationals for their misdeeds.  And oil companies offer a particularly ripe target.  
They are big, which NGOs readily translate as ‘bad.’  They have highly visible brands, making them 
vulnerable to boycotts at the pump.  They cannot choose where oil deposits are located, 
meaning they increasingly operate in countries with unsavory rulers, sensitive environments, and 
impoverished populations… Though the financial toll of these reputational assaults is hard to 
calculate, says Spar, it's clearly no longer just a moral issue—‘it's a bottom-line issue.’” 
If this analysis is correct, oil companies in particular may come to find that biodiversity offsets 
are an important tool in their environmental management arsenal. 
 
 
Box 18: The Heavy Crude Pipeline (OCP) in Ecuador 
In August of 2003, a consortium of oil and construction companies from around the world 
put the finishing touches to a 500-km oil pipeline stretching across Ecuador.  Known as the 
Heavy Crude Pipeline (or, in Spanish, as Oleoducto de Crudos Pesados, OCP), the pipeline 
traverses the country from the Amazon rainforest in the east the to the Pacific Ocean ports 
in the west.  Although the consortium didn’t specifically seek to offset the damage it caused 
to the Ecuadorian environment, it took some interesting steps that were intended to serve 
as unofficial compensation for its environmental impact.  
In addition to re-foresting the areas that were cleared to lay the pipeline, the consortium 
(comprising ENCANA, ENI, Repsol-YPF, Perenco, Occidental Petroleum, Perez Company and 
Techint) agreed to put US$16.9 million dollars into an Ecuadorian environmental trust fund 
(known as Ecofondo) intended to finance environmental projects in the areas through which 
the pipeline passes.  There have been major campaigns against the construction of the OCP 
in the US, Europe and Ecuador and some environmental NGOs were adamant that the 
projects should not be seen as mitigation or compensation for environmental damage.  
From the perspective of the consortium, the fund is intended to address some of the 
negative environmental publicity that the project has caused.  
According to Yolanda Kakabadse, the President of IUCN and former Minister of Environment 
of Ecuador who brokered the negotiations surrounding Ecofondo, the idea was first 
proposed by OCP Ecuador (the Ecuadorian management company set up by the OCP 
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consortium) in 2001, largely as a result of the environmental controversy surrounding the 
project.  “The first mention of this fund,” she says, “came in the environmental license 
granted to OCP by the government of Ecuador, but it was put in there at the request of OCP.  
It is the first time that Ecuador has required such a fund to be created when granting a 
license to an infrastructure project.”  
“Initially,” says Kakabadse, “the company intended to give something like US$1 or US$2 
million dollars for the fund, but very quickly it became clear that given the size of the OCP 
project [estimated at US$1.4 billion], this was not sufficient.”  
“The negotiation for EcoFondo,” says Reyna Oleas, a consultant who also was involved in 
the process, “took nearly two years and had two stages.  First the NGOs got together to 
discuss the idea and to agree on what it is they wanted.  Then the NGOs negotiated with 
OCP over the creation of the fund.”  Finally, she explains, in September of 2003, the NGOs 
and OCP reached agreement on the size and nature of the trust fund:  It would contain 
US$16.9 million dollars, US$10 million of which would be provided by Encana over ten 
years, and US$6.9 million of which would be provided by the rest of the OCP consortium.  It 
was also expected that the NGOs would raise money to contribute to the fund.  The money 
would be used to finance conservation projects in areas surrounding the pipeline, while a 
small percentage would be set aside to address an agreed environmental issue of national 
importance to Ecuador.  The money would be administered by National Environmental Fund 
(Fondo Ambiental Nacional) of Ecuador, a non-profit trust fund already established in 
Ecuador, and would not be used to pay for operating costs of the organizations submitting 
project proposals.  When this report went to press, the agreement for the fund had been 
signed, but the money had not yet been transferred to an EcoFondo account.  
Oleas is quick to point out, however, that the creation of this Eco-fondo was explicitly not 
about mitigation or offsets. “In the negotiations,” she says, “the NGOs were adamant about 
two key points: first, that the creation of this fund would in no way release OCP from its 
environmental liabilities – that it couldn’t just wash its hands of any environmental problems 
caused by the pipeline – and, second, that agreement on the fund would in no way force the 
NGOs to take OCP’s side if problems arose.”  She adds that the concept of offsets and 
mitigation did not come up in the negotiations and she feels that, had it come up, it would 
have been soundly rejected by the NGOs.  Kakabadse agrees. She says: “There was a strong 
feeling that the fund shouldn’t be seen as compensation for damage and that any 
compensation should come out of the ordinary budget for the project… The NGOs wanted 
this fund to be a way for the companies involved to put back into Ecuador some of the 
wealth generated by the pipeline.” Which goes to show that the environmental community 
does not always support the concept of offsets. 
Why did the consortium agree to the fund? Kakabadse and Oleas believe there were two basic 
reasons.  The concept of the fund was embedded in the document granting OCP a license to 
build its pipeline and, more importantly, the parties needed to strengthen their environmental 
image and thought the fund would help.  So, even though the fund was explicitly not designed 
as a biodiversity offset, there are similarities in the business case.  It is intended to boost the 
companies’ environmental image and thus support their license to operate. 
 
5.2.3 Unfulfilled promise 
Another risk that companies face is that, after investing much time and energy on offsets, 
these will not generate the conservation outcomes and associated good public relations or 
reputational benefits they hoped for.  This risk, however, can be minimised by paying close 
attention to the offset design issues highlighted in chapter 4 and particularly to the process of 
engagement with stakeholders (chapter 7). 
Beyond the risk that expected rewards won’t accrue, is the risk that relevant stakeholders 
begin to feel that the project is not achieving its goals or that one or more of the collaborators 
are not meeting their commitments.  Again, this argues for careful planning and discussion of 
goals and motivations up front. 
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Box 19: One approach to enforcement 
In Australia, the New South Wales Fisheries department has a policy of “no net loss” for 
developments that damage aquatic habitat. Developers can compensate for damage by 
transplanting seagrass or constructing fishways, or making payments into a Conservation 
Trust Fund used for strategic rehabilitation projects throughout NSW waters.  As an 
incentive to developers to make good their commitments to offset, a monetary bond may 
be required as insurance against the offset action failing.  For example, up to Aus $250,000 
is charged per hectare for seagrass and habitat compensation is calculated on a 2:1 basis 
for vulnerable habitats.  Consent conditions require an annual progress report for the offset 
action.  
See http://www.fisheries.nsw.gov.au/conservation/policies/policy_guide_content.htm and New South 
Wales Government, 2002 
5.2.4 Legal liabilities and new responsibilities 
Several of our interviewees said they had asked themselves “If you design or implement a 
biodiversity offset can that raise unforeseen legal liabilities?”.  If so, do companies and their 
partners wish to incur these additional responsibilities?  Shell illustrated the kind of 
considerations that a company will need to make.  In Indonesia, one employee explained, Shell 
has a project whose primary objective is to sequester carbon dioxide.  It happens that the area 
where the carbon is being sequestered is home to the orang-utang, a globally endangered 
species.  This raises the question of whether of not Shell would be liable if the population of 
orang-utangs on the land suffered, for whatever reason, and if the species became even more 
endangered?  
Another example given by an interviewee was a scenario where baseline studies for an offset – 
either on the land affected or on the site of the offset – turned up a hitherto unknown but 
highly endangered and economically valuable species or habitat.  Would the company be 
expected to pay for the conservation costs associated with conservation?  What are the 
responsibilities?  Or what if a member of the local community was injured by an animal or 
falling tree on the site of an offset?  Who, if anyone, should assume these new risks and 
liabilities? 
5.3 Implementation of biodiversity offsets by 
companies 
Some companies have weighed up the potential advantages and disadvantages and reached 
the conclusion that there is a strong business case for biodiversity offsets.  Our research has 
revealed a modest, but growing, number of corporate initiatives to offset unavoidable harm to 
biodiversity on a voluntary basis.  In most cases –with the most notable exception being 
wetland and conservation banking in the US– these activities are still conducted on an ad hoc 
basis, driven by the business case or personal enthusiasm of particular members of staff at the 
site level.  Increasingly, they are linked to implementation of the company’s environment or 
sustainable development policy.  This chapter explores corporate policies that could relate to 
biodiversity offsets and some aspects of practical experience of implementing offsets at the 
site level. 
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5.3.1  Signals of industry interest in biodiversity offsets 
As far as we are aware, there have been no studies assessing the number and extent of 
voluntary biodiversity offsets.  We were only able to conduct 37 interviews and collect 
anecdotal information, so it is impossible for us to quantify the growing interest in biodiversity 
offsets on the part of companies.  Interviewees indicated in qualitative terms that governments 
and companies are increasingly using biodiversity offsets as a way of redressing the damage 
caused to biodiversity by corporate activities.  In addition to the specific examples of 
biodiversity offsets described in this report, two groups of companies, one in the oil and gas 
sector, the other in mining and metals, have been exploring the concept.  
The Energy and Biodiversity Initiative, a collaborative project involving BP, Chevron Texaco, 
Shell and Statoil, as well as Conservation International, Fauna and Flora International, The 
Nature Conservancy, The Smithsonian Institute and IUCN, recently released a report that 
discusses biodiversity offsets, among many other issues. (See http://www.theebi.org/.)  
According to EBI: “The objective of an offset is that, by the end of a project, the status of 
biodiversity at a particular site is comparatively the same as before the project began. Use of 
offsets for this purpose should be the minimum standard by which all companies operate. If, 
after all measures are taken to mitigate impacts, there will still be a net loss of biodiversity, 
compensation in the form of offsets may be used to bridge the gap.”   
In the mining sector, a meeting of IUCN and the International Council on Mining and Metals 
(ICMM), held in Switzerland in 2003, discussed the principles of “net biodiversity gain” and “no 
net loss of biodiversity”.  One of the recommendations in the draft report of the meeting states 
that:  “Offsets may present an option for addressing impacts which cannot be avoided, 
minimised or mitigated, but the process for deciding what constitutes appropriate offsets 
needs clarification.”  ICMM is now producing a “White Paper” which examines the mining 
industry’s contribution to conservation.  A review of the appropriateness and nature of offset 
use will be part of this.  (Personal communication, Annelisa Grigg, September 2004) 
5.3.2  Corporate policies 
As Box 20 shows, a number of companies from a variety of sectors have made public 
commitments to environmentally sustainable development in general and to the conservation 
of biodiversity in particular.  The question is, should these be regarded as purely aspirational 
statements that some might dismiss as “greenwash”, or are they backed up by clear 
strategies, targets and routine implementation at the site level? 
Our interviews suggest that, to date, companies have regarded these policies as aspirational in 
nature, and have generally not asked, “How can we quantify this commitment and measure 
whether we are meeting it?”.  However, there is a clear trend among leading companies to 
measure their impacts on biodiversity and to seek to demonstrate how their operations result in 
“no net loss”, or even a “positive impact” on biodiversity.  This chapter will explore companies’ 
attitudes to these corporate commitments to date and the evolution of a new “offset mindset”. 
? The case until now: purely aspirational goals 
A comment by a representative of BHP Billiton nicely illustrates the kind of questions 
companies ask themselves. “What, if anything,” he asks, “are the implications of policies of 
zero harm, such as those of BP and BHP Billiton?  How are they interpreted and 
operationalised?  Those are good questions and we are having lots of discussions internally on 
them.”  He adds that, “‘Minimising harm’ is too general; it sounds as though you can do 
whatever you like.  If you go for zero harm through mitigation, that sets a clear goal you want 
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to achieve. You may never get there, but the fundamental objective is to continue to look for 
opportunities to get as close as possible.” 
In addition to being mostly aspirational in nature, biodiversity offset experience to date has 
rarely linked the scale of the impact to the scale of the conservation measures undertaken.  BP 
explains: “Typically, a business unit would put together a plan with NGOs to carry out some 
conservation work.  Usually, this was not linked to the impact of a particular project.  We didn’t 
get into ‘we have a one acre footprint here, so we’ll offset with 2 acres there’.  For example, in 
Spain, our retail and marketing business identified lynx conservation as a priority we should be 
involved in.  We supported and promoted the conservation activities.  There were business 
benefits for us: sales promotions, customer loyalty and enhanced reputation; benefits for the 
conservation organisations involved – Fundación Doñana, Estación Biológica de Doñana and 
the Global Nature Fund – through support for their work and for a book on the lynx by WWF; 
and definitely benefits for the lynx, in terms of habitat protection.”  
 
Box 20: Examples of voluntary corporate commitments related to offset 
Type of 
commitment, 
from most to 
least rigorous: 
Illustrative company policy statements, from their websites and 
publicly available documents such as Annual Reports and 
Environmental or Corporate Social Responsibility Reports: 
Net positive 
effect 
? BP CEO: ‘We can have a real, measurable and positive impact on the 
biodiversity of the world. That is a high aspiration - but, like our other 
aspirations, we're determined to show that we can deliver’. 
? Rio Tinto: ‘net positive effect’ 
‘No harm’ ? BP: ‘Our goals are simply stated no accidents, no harm to people, and no 
damage to the environment.’ 
? BHP Billiton: ‘Zero harm to people and the environment — our goal’ 
‘No net loss’ ? Waste Management: “The Company is committed to the conservation of 
nature. We will implement a policy of "no net loss" of wetlands or other 
biological diversity on the Company's property.” (This policy was revoked 
after 1998 when the company’s ownership changed.) 
Offset ? Rio Tinto: ‘investigating options to offset any unavoidable adverse effects 
in project areas by conservation actions elsewhere.’ 
? Rio Tinto: ‘Wherever possible we prevent, otherwise minimise, mitigate 
and remediate, harmful effects of the Group’s Operations on the 
environment’. 
Positive 
contribution to 
biodiversity 
conservation 
? United Utilities: ‘As far as possible, we manage our 142,000 acres of 
catchment land in such a way as to produce a positive ecological impact, 
allow access for recreation and protect raw water quality’. 
? Northumbrian Water: ‘[Essex and Suffolk Water is] committed to enhancing 
biodiversity in our region . . .and minimising the direct and indirect impact 
of our operational activities.’ 
? RMC: ‘conserve and create habitats that support a diversity of plants and 
wildlife before, during and after our operations’. 
? Shell: part of the company’s approach on biodiversity is to make a 
“positive contribution to conservation”. 
Maintaining 
ecosystems 
? Shell: ‘Protect the environment’; ‘maintain ecosystems’. 
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In a similar fashion, other companies have indicated that they tend to design projects to 
compensate for their footprint, but that neither impact nor offset was ever really quantified.  
For instance, when Shell was designing its potential project in Camisea, Peru (a project which 
did not go ahead), the company was not looking for strict one-for-one offsets. Sachin Kapila 
explains it in this way: “We were looking for conservation opportunities either along the 
pipeline or in another area.  We were not aiming for absolute like-for-like or absolute offset.” 
The same has been true for Rio Tinto, as Stuart Anstee explains:  “What has been happening is 
that individual operations have been involved in conservation activities based on regional 
needs, but not with the mindset to balance the equation of impact and benefit.”  
Steve Botts of Antamina, goes further.  He explains that “It is hard to see impacts and offsets as 
a purely mathematical relationship.”  He says that Antamina hasn’t really talked about direct 
offsets simply because “the term is just not part of our vocabulary yet.”  He emphasises, 
however, that it is a useful concept, one that his company is likely to use more in the future. 
In the case of the controversial OCP pipeline in Ecuador (see Box 18), NGOs argued against any 
quantitative relationship between impact and conservation measures supported by the 
company, concerned that “offsets” could be perceived as reducing the company’s 
responsibility to minimise the impact caused by the pipeline.  
? Ad hoc contributions by charismatic individuals  
Hitherto, voluntary biodiversity conservation projects have largely been ad hoc, driven by 
“individual personal passions”, as Kathryn Shanks of BP explains.  “A lot of it is because 
somebody locally got excited. It might be one to two people.  There was a wonderful Malay 
lady who got a turtle project going almost single-handed.  In another huge project, employees 
in Trinidad turned a scrap yard into a nature reserve and educational centre.”  Sachin Kapila of 
Shell describes two triggers for companies’ conservation activities: personal enthusiasm or 
case-by-case risk management:  “Either there are individual champions, or there's a real 
business risk that you need to manage, in our case through our early warning system and then 
the EIA process to identify risks.  We can then turn risks to opportunities by designing 
conservation projects.”  
? Moves towards the offset mindset: demonstrating net positive effect 
and transcending environment/development trade-offs  
Increasingly, companies are looking to link conservation activities more closely to impact and 
exploring how they can demonstrate a net positive effect from their operations.  “The Shell 
Biodiversity Standard is designed to minimise impact and make a positive contribution.  It 
already supports a loose form of offset and now we're looking more specifically at what 
‘positive contribution’ means”, says Sachin Kapila. 
  
“We need to get more innovative about a whole lot of things. We 
need to give biodiversity offsets and delivery of aspirational 
policies such as ‘no harm’ more thought.” 
Ian Wood, BHP 
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Likewise, in April 2000, Lord John Browne, CEO of BP, said  “We can have a real, measurable 
and positive impact on the biodiversity of the world.  That is a high aspiration - but, like our 
other aspirations, we're determined to show that we can deliver”.  That statement has set the 
tone for the company’s current thinking on biodiversity.  Moving on from the its top-down 
corporate policy of “no damage”, “we are now looking much more locally”, says Kathryn 
Shanks.  “The ‘no damage’ policy and minimising impact was a good start.  Now we need to 
look on a site-by-site basis to review the benefits and impacts of having a plant in a particular 
location.  We are starting to think more about specific impacts and how we actually make 
measurable progress towards ‘no damage’.  Can we quantify the benefits to people or to 
biodiversity or to the environment of our activities?  What can the company do to create a 
positive benefit as well as to develop the particular project?  You can’t have oil and gas 
reserves without a certain level of impact.  Our challenge now is to transcend the trade-off 
between the benefits of development and energy use, on the one hand, and environmental 
considerations, on the other.  We want to go beyond that to deliver benefits to the 
environment.” 
 
“Everyone’s familiar with the nature of trade-offs. Traditionally, 
these operated by comparing, for example, job creation with 
environmental impact.  The difference with biodiversity offsets is 
that the comparison is made between impacts and benefits 
within the same sphere: like for like.  There are likely to be 
significant social and economic development benefits from 
mining projects, but we don’t propose to claim these as offsets 
for unavoidable biodiversity impacts.  Rather, we aim to 
demonstrate a net positive effect on biodiversity, in addition to 
the socio-economic development benefits.” 
Dave Richards, Rio Tinto 
 
Just as BP speaks of “transcending trade-offs”, so Rio Tinto also described an evolution in the 
company’s thinking, away from the old assumption that damage to biodiversity could be 
“traded” for the development benefits of projects, towards a contemporary expectation that 
there will be biodiversity as well as economic benefits. 
Dave Richards explains the context for this work.  “If there’s a mine, it’s going to have some 
biodiversity impact.  People across the Rio Tinto Group recognise the value of putting 
conservation activities in place to offset the damage we can’t avoid.  We refer in our corporate 
biodiversity guidance to how we want our businesses to approach biodiversity offset.  The 
biodiversity strategy teams, including both an internal group and an external advisory panel, 
translated this into a position statement and principles, and these include a commitment to net 
positive effect on biodiversity through our activities.  In making that statement, we started 
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talking about offsets.  We need to do something creative to offset our impacts on biodiversity.”  
His colleague Stuart Anstee describes the company’s move towards a more quantified 
approach.  “Conservation activity based on regional needs but without the mindset to balance 
the impact/benefit equation was the right thing at the right time.  Now we are formalising the 
process and moving it on.  The commitment to net positive effect on biodiversity needs offsets 
to deliver it.  We have got to review the negatives and positives and convince people there is a 
net benefit.”  
Some companies are reviewing their policies to include clearer statements about offset or 
developing internal guidance on the topic.  Some intend to experiment with biodiversity offset 
projects and learn from these to develop and apply best practice.  “There’s a level of 
understanding of the issues now and creative ideas for programmes are starting to mushroom.  
There won’t be one size that fits all.  We need to try things out and learn what works well from 
the best programmes,” says Dave Richards. 
It became apparent in the interviews that companies do not yet have methodologies to 
quantify the biodiversity impact of their operations and the biodiversity benefits of proposed 
offset projects, and that they hope for collaboration from NGOs, governments and experts on 
this.  “We don’t yet have a suggested mechanism for doing the ‘net positive effect’ sum,” says 
Dave Richards.  “Offset is a principle we want to embrace and use,” agrees Stuart Anstee, “but 
the mechanics and the framework are still lacking: the basis for comparing one site with 
another and determining a net benefit”.  Similarly, Lord Browne’s challenge to deliver 
measurable and positive results for biodiversity was directed to BP’s individual businesses “to 
make the determination as to what is appropriate”, says Kathryn Shanks.  “Our activities are 
tailored to the actual site and operation.  One size will not fit all.”  
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6 How to offset: technical Issues 
As we have seen in chapters 2-4, with the appropriate policy framework and willing 
participants, biodiversity offsets appear to offer both conservation and business benefits.  
However, to achieve this win-win scenario, many tricky issues and risks need to be properly 
addressed.  If offsets are poorly thought through or attempted without adequate participation, 
expertise or commitment by the companies, governments and communities involved, they 
could fail to achieve conservation outcomes, business benefits will not materialise and those 
involved will be exposed to the risk of reputational damage.  For this reason, the approach to 
designing offsets and the basis for doing so are extremely important.  This chapter discusses a 
number of features of offsets: the challenge of measuring the impact of developments; of 
establishing “no net loss”; the potential goals (which may conflict) of ecological equivalence 
and optimising conservation benefits; the location of offsetting activities; their duration; the 
kind of activities that “count” as offsetting conservation activities; and some issues related to 
cost-effectiveness.  Chapter 7 goes on to explore who decides the answer to these questions 
during the design of offsets, who implements them and who evaluates their success.  
6.1 Measuring impacts and establishing “no net loss”  
One of the many challenges of implementing biodiversity offsets is determining the type and 
scale of compensation required.  How do you determine “no net loss”?  To do so demands 
clarity not just about the impacts of land use on biodiversity, but also some measure (or 
“currency”) for the impact and for countervailing conservation activities.  
Measuring the impacts of land use change on biodiversity is a far more daunting task than 
measuring certain other environmental impacts.  For example, Kathryn Shanks of BP notes that 
her company knows with some degree of accuracy the extent of the carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions they are responsible for, both directly, in terms of the company’s industrial and 
other operations, and indirectly, in terms of emissions associated with the use of their 
products.  Also, one tonne of CO2 emitted is equivalent to another tonne sequestered.  The 
same does not apply to biodiversity.  
One researcher we interviewed contrasted biodiversity offset schemes with the well-
developed market for SO2 (sulphur dioxide air pollution) emission allowances.  Whereas an SO2 
emission allowance is “a uniform, well-defined commodity that is tradable across the country,” 
the same does not apply to wetland or conservation banking, where “what you have is service 
territories where trading can happen, which may be big or small.”  He added that while SO2 
allowances can be traded without additional regulatory review, every wetland or endangered 
species offset requires detailed review by the environmental regulator, adding significantly to 
transaction costs.  Finally, he concluded that “wetlands and endangered species will never 
really be … as commoditized [as SO2].  The reality is one wetland is not the same as another.”  
Not all hectares are created equal.  Given our imperfect knowledge of biodiversity and its 
complexity, it is difficult to measure impacts on biodiversity, to attribute them to individual 
development projects among many contributing factors and to measure the response of 
ecosystems to conservation measures.  
This section will explore two issues:  What do you need to measure?  And what is the currency 
for biodiversity offsets?  
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6.1.1 Measuring impacts 
As noted by Chris Spray of Northumbrian Water, there is a need for high quality ecological data 
before one can begin to consider the viability of an offset.  Simply carrying out a baseline species 
inventory in a potential development site can cost more than £250,000 (over US$400,000).  
Moreover, one may also need to undertake behavioural studies of how a particular site is used by 
different species, in order to assess what functions need to be replaced by an offset.  Quantifying 
ecosystem services, the impacts on these of industrial activities and the response of “offset” 
ecosystems to positive conservation activities is even more complex.  
Alice Ruhweza of Uganda’s National Environment Management Authority points out that one 
major complication is the fact that many of the impacts of land-use change are indirect.  For 
example, a large development project can attract immigrants to an area; they in turn may 
undertake further changes in land use, resulting in negative impacts on local biodiversity outside 
the boundaries of the project site and beyond the control of the project implementers.  A 
company is not wholly responsible for these indirect impacts, but companies increasingly 
acknowledge that they share responsibility with government. (See EBI, 2003.)  Indirect impacts 
will need to be taken into consideration in assessing the impact to be offset.  An example of how 
this has been done can be found in BP’s gas production facility in Tangguh, Indonesia.  In this 
case, simply offsetting the direct impacts of the facility was considered insufficient, due to the 
high risk of environmental damage posed by people moving to the area (including company 
employees, their families and others attracted by the increased economic activity).  Hence BP 
and its project partners are undertaking a broader programme of land use planning and 
environmental training in an attempt to address threats to biodiversity outside the project site. 
 
Box 21: NAM Protocol for determining the extent of biodiversity 
compensation 
The Dutch company NAM, part of the Shell family, has a policy of avoiding harm to the 
environment to the extent possible.  To translate this into practical guidelines concerning 
biodiversity, NAM has prepared a protocol that applies to every activity that places new 
demands on species and habitats.  Its intended objective is “prevention of a negative 
impact on biodiversity, or aiming for an average neutral or positive result.  The assessment 
should be carried out at the local level.”  
The protocol sets out a methodology providing a basis for calculating the extent of harm to 
biodiversity on the development site and for determining the correct form of compensation.  
It consists of a chain of choices to be made in any individual setting, which are described in 
the Environmental Impact Report (i.e. NAM’s internal EIA Report, as opposed to the final, 
official EIA) and which involve mitigating measures such as avoiding work in certain seasons 
and determining restrictions to lighting, transport and noise.  The protocol focuses on 
“compensation of remaining loss of ecological values”.  “The rule of thumb”, it explains, is 
that “that part of the activity is compensated that can be shown to cause an actual 
disruption which cannot be removed through mitigation.  It is preferable that compensation 
is carried out locally.  This would be the fairest for the involved parties (social component) 
and is in accordance with the requirements of the Habitat and Birds Directives.”  
Its principles are: 
? First mitigation, and only then compensation. 
? Only what is actually disrupted is compensated. 
? Compensation is sought in the direct vicinity. 
? Use is made of existing structures and “management contracts” on a voluntary basis. 
? Anticipation allows compensation in advance. 
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The protocol lays out the basis for calculating the harm caused to biodiversity through the 
use of space and emissions of light and noise: 
? Physical use of space: calculation of the area involving elements foreign to the 
landscape, including the area within the company’s fence, the entrance road and buffer 
area. 
? Noise: combination of area within the noise contour and decibel level conversions for 
permanent and temporary installations in woodland, meadow and salt marsh areas. 
? Lighting: basis for calculating the habitat area to be compensated, using the value 
corresponding to the physical area of the installation and buffer zone, the value related 
to noise disruption around the installation and of lighting permanently on during the 
breeding season and the value linked to the entrance route.  Compensation takes place 
during the life of the installation. 
The protocol refers NAM staff to existing management systems for determining the correct 
form and package of compensation (as described on the website of LNV (Agriculture, 
Nature and Food Chain Quality: www.minlnv.nl)).  For compensation, “an equivalent area of 
land is sought for which a management contract is arranged on a voluntary basis, in 
accordance with the conditions that are also employed by LNV.  In general terms this comes 
to a compensation of approx. 250 euros per year per ha (e.g. meadow bird grassland rich in 
species) for which particular – well described – efforts must be made.  An average location 
therefore comes to 2 – 6 hectares and drilling operations to over 30 hectares”.  
The protocol suggests that the arrangements should be made in consultation with 
associations of farmers, landowners and land-users that are directly involved or with 
working groups at the time the activities are established.  It recommends that the 
arrangements should be checked by local environmental groups with local farmers and that 
the users of the land surrounding the installation would need to be willing to participate on 
a voluntary basis. 
Compensation that extends beyond the calculations described here would fall under a 
sponsorship and donations policy, for which there is a separate corporate policy. 
Source:  Pers.communication, Sachin Kapila and Steven de Bie, Shell. 
6.1.2 Establishing equivalence for offsets 
Even where both the direct and the indirect impacts of a project on biodiversity can be 
identified, there remains the thorny question of whether development is appropriate (and thus 
the question of an offset legitimately arises – see chapter 2), and, if it is, then of determining an 
appropriate offset.  Perhaps the fundamental challenge of biodiversity offsets is establishing 
the basis for determining “no net loss” when no two hectares are ecologically identical.  This 
chapter will look at two contrasting methodologies:  establishing ecological proxies as 
currency to determine equivalence (the main method used to design offsets); and economic 
valuation (which has largely been used retrospectively in other contexts to assess liability for 
damage to ecosystems, but which could offer useful tools for offset design). 
? Ecological proxies  
As Salzman & Ruhl (2002) put it, “whether we can confidently trade x for y depends on what we 
are trying to maximise and our standard of measurement, both of which turn on the currency 
of exchange.  Put simply, unless the currency captures what we care about, we can end up 
trading the wrong things.”  They point out that this begs the questions of what the relevant 
values are, how we measure them and how we reflect them in a conveniently traded currency.  
The two main types of currency “traded” to date are hectares and habitat functions.  Since 
“not all hectares are created equal”, the currency of one hectare conserved as an offset for 
one hectare harmed through development is the most crude of currencies.  Habitat or 
 58
ecosystem functions are barely less crude.  The authors note that, in the context of s.404 
wetland permits, the US Corps of Engineers has given its local field offices wide discretion in 
selecting the method of wetland accounting.  Roughly 40 different assessment methods have 
been developed, categorised as:  
? indices derived from easily observed characteristics that serve as surrogate indicators of 
ecological functions (e.g. percentage cover of aquatic vegetation);  
? narrow systems that measure particular wetland services such as wildlife habitat (e.g. 
percentage duck habitat); and  
? broader systems covering a range of wetland functions covering a number of observable 
characteristics.  
Salzman & Ruhl note that explicit measures of service values remain beyond the reach of 
virtually all assessment methods in use and that assessment methods have advanced little 
from the beginning of the wetland banking programme some twenty years ago.  Crude 
currencies such as hectares and habitat function fail to capture complex differences in 
wetlands.  One result has been that mitigation banking programs are reluctant to stray far from 
strict, in-kind policies.  They believe this problem will be endemic to habitat trading 
programmes in general, until ecologists can deliver cheaply calculated, refined currency for 
habitat values.  They say even the most developed habitat assessment methods are ill 
prepared to produce reliable, inexpensive and ready measurements of a habitat’s 
environmental and service values.  “These measurements require far more money and time to 
produce on a site-specific basis than developers, habitat bankers and the government seem 
prepared to allocate.” 
 
Box 22: Habitat Hectares as the basis for the State of Victoria’s 
“Net Gain Principle” 
In order to implement the Net Gain principle, the Victorian State Government has developed 
an approach that assesses both the quantity and quality of vegetation.  Vegetation/habitat 
quality is assessed based on a simple equation based on two primary determinants: 
inherent site conditions and viability of the patch of vegetation in the landscape context.  
This statewide, standardised approach estimates vegetation/habitat quality on a scale from 
zero (complete loss) to one (complete retention of natural quality as described by 
benchmark characteristics)(see Parkes et al 2002).  The quality measure is combined with a 
measure of area to create a measure for the offsets called “Habitat hectares” (habitat score 
x area).  The number of Habitat hectares needed for a given offset depends upon the 
conservation significance of the area to be affected.  The habitat hectares approach is an 
explicit, quantitative method for assessing the quality of vegetation by adding scores that 
are assigned to 10 habitat attributes.  The government has prepared a table describing 
circumstances in which clearing is or is not permitted, the Habitat Hectares required, 
guidance on “Like-for-like”, the location of the offset and timing within which offsets must 
be initiated. (see Victorian Government, 2002, Appendix 4) 
Source: Victorian Government, 2002. 
 
Several of our interviewees reflected these challenges and described how it is easier to be 
satisfied of equivalence if the offset is conducted in a similar ecosystem to that damaged.  A 
common, if rather crude, method used to ensure that an offset is adequate compensation for 
the habitat lost in development, is to select habitat that is ecologically similar and to conserve 
an area of the same size or a multiple of the area damaged.  Baselines studies may help 
establish the similarity of the ecosystems, but, fundamentally, area is being used as proxy for 
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biodiversity.  This can be the case even where the legal framework specifies a particular 
species to be conserved and “offset”.  
For instance, in the US, wetland and conservation banking programmes typically use the area 
of a particular type of habitat as a proxy for particular endangered species or ecological 
functions and services that environmental regulators seek to conserve.  As one interviewee 
put it, in the US, “we don’t trade species; we trade habitats”. 
In many existing biodiversity offset programmes in the US, there is a strong preference for any 
habitat lost to development to be offset through restoration or rehabilitation of similar habitat 
as close as possible to the impact site.  As noted by Robert Bonnie of the US conservation 
group, Environmental Defense, such “like-for-like” offsets are “easier for the public to 
understand and for conservationists to measure.”  Bonnie’s colleague Michael Bean agrees.  
Whereas like-for-like offsets are readily understood by the public, “the more dissimilar the 
resource being protected … to the resource being damaged, the more explaining that will be 
necessary.”  Moreover, even relatively straight-forward offsets, involving like-for-like 
compensation, entail substantial scientific inputs and sometimes third party validation to 
ensure their credibility.  The efforts involved with dissimilar ecosystems could make any 
assessment of no net loss extremely difficult, if not meaningless.  
 
“We need compensation that clearly relates to impact to ensure 
that habitat function and species are truly preserved.  Trading 
should be like-for-like. This is our priority but it is not always 
possible.” 
Tina Bartlett of California Department of Fish and Game 
 
Even if an offset is conducted in a similar ecosystem to that affected by development, the 
development may affect relatively “mature” habitat, while offsets may involve rehabilitating or 
restoring habitat on comparatively degraded lands.  In such scenarios, more biodiversity will 
be lost per hectare in the site developed than conserved in the site offset, so many offset 
programmes seek to ensure that the offset area is larger or ecologically “richer” than the area 
lost to development.  Acknowledging that area is a very crude proxy for biodiversity, even in 
similar ecosystems, multiples are commonly used to ensure a sufficient margin to say with 
confidence that the offsetting activities more than compensate for the losses on the area 
developed.  This approach has been used in the US wetlands system to allow a “margin of 
safety” (Salzman & Ruhl (2002); Bishop (2003)).  But, as described in chapter 3, critics of the US 
wetlands trading system, such as NWF’s Julie Sibbing, argue that these targets and multiplies 
are, in practice, not being met.  
In mandatory offset programmes the ratio of offset to damaged area is often prescribed, but in 
voluntary schemes the ratio used (if any) is subject to negotiation and varies on a case-by-case 
basis. As noted by Bob Watson and Habiba Gitay of the World Bank, “what is a fair offset is part 
of the negotiation. [Nevertheless,] people normally go for a much bigger offset than the 
original area damaged.” Chris Herlugson of BP describes ratios of 1.5:1 or 2:1 as fairly typical, 
but adds that there are no “hard and fast rules.” In most cases the resulting offset is whatever 
is considered by all concerned to be “most appropriate for the conditions.” In Mexico, 
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according to José Carlos Fernandez, the ratio is varied depending on the proximity of the offset 
to the damaged site. Thus, for example, if the offset takes place on adjacent land the ratio may 
be one-to-one, whereas for a more distant offset a ratio of 2:1 or higher may be required. 
 
“Experience suggests that having the geographical area of the 
offset project be a small multiple of the size of the area originally 
developed or degraded helps overcome any residual doubts that 
the offset is an adequate compensation for the original damage.  
A useful approach to dealing with uncertainty is [thus] to take a 
simple multiple of the area damaged.” 
Geoff Burton, Environment Australia 
 
However scientific the basis for assessing the biodiversity affected and offset, there is likely to 
be a strong subjective element involved.  This highlights the importance of the question of who 
decides what is a satisfactory offset, which is the subject of Chapter 7.  As Dave Richards of Rio 
Tinto puts it, “Given the problems of measuring and quantifying biodiversity, we’re going to 
have to start by making the case for net positive benefit through being transparent.  At 
present, we can’t prove in factual measures that it’s a net positive benefit, because the 
methods are not yet accepted and proven.  Initially, we expect to base our reporting on what 
we believe is reasonable, and we will involve our external partners in that process”, he says.  “If 
it is not patently fair, people will take against it.”  
? Economic valuation 
While most existing biodiversity offset initiatives aim to achieve ecological equivalence, as 
described above, few make any effort to determine the economic value of habitat gained or 
lost.  The application of economic valuation methods to biodiversity offsets remains relatively 
undeveloped.  As noted by Sachin Kapila of Shell, “there's lots of debate going on …. [but] few, 
if any, are looking at value.” 
Given the challenges of establishing an ecological currency for biodiversity offsets, and the 
strong subjective element of people’s preferences for conservation of different habitats, an 
alternative approach is to use a monetary currency.  Economic valuation techniques can be 
used to assess people’s preferences for different types of habitat in different locations, and 
thus help determine what type of offset will compensate for the loss of welfare that people feel 
when existing natural habitat is damaged due to development.  
Recent legal precedents in North America suggest that economic valuation may become more 
widely used as a means of determining appropriate compensation for environmental losses.  In 
the case of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, for instance, US courts accepted the use of valuation 
methods to estimate environmental damage claims, including non-use or “existence” values 
held by people who were not directly affected by the spill.  More recently, in 2003, the National 
Ecology Institute organised a seminar for members of the US and Mexican Supreme Courts to 
share experiences on environmental fines (e.g. for failure to comply with environmental 
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regulations) and compensation (e.g. valuing claims against companies for environmental 
damages).  
A weakness of economic valuation is that most methods generate piecemeal estimates of 
specific values (e.g. recreation, landscape, existence value), rather than a holistic view of an 
entire ecosystem.  Moreover, economists continue to debate the validity of valuation methods, 
undermining public confidence in their findings.  According to José Carlos Fernandez, until 
economic valuation becomes routine and reliable, the courts and others will continue to rely 
on existing methods such as habitat equivalence and multiples.  
6.2 Optimising conservation benefits 
While offsets involving land similar and close to that developed may be preferred because they 
are easier to judge and measure, in some cases it is neither possible nor appropriate to seek 
perfect ecological equivalence.  As noted by Geoff Burton of Environment Australia, it is often 
“best to aim for conservation of complex systems [rather than] direct equivalence.”  He gives 
the example of a mine site where the original ecosystem was “relatively sparse,” in terms of 
species diversity.  While the proposed offset was not identical, the potential increase in species 
richness that would result from remediation efforts was judged more important than achieving 
ecological equivalence.  He adds, however, that direct equivalence may be appropriate where 
unique habitats or endangered species are concerned. 
The question of what constitutes an appropriate offset is a subject of much debate in the US. 
Referring to a recent report on wetland banking by the National Academy of Sciences, Palmer 
Hough of US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) notes that the preference for ecological 
similarity and offsets close to the site damaged within the same ecosystem “may be 
contradictory to a watershed or ecosystem approach.”  Bob Brumbaugh of US Army Corps of 
Engineers agrees and adds that focussing strictly on mitigation of similar ecosystems close to 
the site damaged has been problematic in the US.  He suggests that we should try to imagine 
“what would the watershed want?”  In many cases, he adds, environmental goods and services 
“could be better provided by going off-site or out-of-kind”. 
Rich Mogensen of Earthmark describes more acceptance of out-of-kind mitigation, focused 
less on strict ecological equivalence in the US, based on growing recognition that a more 
flexible approach could achieve more effective conservation.  Thus, for example, instead of 
“creating the same kind of wetlands somewhere else”, there may be cases where “restoring 
water flow upstream could do more for the environment and the watershed.”  
Another interviewee argued that while ecological equivalence of an offset is to be favoured, 
allowing a degree more flexibility enables small, isolated blocks of degraded ecosystem to be 
exchanged for much larger chunks of functioning ecosystems, with far greater conservation 
benefits.  Jason Coccia of the US-based Conservation Fund agrees that what is important is “to 
create greater biodiversity value and, if possible, enhance it.”  
Michael Bean argues that in either case, whether an offset attempts to provide an equivalent 
ecosystem or something completely different, “the key issue is clearly expressing the link 
between what is being offset and what is being lost.”  Looking further ahead, David Brand 
suggests that out-of-kind offsets could become routine “when markets [for biodiversity] are 
liquid and deep.” 
However, arguments in favour of departures from ecological equivalence in order to prefer the 
conservation of other, more worthwhile conservation targets rest on such conservation 
priorities having been identified and agreed.  As Chris Spray of Northumbrian Water notes, 
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there is all too often a lack of consensus and clarity about conservation priorities within the 
environmental community, which makes it difficult to determine an appropriate offset.  
Northumbrian Water has been able to refer to UK government priorities, set out in the UK 
Biodiversity Strategy, but such clear prioritisation may be lacking in other countries. 
6.3 Location  
The issue of where conservation activities to offset unavoidable harm should take place is 
linked to consideration of the kind of ecosystems and species to be conserved (see sections 
6.1 and 6.2), but also raises some additional questions.  If the goal of offset is to conserve 
equivalent biodiversity to that damaged by the development, the location of the offsetting 
activity is likely to be influenced by where similar ecosystems that could be conserved may be 
found.  But if suitable ecosystems occur in many locations, or if the objective of the offset is 
defined more in terms of conservation priorities and values than specific ecological 
equivalence to the site affected, questions will arise as to how close to the site of impact the 
offsetting activities should be conducted.  In the end, issues such as fairness, social license to 
operate and the sense of ownership by local communities needed to guarantee conservation 
results are just as likely to shape an acceptable outcome as the ecological value of the site.  
This section will discuss factors other than ecological equivalence that might affect the 
selection of areas to be conserved through biodiversity offsets.  It will address arguments for 
implementing offsets as locally as possible to the site impacted; arguments for more flexibility 
allowing offsetting activities to be conducted further afield in order to meet conservation 
priorities; questions as to whether companies should ensure “no net loss” at the site- or 
corporate- level; and whether there would be advantages in an internationally tradable system 
of offsets or conservation credits, analogous to the international trade in carbon credits.  
6.3.1 Proximity to the site affected 
The majority of interviewees argued for implementing offsets as locally as possible to the site 
impacted, principally because they felt that public acceptance would be more likely when local 
communities can see benefits.  As Geoff Burton of Environment Australia put it, “To achieve the 
community support on which the whole thing stands or falls, it is best to have sufficient 
propinquity between the site of the offset and the mining site, so people can feel there is a 
clear connection.  The further away the offset is from the original site, the more tenuous is the 
connection and the less support there would be from the community - whether you're 
speaking of the 'community' at the local, regional or state level.  If the offset were in an 
adjacent wetland, that would be OK, but if it were outside state territory, there would be little 
ownership by the local community and their representatives, local govt and stakeholders. Ian 
Wood, from BHP-Billiton agrees.  “A tonne of carbon is the same anywhere in the world and 
people don't care where it came from, but so many conservation issues are local that the 
offset needs to be seen in the local context.  People would not be happy if their local protected 
area was impacted and the conservation benefit was way away in Malaysia.”  
Chris Spray of Northumbrian Water adds that “You could get the reverse of ‘NIMBY’ [‘Not-in-
my-backyard’] if locals lose out.  It wouldn’t do to say ‘you’re ruining this patch but mending 
one far away’.  I suspect what is needed is a short distance between the impacted and the 
offset sites, so locals benefit.”  Alice Ruhweza from Uganda’s National Environment 
Management Authority says that in Uganda “Local people have to see the benefit of the offset. 
In some circumstances, they can also manage the offset project.”  Chris Herlugson explains 
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that BP has had the same experience.  “You’re looking at what’s appropriate in your area or 
region.  We feel our mitigation projects should be where the impact occurs.”  
As well as the advantage of securing the consent and motivation of local communities, 
decentralisation of government – and thus the likelihood of having to deal with different 
government authorities in the area affected and the area where the offset takes place – offers 
another reason for considering offsets close to the site impacted.  Alice Ruhweza described 
how Uganda has decentralised environmental management to the district level, and thus how 
it would be more manageable to arrange offsets within this level of jurisdiction.   
Again, this will have to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis, since there are instances where 
an ecosystem being damaged provides benefits and services to people and environments 
thousands of miles away.  Rick Herd, a consultant who used to work on these issues for 
Allegheny Power, a major US utility, says determining the scale and level of work is an “age old 
problem.”  He argues that, to a large extent, it needs to depend on the level of impact.  He 
gives the example of river pollution, where he says certain pollutants such as iron and 
aluminium have limited impacts, and therefore can be offset locally at the level of rivers and 
watersheds, whereas other forms of damage – for instance nutrient pollution – have wider 
impacts and therefore have to be considered at a much broader scale.  By way of example he 
notes, “Nutrient pollution in West Virginia has an impact all the way down to the Gulf of 
Mexico.  So offsetting is more difficult.” 
6.3.2 The bigger picture: offsets further afield  
Despite the inherent appeal of establishing the offset close to the area damaged, as was 
suggested earlier, there are arguments for allowing offsetting activities to be conducted 
further afield in order to focus on conservation priorities.  There may be other, more valuable 
and critically endangered ecosystems and species that need to be protected elsewhere.  At 
the same time, resources may be scarce and the investment in conservation generated by 
offsets may be an important (or even the only) mechanism for securing their future.  Or, the 
development project may occur in an ecosystem that is of comparatively low biodiversity 
value.  In all these cases, it may make more sense for the offsetting activities – and financial 
resources – to be focused on securing a more representative national or regional system of 
conservation areas, even if these are distant from the site damaged. 
It is important to take account of wider national and regional priorities and broader 
ecoregional considerations.  Candace Skarlatos of Bank of America believes that what is 
needed is landscape-level planning that involves all stakeholders in determining conservation 
priorities.  “We need more studies on what needs to be protected,” she explains.  “It is 
pointless conserving small plots that will fail when development happens all around them.  We 
must look at how protection fits into the overall system.  When we are starting the process, we 
need to know where we can go ahead and build and where, regionally, we shouldn’t build at 
all.”  
According to Bob Brumbaugh of the US Army Corps of Engineers, “We need a structured 
approach to prioritising conservation, with logic involving watershed, ecosystem and 
landscape perspectives”.  David Brand of Hancock Natural Resources Group agrees that 
broader spatial planning is the trend for the future.  “In the longer term,” he says, “I would like 
to see a more regional, ecosystemic approach, where ecosystems are treated as pools of 
biodiversity.  If you create, protect, develop, or enhance them, then you get credit; if you 
destroy them, that’s a debit.” 
Some policy-makers who are well aware of the need to deliver benefits to local stakeholders 
are already thinking of how to reconcile these needs with such ecoregional considerations. 
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“We are talking about how to break through the distance barrier,” says José Carlos Fernandez. 
“From the public opinion perspective, distance matters.  The closer the offsetting activity, the 
easier is public acceptance.  The worry is that the most effective conservation may not have 
any benefits to the local community.  So maybe we need to think of a limit, a top percentage, of 
offsets that can be bought elsewhere.  Secondly, we need to be aware that some things are 
simply not ‘offsetable’ or tradable.  We should think about a critical threshold.  You need to 
qualify which type of damage is ‘offsetable’ and which is not.  For instance, if a project involves 
harm to endemic species or very rare ecosystems, development may not be appropriate.  If 
development can safely go ahead, you should ensure that the offset supports the conservation 
of those same species and ecosystems.  If you are talking about more standard ecosystems, it 
may be fine to conserve something different instead.” 
Within the aim of securing the maximum conservation value through the offsetting activities, 
there is a range of options, from offsets that conserve whichever area is top of a country’s 
conservation priorities (even ecosystems completely dissimilar to those damaged and very 
distant from the development), to offsets that protect ecosystems similar to those damaged, 
but which may not be on the doorstep of the development project.  
At one extreme, the pure logic of focussing offset activities on the country’s conservation 
priorities suggests that the offsetting activities could be decoupled altogether from the nature 
of the ecosystem affected by development, and focus on dissimilar ecosystems, anywhere in 
the country.  As argued by Geoff Burton of Environment Australia, “The biodiversity outcome is 
more important than ensuring equivalence of the actual ecosystem damaged or the 
conservation of the immediate habitat, provided the ecosystem functions and visual aspect of 
the development site were properly restored.”   
 
Box 23: Brazilian “Units of Conservation” 
The Brazilian National System of Conservation Units described in Box 23 converts the 
damage inflicted by the development project, based on the scale of the investment, into 
“units” to be spent on conservation by the government anywhere within the jurisdiction 
concerned, while aiming to achieve the optimum conservation results.  The system is 
administered at the federal level by IBAMA, but IBAMA delegates the function to state 
agencies.  Most of the Conservation Units created through offsets to compensate for 
private investment fall under state jurisdiction, so are created within the state’s boundary.  
However, where a project lies on a state or national boundary, IBAMA may create 
Conservation Units in any of the States involved.  
Source: personal communication, Juliana Rehfeld, Anglo American Brazil. 
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6.3.3 International trade  
Could there be conservation and economic arguments that support an internationally tradable 
system of biodiversity offsets or conservation credits, analogous to the international trade in 
carbon credits?  
Several of our interviewees have been involved in international carbon markets, but few felt it 
was credible to suggest that an international market in biodiversity credits would develop, 
certainly not in the short- to medium-term.  In their view, this was mostly because the political 
will for offsets would rest on national and even local stakeholders deriving palpable benefits 
from the offsetting activities.  “I don't get any sense that the stakeholders we work with would 
support a system that traded conservation in Indonesia for damage in Ireland”, says Ian Wood 
of BHP-Billiton.  
In addition, the further afield the offset is from the site damaged, the harder it is to establish 
ecological equivalence and demonstrate “no net loss”.  As David Brand, of Hancock Natural 
Resources Group explains, “You can’t trade jaguars for tigers.”  Brand, however, does believe 
that eventually, “when markets are liquid and deep” such trades might be possible, but that 
they will take the form of financial transactions, and that such a system is “far in the future”. 
Despite this, some companies are looking forward to the possibility of savings that could be 
made in the future by banking conservation credits or trading them internationally.  “If 
biodiversity offsets emerge as a market mechanism,” says Sachin Kapila of Shell, “it may be 
interesting to see how we could be more cost-efficient through banking conservation 
activities, getting credits and trading them.  Perhaps biodiversity credits could be purchased 
from developing countries, where conservation activities may be more cost effective than in 
developed areas where most of the biodiversity has already gone.”  
Kapila, however, cautions that such a system will be difficult to achieve.  “You’d need any 
international system to be very transparent at the local level and very participatory,” he says.  
“You will probably need a central clearing mechanism to support international trade: a sort of 
central bank clearing-house that traded in credits that were market instruments, just like 
others.  I do believe one day we will be able to trade biodiversity offsets.  It just needs very 
clever leaders.  Give it five or ten years.”  
6.3.4 Should “no net loss” for companies be at the site or corporate 
level? 
Another important issue that will affect the location and scale of offsetting activities is whether 
“no net loss” is to be calculated at the site or corporate level.  Dave Richards of Rio Tinto 
explains the dilemma.  “We’ve been discussing whether to offset on a case-by-case basis, or on 
the basis of ensuring a net positive contribution for the Group as a whole.  If we say we are 
going to have a net positive effect, we could add up our 100 or so operations in 24 countries 
and add in our corporate biodiversity programmes.  There would be a difference between this 
approach and the result if we said we would make a net positive effect at a smaller scale – at a 
national level or even site or regional level.  We’ve come to the conclusion that people will 
increasingly expect us to demonstrate a net positive effect on the ground, and to be 
accounting at a lower level than the global level.”  Martin Hollands of Fauna and Flora 
International concurs.  “I agree there is probably a legitimate ethical case for “no net loss” at 
the group level, but that alone isn’t what stakeholders such as communities or regulators are 
going to find acceptable.  So, for business, the tactic has to be to show “no net loss” at the 
local level as well as at the group level.  
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If, then, the principle of offsets should apply at business unit rather than corporate level, does 
that mean that companies should offset the biodiversity impact of each and every operation?  
BP argues for room to ensure that “no net loss” is calculated at a more macro level.  In the 
conclusions chapter, we suggest a two-part strategy for companies; offsetting at the business 
unit to demonstrate no net loss at sites of high biodiversity value (and thus business risk) and 
making broader contributions at the group level to conservation for the cumulative impact of 
the rest of the company’s operations on biodiversity. 
6.4 Timelines 
When designing biodiversity offsets it is important to pay attention to two main issues of 
timing.  One relates to the duration of the offsetting project and the other to when the damage 
is done compared to when the offsetting activities take place.  
6.4.1 Duration of offsetting obligations 
While many environmental organisations argue that the offsetting projects should be 
implemented “in perpetuity”, in practice this can often be very difficult to achieve.  As one 
observer put it, “perpetuity is an awfully long time.” 
Bob Brumbaugh, of the US Army Corps of Engineers argues that the duration of the offsetting 
project should relate closely to the duration of the expected impact.  “In some cases,” he says, 
“permanence doesn’t make sense.  Sometimes impacts aren’t permanent; they disappear. Still, 
in no case should the mitigation last less than the expected impacts.”  He believes that 
focusing too doggedly on getting offsets to last “in perpetuity” may in the long run be counter-
productive.  He says he would rather mimic natural systems and focus on the sustainability of 
the offset.  Having said that, he recognises that terms like “in perpetuity” are easy to 
understand and that they satisfy government representatives and other stakeholders that 
make the offsets (and the behaviours being offset) possible.  
Along similar lines, José Carlos Fernandez of Mexico’s National Ecology Institute adds that 
impact assessment, as an input to the design of offsets, needs to account for the duration and 
reversibility of ecological damage.  For example, “where something is irreversibly transformed 
so that it is economically and physically irreversible,” it may be appropriate to create an offset 
in the form of a permanent nature reserve with sufficient funds held in trust to ensure 
management in perpetuity.  In other situations, the damage from development may be long 
lasting but reversible, in which case an offset might aim to replace the loss of ecological 
services during the period of restoration or recovery.  A third category of offset, for relatively 
low-priority sites, could involve little more than charging the developer the full cost of clean up 
and rehabilitation. 
In the US, there are some interesting examples of how companies attempt to deal with the 
duration and viability of offsets.  For instance, conservation banks in California require not only 
that the development rights to the land be set aside in perpetuity in the form of conservation 
easements held by qualified non-profit organisations or one of the regulating resource 
agencies, but also that financial mechanisms (e.g. trust funds and endowments) be created 
that can help finance the management of these areas in perpetuity.  Tina Bartlett, who is the 
Conservation Banking Co-ordinator at the California Department of Fish and Game, 
acknowledges that these sorts of financial and legal requirements are necessary to ensure 
permanence and longevity, while they may involve some practical difficulties. 
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In addition to helping ensure that any damage is well and truly offset, mechanisms such as 
easements and trust funds may also help appease stakeholders, thus allowing the project to 
go ahead and limiting some of the reputational risks associated with projects that damage 
biodiversity.  In fact, according to Burton and others, when designing offsets, it is important to 
bear in mind not just how long the damage to biodiversity might last, but also the duration of 
the benefits the company can accrue from the offsets.  “The greatest value to a company [of an 
offset],” says Burton, “is if the offset’s benefits (through visibility of actions, etc.) continue after 
the company ceases mining.  In other words, the duration of the harmful project is less 
relevant [than the duration of the offset’s reputational benefits].” 
The issue of legal liability and the public perception of corporate responsibility (which can 
often outlast it) are also important when considering the duration of offset projects.  In the US, 
for instance, legal liability for damaging a wetland can be passed on to a wetlands mitigation 
bank.  In fact, this transfer of liability is one of the biggest selling points for mitigation banks 
(see section 5.1.6 above).  
While legal liabilities can sometimes be transferred or sold, reputational liabilities are often 
harder to shift.  One company told a powerful anecdote that argues strongly in favour of 
ensuring that liabilities and long-term projects like biodiversity offsets are fully funded and 
properly transferred if certain interests are sold.  The company concerned owned a refinery 
which had designated an area onsite for the disposed of heavy oil.  Before the site was due for 
remediation, the company sold the refinery and passed on the obligations to clean up the 
heavy oil to the government of country concerned, which in turn hired a national oil company 
to conduct the remediation.  In the event, the remediation was not carried out.  Although the 
original company had sold the site and the obligation to remediate, it was still blamed for the 
damage.  “We paid for it in the reputational sense”, the company representative said.  “And we 
may still come away suffering.”  
The moral of this story is that while legal liabilities may have limited lifespans, reputational 
liabilities can last much longer.  Companies need to bear this in mind when designing 
biodiversity offsets and ensure that these are properly administered and funded to deliver the 
results planned over the lifetime of the project, which may well outlive the company’s direct 
control. 
6.4.2 Should offsets be implemented in anticipation of 
development projects? 
Some argue that damage to biodiversity should only take place once the offsetting activities 
are operational and have proven themselves, so there is no net loss at any period of time, and 
the risk of the project failing to deliver the desired conservation outcomes is reduced.  In the 
US, this is the standard against which wetlands mitigation banks are judged.  By law, mitigation 
banks cannot get their credits approved –and therefore cannot sell credits to developers– until 
and unless the wetland they are purchasing as an offset has already been restored or 
protected. 
While this imposes substantial up-front costs for mitigation bankers (and saddles them with 
many of the risks inherent in creating a mitigation bank), NGOs and others have argued that 
having the offsetting project operational before the damage is done is essential to the viability 
of the model.  One study (National Research Council, 2001) found that “Compensatory 
mitigation should be in place concurrent with, and preferably before, permitted activity.” This, 
they argued, would give the greatest assurances that what was being damaged was effectively 
offset.  
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However, biodiversity offsets cover a far broader range of ecosystems and locations than 
wetlands in the US, and they are intended to offset the unavoidable harm in the specific 
context of each development project, tailored to the particular case and designed with the 
involvement of the communities who will be affected by the development project.  The 
appropriate offset and the relevant stakeholders are likely to be foreseeable only when the 
project itself is being designed, so that the anticipatory approach adopted in the case of US 
wetlands is unlikely to work for all biodiversity offsets.  
6.5 What kind of activities count as legitimate 
“offsets”? 
Biodiversity offsets are usually defined in terms of ecological equivalence and “no-net-loss” of 
habitat, as described above.  In addition to the challenge of measuring the impacts on the site 
affected and the equivalence or superior conservation value of the site proposed for the offset, 
two other questions go to the heart of whether activities can be regarded as offsets that result 
in no net loss.  One is whether the offsetting activity represents a genuinely new contribution 
to conservation or whether the project would have taken place anyway: an issue sometimes 
referred to as “additionality”.  The other question is whether broader activities relevant to 
conservation, such as taxonomy or capacity-building “count” as biodiversity offsets, or 
whether in situ conservation of biodiversity alone will satisfy the “no net loss” approach.  This 
chapter will explore each issue in turn. 
6.5.1 Additionality 
What counts as equal and opposite conservation activity to the negative impacts caused to 
habitats by development projects?  Do the offsetting projects or activities truly add value?  Are 
they new and additional or would the projects have taken place anyway, with or without the 
biodiversity offsets?  A range of possibilities exists for activities that create additional 
conservation benefits.  Three examples are as follows: 
? Foregone losses:  Ensuring the future conservation of an area which would itself 
otherwise have been degraded through development.  In the field of carbon offsets, 
“avoided deforestation” is currently not credited for carbon sequestration under the Kyoto 
protocol.  Some Parties to the treaty were concerned about the problems of proving that 
the habitat would indeed have been lost and some found it unpalatable to be in a position 
where supposedly doomed habitats could effectively be ransomed.  However, the 
importance of finding a biodiversity offset that makes the most significant contribution to 
conservation was stressed by many of our interviewees.  If all the stakeholders in a given 
case could satisfy themselves that a given area was of conservation value and was truly 
under threat, conserving it through a biodiversity offset may be a viable option. 
? Meeting the costs of existing conservation:  This could entail contributing funds to 
support conservation work on protected areas, which may nonetheless be threatened by 
lack of resources.  If an area has already been designated as protected, could 
contributions to its conservation count as a biodiversity offset?  The resulting conservation 
would not be additional in the sense of contributing a new piece of habitat for 
conservation.  But in many countries, the protected area systems are significantly 
underfunded to such a degree that the long-term viability of the area is genuinely 
threatened.  A common example is where illegal logging is making incursions into 
protected area, but the authorities have insufficient financial resources to enforce the 
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security of the park.  It may be argued that financial contributions to park budgets in such a 
context could create additional conservation outcomes in an area that the country has 
already deemed a conservation priority.  
Our interviewees pointed out that the more that a company can prove that the conservation 
project it is undertaking is “new and additional”, the better.  Both Bob Watson and Habiba 
Gitay of the World Bank have noted that a project can only be considered an offset if the area 
conserved was potentially under threat.  “You have to be confident,” says Ian Wood of BHP 
Billiton, “that, if the offset had not been done, the area would have been trashed. Otherwise it 
is not ‘no net loss.’” 
Having said that, a number of the companies interviewed expressed some concern about a 
rigid interpretation of the principle of additionality.  They asked whether, in the interests of 
conservation, it might not be better in some instances for offsets to provide “new and 
additional” support to existing conservation activities.  Should the concept of “new and 
additional,” they asked, only apply to the areas being conserved, or might it, in some cases, 
apply to the support and resources being provided?  After all, they argued, existing projects 
may have a higher likelihood of success (and presumably already have some level of 
community/government support) than projects that have to be started from scratch. 
Geoff Burton of Environment Australia pointed out that, in some cases, there might be a slight 
tension between gaining community support for an offset project and ensuring that the project 
accomplishes something “new and additional” for biodiversity.  “From a practical point of 
view,” he says, “if you buy into something with existing community support, it is better than a 
new project for which you have to build support anew.  But that raises the question 'is that OK 
for biodiversity'?  There may be tension between capitalising on existing community support 
for a project and providing additionality for biodiversity.”  What’s more, Burton believes that 
public affairs staff within companies may well prefer to buy into existing conservation projects, 
which may be seen as more credible than new ones. 
In the end, as with so many of the issues surrounding biodiversity offsets, the people 
interviewed concluded that the issue of additionality could only be resolved on a case-by-case 
basis.  In some cases, support for existing projects might accomplish more for biodiversity 
than creating new projects, while in other cases, creating new projects would appear to make 
more sense.  
6.5.2 Conservation or capacity building?  
Offsets generally take the form of investments in habitat restoration or conservation, even if it 
is far removed from the site of development impacts.  But what about other forms of 
compensation?  There may be situations where local stakeholders give higher priority to 
investments in building the capacity of conservation agencies, or environmental education, 
than to restoration or conservation of natural habitat.  Going even further “out of kind”, some 
communities and governments may prefer compensation for environmental damages in the 
form of investments that have nothing whatsoever to do with conservation, such as improved 
public services or local economic development. 
As chapter 7 will discuss, the challenge of achieving a viable biodiversity offset is to reconcile 
the different (and sometimes conflicting) priorities of different stakeholders, while taking 
account of local opportunities and constraints.  Chris Herlugson of BP notes that in some 
countries it may not be feasible to provide an offset by designating new and additional 
protected area or demarcating land for conservation purposes.  In such cases, other types of 
investments may be the best or only option for offsetting environmental damage.  He cites 
examples such as support for environmental research, capacity building, environmental 
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education, training and awareness raising.  Chris’ colleague Kathryn Shanks describes such a 
situation in Indonesia, where BP worked with others to identify the root causes of biodiversity 
loss and design an appropriate response.  They concluded that the physical “footprint” of BP’s 
gas facility was a less significant threat to biodiversity than the lack of conservation capacity in 
the area, prompting the company to invest in an environmental training centre that had been 
abandoned due to lack of support.  (BP also provided a more conventional offset in the form of 
ecosystem restoration.) 
Dave Richards of Rio Tinto likewise asks whether biodiversity offsets must always be limited to 
land or habitat “swaps.”  Citing the example of a World Heritage Site that is at risk, he suggests 
that the presence of a large mine next door may be less of a threat than the lack of management 
planning and capacity.  In such cases, “would it not be better, instead of always securing bits of 
land, to look at where the greatest difference can be made, for example by building capacity to 
manage conservation sites that are under threat.” 
Sachin Kapila of Shell notes that out-of-kind offsets could also provide opportunities for 
activities that have little or no direct impact on biodiversity.  “What are the opportunities,” he 
asks, “to look at supply chain issues in retail petrol stations?”  In his view, companies should be 
able to choose from a range of options to deliver offsets, depending on the type of operation 
concerned.  In the case of a pipeline, for example, a direct “habitat for habitat” approach may 
be appropriate. In other cases, offsets might take the form of support for conservation more 
generally, including policy changes, awareness raising, research and capacity building.  Kapila 
acknowledges, however, that it will not be easy to show how such activities offset 
environmental damage. 
It is likely that capacity-building will be important to secure the success of biodiversity offsets.  
Some interviewees felt it would be necessary to build the capacity of some stakeholders to 
engage in offsetting negotiations.  As one put it, “We pay for some of our NGOs to get advice 
because we want them to be able to have a logical conversation with us.  In a lot of cases, it 
would be very advantageous to us to build stakeholders’ capacity to engage in discussion, 
particularly in least developed countries.”   
According to this argument, capacity-building is vital for companies to secure license to 
operate, but it should be seen as a separate activity from the conservation involved in 
biodiversity offsets.  Several referred to the “cynicism” stakeholders and observers would feel 
if companies presented training and scientific research in lieu of damaged ecosystems.  As one 
interviewee put it, “local people would not be willing to trade habitat for education.  Education 
is not always a direct conservation benefit”.  Martin Hollands of Fauna and Flora International 
adds, “It is great in principle to say ‘we wish to balance negative impacts on habitat with 
investment in the development of capacity for conservation’.  But how do you quantify the 
impact of that?  You would need a very strong case to demonstrate the impact of capacity-
building measures in terms of solid conservation outcomes.”  
According to José Carlos Fernandez of Mexico’s National Ecology Institute, “I don’t think 
broader concepts for what counts as offset are appealing.  It is difficult to argue that you are 
compensating for irreversible loss of habitat by having a few workshops!  If you could show the 
work was credibly related to lowering threats of further irreversible dangers, just possibly you 
might have an argument.  Or you could enter into an agreement with the local community for 
alternative development opportunities by contracting the community to carry out the 
conservation.  It's a question of credibility.” 
Chris Spray of Northumbrian Water suggests that one solution might be to invest a percentage 
of the budget for the offset activities into capacity-building to secure the long-term success of 
the offsetting conservation activities. 
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6.5.3 Conservation or development?  
An extension of the issue of what range of conservation-related activities would satisfy 
stakeholders as a biodiversity offset is the question as to whether pure economic and 
development benefits represent satisfactory compensation for biodiversity losses.  Hitherto, 
economic benefits such as employment opportunities and contribution to GDP were regarded 
as adequate trade-offs for the environmental impacts.  At the level of sustainable development 
strategy, it falls to government to determine major issues of policy such as this.  However, 
companies may have to tackle these issues at the site level when they are raised during 
stakeholder consultations.  One company described an experience with one of its operations in 
Brazil, when a Town Mayor felt the company need not bother with conservation benefits for 
the project, but should focus instead on community development.  As our interviewees 
suggest (see chapter 5.3.2), companies increasingly believe a development project should 
deliver both environmental and developmental benefits, rather than trading one off against the 
other.  Several interviewees described the benefits of dialogue with government in order to 
reach a conclusion on some of the value judgements inevitably involved in these decisions. As 
Chris Spray of Northumbrian Water puts it, “We have no way of saying if a Site of Special 
Scientific Interest is more important than a village shop.  Hence we need to accept that there 
will always be an element of value judgement.” 
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7 How to offset: stakeholder issues  
Chapter 6 explored a number of the components of biodiversity offsets that deserve careful 
consideration if they are to deliver both conservation and business benefits, such as:  Where 
should the offsetting activities take place?  How long should they last?  And what kind of 
conservation activities provide a satisfactory offset that adequately compensates for the 
impacts of development projects?  This chapter turns to perhaps the most important question 
of all: Who decides?  People often value natural habitat differently, depending on their personal 
circumstances as well as the characteristics of the habitat in question.  If the design, 
implementation and evaluation of offsets are carried out without adequate participation, 
expertise or commitment by the companies, governments and communities involved, they 
could fail to achieve conservation outcomes, business benefits will not materialise and 
stakeholders and observers may well criticise the outcome.  This chapter explores who is 
involved in the design of offsets, who implements them and who evaluates their success.  
7.1 Who is involved in designing an offset and who 
decides whether it is acceptable? 
Just as fundamental to offset as issues of currency and location is the question of who 
determines what is fair and acceptable.  During our interviews, it was evident that government 
is seen as a key – if not the determinant – partner in the decision, even if the offset is a purely 
voluntary initiative.  Several company representatives pointed out that corporations are not 
biodiversity experts and should not be the ones to decide whether a biodiversity offset is 
acceptable and whether it is appropriately conceived.  BP spoke for many, saying “it is very 
difficult for a company, even one as big as BP, to decide what space should you invest in to 
conserve biodiversity for the long term.  We need a lot of help to make long term decisions for 
the right outcome.  We try and participate in a process to work with regulators and 
conservation organisations to see how we can contribute what’s appropriate.”  Many 
interviewees stressed how helpful it is when government makes its priorities for the 
conservation of biodiversity clear through law or policy, such as national biodiversity strategies 
and action plans, and also through involvement in case-by-case negotiations.  “Biodiversity is a 
useful paradigm for business in the UK, as the UK has biodiversity targets and costed 
programmes with agreed measures of success: something the conservation movement never 
had before,” says Chris Spray of Northumbrian Water.  “We can work within that.  Business 
does not need to answer the question:  “What is the conservation priority here?”  We can use 
the government’s priorities.  We simply accept that conserving the Gurney’s Pitta is key, if that 
is what the authorities and experts tell us.”  
“The absolute ideal would be if there was agreement by the governments within a region on 
conservation priorities and how impacts should be offset, and a transparent process and 
sound scientific basis for designing offsets was established.  Local governments would have 
established a mechanism to decide these priorities.  And, ideally, there would be agreement in 
the conservation world on how to manage an area for prioritised conservation outcomes, with 
zoning, as appropriate, for development.  A regional plan would be developed transparently, 
based on a democratic process and informed consent, in consultation with local and 
indigenous communities, central and local government and with business.  Several companies 
working within the same area would participate together.  Funding would be secured for 20 – 
30 years to ensure the long-term conservation of the region.  That would be a constructive 
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programme.  Without a scientific basis or transparent process, you just get into tit-for-tat 
arguments about whether a multiple of 1.5 or 2 times the damaged area is appropriate,” says 
Kathryn Shanks of BP.  
Several interviewees referred to “increasing frustration that the conservation community can’t 
decide what to do, where, when and why”.  They made a strong plea for a more planned and 
united input from the conservation community, which could help by communicating a clearer 
and shared vision on conservation priorities.  They described a growing tendency for 
companies to turn to environmental or conservation groups to help in these areas and to 
participate in planning projects such as biodiversity offsets.  
Our impression from the interviews is that some companies seeking to move forward on this 
issue are not finding the clarity and support from governments and the conservation 
community that they feel is needed to make biodiversity offsets work.  As David Richards of Rio 
Tinto put it, “We’re willing and committed to biodiversity offsets, but at the moment we don’t 
see much agreement in conservation policy and science about how to go about this.  There is a 
lot of uncertainty about whether offsets are an acceptable device and how they should be 
constructed.  This is true right down to how you quantify the minus and plus parts of what’s 
essentially a sum so that you can demonstrate a net positive effect.  More progress on these 
aspects is needed in the conservation community.”  Martin Hollands, from the conservation 
NGO community, acknowledges this.  “We NGOs are already being strongly challenged by the 
major donors on biodiversity to quantify our impact on conservation.  Companies are now 
throwing down another challenge.  How to develop methodologies on measuring and 
balancing, as the basis for designing biodiversity offsets.” 
A further challenge is that it will not always be easy to reach consensus among the parties 
involved on what is the most appropriate biodiversity offset project.  Just as with any other 
multistakeholder discussion, those involved may hold strongly opposing views.  In some cases, 
government will be the ultimate arbiter, as it grants the permissions and licenses for 
development projects.  However, particularly in the case of voluntary offsets, a company 
would be unlikely to proceed unless if felt the project was workable and enjoyed sufficient 
support to succeed.  This may depend on the capacity and level of involvement of local 
communities and NGOs.  
7.2 Who implements a biodiversity offset? 
Government, local communities, NGOs and the companies planning a commercial 
development may agree on a biodiversity offset project, but who is to carry it out?  Should the 
company maintain sole responsibility or residual involvement in implementation, or should 
government, local communities or a third party such as an NGO be responsible for conducting 
the conservation activities involved? 
Just as companies are not best qualified to design a biodiversity offset project, they may not be 
the most appropriate organisations to implement conservation activities in the field beyond 
their own fence.  Most interviewees were comfortable with the idea of the implementation 
being outsourced to a third party organisation with appropriate interest and qualifications in 
conservation.  
Several companies have experience of agreements with individuals and conservation groups 
to undertake conservation activities. For instance, Northumbrian Water has six environmental 
partnerships where independent third parties based in conservation organisations work on 
conservation projects on the company’s reservoirs.  The institutional affiliation of the person 
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concerned is the conservation organisation, but the company pays for their time on the 
project.  This can help both parties.  The company gains expertise and someone with the time 
and motivation to implement good conservation activities.  The company also benefits from 
additional leverage, as the conservation organisations can often obtain matched funding from 
foundations or other sources that increase the scale and impact of the conservation work.  The 
conservation organisation can carry out more conservation activities and generates a new 
source of funding.  In one example that Chris Spray gives, “We gave land to the local Wildlife 
Trust to work on a UK Biodiversity Action Plan key habitat and together developed 7 acres of 
reed beds and 11 acres of wetlands. We invested a further £50,000 and our partners were able 
to raise a further £400,000, including from the heritage lottery fund. For the land and the 
modest sum, we and our partners were able to generate a considerable sum for conservation 
and phenomenal PR.” 
Local communities have implemented long-term conservation projects with success in some 
areas, although this may depend on their experience.  According to José Carlos Fernandez, 
such agreements have only worked with a few communities historically.  In Oaxaca, 
communities in the North are already involved in selling carbon offsets, provide FSC certified 
wood, sell organic coffee and have designed their own bioprospecting project.  He believes 
that, if you were to attempt to find local groups to implement offsets in less well-organised 
communities elsewhere, particularly in a conflict region or somewhere with no track record of 
meeting contractual obligations, there is a heavy risk that the project’s objectives would not be 
met consistently.   
When deciding who should take on conservation duties, BP says “talk to the experts”.  In 
common with many other companies, BP works with The Nature Conservancy, Conservation 
International, Fauna and Flora International, WWF and many other local partners around the 
world, ranging from local environmental NGOs and schools to local government and other 
public agencies and institutions.  
“Delegation” or outsourcing the conservation implementation to a third party is the basis of 
the wetland banking system in the US, where several benefits have arisen from this approach.  
Certain organisations are involved in many mitigation projects, leading to consolidation of the 
areas protected.  This can support the effectiveness of conservation outcomes and make it 
easier to monitor the results.  The group of “experts” in mitigation that has emerged can help 
new projects succeed, by drawing on the experience of having run similar ones in the past. 
Despite these potential benefits of outsourcing biodiversity offsets, companies may wish to 
maintain some involvement in the conservation implementation activities.  They may feel there 
is more to gain from a closer, working relationship with NGO and community partners and may 
be better able to influence the outcomes. 
7.3 National systems to define and administer 
biodiversity offsets 
Governments with policy requiring or supporting offsets will generally establish an institutional 
framework for considering offset project proposals, applying guidelines to aim for consistency 
and building experience on factors that contribute to the success of offset design and 
implementation.  In the highly regulated context of the UK, for instance, the Secretary of State 
for the Environment is responsible for developing regulations, guidelines and for implementing 
the compensatory component of the Habitats and Birds Directives.  
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In Uganda, where a range of law provides the framework for biodiversity offsets (see chapter 
4.3), a Technical Committee is preparing a broad policy framework on various issues including 
biodiversity conservation and carbon offsets.  The committee involves representatives from 
the National Environment Management Authority and from other government departments 
and agencies, including the fisheries department.  NEMA is working in partnership with 
Makerere University’s Institute of Environment and Natural Resources to build a database 
showing the national distribution of biodiversity.  The objectives are to accumulate 
quantitative and qualitative data on the location, use and distribution of various groups of 
fauna and flora in Uganda, so that the impact of development projects and offsetting 
conservation activities can be prioritised.   
7.4 Who judges success?  
A biodiversity offset project is likely to be judged both formally and informally.  Formally, the 
undertakings made by the company involved may be audited by government for compliance with 
permits and licenses, and by parties to the offset activities for consistency with the agreement 
defining the project.  Companies may audit biodiversity offset projects just as with other aspects 
of corporate policy, strategy and management.  They may do so internally, through audit and 
assurance processes, or, preferably, externally, through independent monitoring and 
verification.  Some of the companies interviewed were explicit that they do not wish to take 
responsibility for certifying and authenticating biodiversity offsets.  “This needs to be done by an 
independent clearing house.  Companies can't take that on board themselves,” says Sachin 
Kapila of Shell. Michael Bean of Environmental Defense agrees.  He argues that “independent 
external third party verification will ultimately be very important to ensure the environmental 
benefits.  You can’t use your own stable of experts.  Independent verification could help assuage 
fears of greenwashing.” 
In addition to regulatory and contractual compliance checks and corporate auditing and 
verification, biodiversity offsets are likely to attract interest and be judged by local communities, 
NGOs and the media.  These reasons simply add to the inevitable desire on the part of project 
participants to monitor and evaluate how successful the project is in achieving its goals.  “People 
will want to form clear objectives and indicators for success so they can return later and say ‘did 
it work?’ And get an answer,” says Geoff Burton of Environment Australia.  
Several companies that Insight has interviewed for other biodiversity projects have described 
how difficult it is for them to find individuals from the usual auditing and verification 
organisations who are sufficiently competent on biodiversity to audit this aspect of their 
policies and activities (Grigg and ten Kate, 2004).  In these circumstances, NGOs involved in a 
biodiversity offset project may be able to help.  Independent third party organisations with 
specific biodiversity expertise may also offer verification as a service.  “The local Wildlife Trust 
was involved in gauging whether our biodiversity projects were successful,” says Chris Spray 
of Northumbrian Water.   
Experience with wetlands mitigation and conservation banking in the US offers some insights 
into monitoring and evaluation that may help those designing biodiversity offsets in the future. 
Palmer Hough of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) looks back at the US 
experience and feels that a shortcoming has been a lack of adequate funding to monitor and 
follow-up on mitigation projects.  Tina Bartlett from the California Department of Fish and 
Game agrees.  “We can always do better.  We are trying to achieve ‘no net loss’ and the full 
mitigation standards of California.  To do this, we are developing a mitigation banking database 
to track impact and compensation.  Currently, we must rely on existing information and on 
reporting by bank operators.  In the near future, we must refine the baseline monitoring 
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information and success criteria on both the impacting side and the mitigating side.  It would 
be helpful for public and NGOs to get involved to make it better.”  
The design of SMART9 targets and key performance indicators for biodiversity offset projects 
raises the abiding challenge for people working on biodiversity:  establishing measurable and 
meaningful indicators of conservation outcomes, rather than just procedures followed.  Given 
the scant knowledge of biodiversity, the lack of baseline data and the expense of gathering it, it 
is particularly difficult to measure rates of change in biodiversity and establish to what they are 
attributable.  As Michael Bean of Environmental Defense explains, “One difficulty will be 
establishing metrics to evaluate results.  It is useful to be systematic about this and important 
to clearly articulate the goal and then establish a metric for it.”  Difficult as it this is, it will be 
very important for participants in biodiversity offset projects to clarify early in the design phase 
what exactly are the project’s objectives, and then to design and refine indicators of 
performance. 
 
 
                                                 
9
 Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Time-bound.  
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8 Conclusions  
8.1 Views on offset  
8.1.1 Growing momentum and interest in biodiversity offsets 
Our evidence, while based on only 37 interviews, suggests that the use of biodiversity offsets 
as part of development projects is increasingly accepted as best practice by governments, 
companies and NGOs.  At the same time, the number of biodiversity offset projects is growing.  
On the governmental side, authorities are investigating how they can use existing legal 
frameworks or introduce new policy to facilitate the negotiation of biodiversity offsets as part 
of existing project approval processes.  Meanwhile, a number of companies are developing 
technical expertise, building institutional support and making the business case for voluntary 
offsets.  They are moving towards quantified approaches that can demonstrate “no net loss” 
or even “net benefit” to biodiversity, experimenting with implementation of biodiversity 
offsets, and calling for help in designing methodologies to assess both sides of the offset 
equation: their impact and actions to benefit to biodiversity.  Leadership groups of companies 
such as the International Council of Mining and Metals (ICMM) and multi-stakeholder 
partnerships such as the Energy and Biodiversity Initiative (EBI), to name but two, have also 
been working on the issue.  
Conversations with our interviewees revealed a range of interpretations and opinions on the 
new and rapidly evolving practice of biodiversity offsets, but the large majority of our 
interviewees voiced the opinion that, in the appropriate context, offsets have much to offer 
and should be further explored.  As Geoff Burton of Environment Australia put it, “The concept 
of offset is invaluable because it allows the community to achieve the best possible 
biodiversity outcome.”  Sachin Kapila from Shell adds that “We would miss out by seeing 
biodiversity offset just as risk management.  It’s an opportunity”.  
 
Box 24: Some company views on the prognosis for biodiversity 
offsets 
 “My feeling is that offsets are a very logical approach and I've spoken to people in 
conservation groups who are very positive about it, although they acknowledge that 
politically the concept may be difficult to sell to some in their constituency.  The concept 
has obvious potential for win-win outcomes.” (Ian Wood, BHP Billiton) 
“I think biodiversity offsets are exciting and should be explored.  I see a time when offsets 
just become a market mechanism.  I believe one day we will be able to trade biodiversity 
offsets.  It just needs clever leaders. Give it 5 or 10 years.” (Sachin Kapila, Shell) 
“Both ecosystem services and biodiversity offsets are growing areas.  We need to keep 
close and contribute to what evolves over the next couple of years.” (David Richard, Rio 
Tinto) 
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Despite this growing interest, we recognise that, in some circumstances, development 
projects are simply not appropriate and should not go ahead, so the whole question of offsets 
should not arise.  
In addition, any attempt to undertake biodiversity offsets in settings where there are serious 
failures of public and corporate governance and a lack of transparency, participation and 
accountability in the management of natural resources will almost inevitably fail.  Basic 
practices by states related to the rule of law, compliance and enforcement and by 
corporations related to governance and probity, are a pre-requisite for biodiversity offsets, as 
they are for other approaches to sustainable development. 
8.1.2 Possible advantages of biodiversity offsets 
Interviewees identified a number of benefits that can result from the use of offsets. These 
include: 
For organisations devoted to the conservation of biodiversity: 
? The possibility of more in situ conservation activity than would occur if developers were 
not encouraged to offset their impacts on biodiversity; 
? A way to ensure better conservation outcomes by offsetting degradation of natural habitat 
of relatively low biodiversity value for conservation or restoration of high biodiversity value 
habitat (e.g. focusing on ecological corridors and priority sites) and by trading small, highly 
compromised sites for larger areas of habitat where conservation outcomes are more 
secure;  
? A mechanism to integrate conservation into development planning at a time of growing 
pressure for resource development; to internalise environmental “externalities”; and to 
integrate biodiversity conservation into the investment plans of companies;  
? The possibility that offsets will give greater economic value to biodiversity, natural habitat 
and the restoration of degraded ecosystems; and 
? A significant new source of finance for biodiversity conservation. 
For companies, developers and investors: 
? The ability to undertake projects that might not otherwise be possible; 
? Better relationships with local communities, government regulators, environmental 
groups and other important stakeholders; 
? An enhanced reputation and therefore “social license to operate”; 
? Increased “regulatory goodwill” which could lead to faster permitting; 
? Easier access to capital and associated competitive advantages; 
? A practical tool for managing social and environmental risks and liabilities; 
? The possibility of influencing emerging environmental regulation and policy; 
? Reduced costs of compliance with environmental regulations; 
? “First mover” advantage for innovative companies; and 
? Strategic opportunities in the new markets and businesses that emerge as biodiversity 
offsets become more widespread. 
 
 79
For communities affected by development projects: 
? A means to ensure that developers leave a legacy not only of properly rehabilitated project 
sites, but also additional conservation benefits in the surrounding area; a legacy that could 
support livelihoods and amenity values; 
? The opportunity to negotiate optimal environmental, economic and social outcomes at a 
community or landscape scale; and 
? A means to identify pre-project biodiversity and ecosystem benefits and to ensure that 
important ecosystems remain functioning and productive both during and after 
development projects. 
For environmental regulators and policy makers: 
? A mechanism to encourage companies to make increased contributions to biodiversity 
conservation, without necessarily requiring elaborate new rules; 
? A means to ensure that development projects required to meet the growing demand for 
energy, minerals, food, fibre and transport are nonetheless planned in the context of 
sustainable development; and 
? Better balancing of the costs and benefits of biodiversity conservation and economic 
development. 
8.1.3 Associated risks 
Despite the potential advantages of biodiversity offsets identified by many of our interviewees, 
this report has shown that they offer no panacea or simple solution for the many biodiversity 
issues associated with development.  Indeed, biodiversity offsets are only likely to succeed in a 
conducive policy atmosphere, if they meet the needs of all the key stakeholders who should be 
involved in their design.  Designing a biodiversity offset requires the resolution of a number of 
complex challenges against a background of incomplete information.  
Even when properly designed, offsets are likely to be controversial and the subject of 
disagreement.  For instance, some conservation organisations oppose the entire concept of 
offsets, preferring to lobby for an outright ban on habitat conversion (NCC, 2001; PENGO, 
2002).  Others are less critical of the concept of offsets in theory, but feel that the way they are 
being put into practice leaves much to be desired.  Conversely, some developers oppose 
biodiversity offsets on the grounds that such compensation will cost more than they can bear 
(Property Council of Australia, 2002).  The public, meanwhile, may be sceptical that offsets 
deliver true net benefits.  And local communities may not feel that they stand to gain, 
particularly if the conservation activities are not undertaken very close to the original 
development, or if companies trade off conservation benefits against socio-economic ones, 
rather than delivering both.  
There is a risk that the mechanism could be perceived as a “license to trash” for companies. 
And any strong backlash could stifle interest in exploring voluntary offsets, particularly on the 
part of  companies, as it would counter one of the strongest elements of the business case (i.e. 
reputational advantages and license to operate).  
In some circumstances, such as where the damage to biodiversity is irreversible or occurs on 
unique sites of global significance, many people would agree that development is simply not 
appropriate, so the whole question of offsets should not arise.  This perspective is reflected, 
for example, in a 2002 IUCN recommendation calling on states to prohibit mining in protected 
areas management categories I to IV and to strictly limit mining in protected areas falling in 
 80
categories V and VI.10  If governments and companies nonetheless go ahead with development 
in such cases, the public is unlikely to perceive the outcome as acceptable, even there is an 
attempt to offset the harm caused to biodiversity.  Offsets in such circumstances would be 
likely to undermine public acceptability of the concept in general. 
Together, these risks point to the need for credible and transparent standards, methodologies 
and guidelines for biodiversity offsets, if the approach is to be adopted more widely. 
8.1.4 Lack of clear vision 
Despite the growing interest in biodiversity offsets, a number of obstacles currently hamper 
progress.  First, our research has shown that the different terminology and contexts for 
“biodiversity offsets” and the lack of a shared vocabulary on the subject hinders dialogue and 
the pooling of experience and expertise.  Additionally, there is little regulatory requirement for 
biodiversity offsets around the world and no intergovernmental discussion of the issue (with 
some notable exceptions discussed in chapter 4.2).  This means that most experience world-
wide has emerged ad hoc, from mitigation banking in the USA or from environmental impact 
assessments and planning processes, as well as the voluntary enthusiasm of particular 
individuals.  In short, experience is developing from the bottom–up, with little exchange of 
information and no co-ordination.  Likewise, not much is known of existing practice and current 
experiments with biodiversity offsets.  Indeed, this is among the first studies on the subject of 
which we are aware.  Although several leading companies have recently announced 
commitments related to “net positive effect” on biodiversity, none has published a clear 
strategy on how it intends to accomplish this. 
All this suggests that biodiversity offsets are at a turning point:  There may be considerable 
interest and growing practical experience, but there is insufficient dialogue.  There appears to 
be broad acknowledgement of the need to test the political acceptability of the approach, but 
there is a need to develop guidelines and tools to help those involved to clarify their objectives 
and demonstrate their success or failure.  Against this background, we offer some initial 
conclusions, based on our interviews and research.  
8.2 Key conclusions 
8.2.1 The meaning of biodiversity offsets and the mitigation hierarchy 
Our first conclusion is that any discussion of biodiversity offsets needs to clarify the 
participants’ understanding of the concept at the outset.  The use of offset vocabulary varies 
around the world, as does the assumption as to the context within which offsetting activities 
take place.  For instance, in the US, the term “mitigate” (or “compensatory mitigation”) is often 
preferred to “offset”.  This refers to activities designed to compensate for unavoidable 
environmental damage, generally in the context of a regulatory framework that mandates 
offsetting activities and that has created a market in which biodiversity and wetland credits can 
be traded.  In Europe the term “mitigate” means to minimise harm or to make it less severe, so 
offset is seen as a distinct activity that compensates for unavoidable harm once this mitigation 
has taken place.  In addition to complying with regulations that require offsets in some 
                                                 
10 World Conservation Congress 2002 REC No. 082 “Protection and conservation of biological diversity of 
protected areas from the negative impacts of mining and exploration.” 
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contexts, European companies (like their North American counterparts) sometimes carry out 
biodiversity offsets in their operations around the world on a voluntary basis, motivated by the 
business case for doing so.  
To clarify the concept that forms the basis for our research, in this report we have defined 
biodiversity offsets as conservation activities conducted to compensate for the residual harm 
to biodiversity caused by development projects in such a way as to ensure no net loss of 
biodiversity.  We strongly emphasise, however, that before reaching this point, projects must 
have first sought to avoid and minimise such harm.  
In other words, for us, integral to the concept of biodiversity offsets is their proper placement 
within the “mitigation hierarchy”:  developers should first seek to avoid, minimise and mitigate 
the harm their projects cause to biodiversity (where “minimise” means to design a project in 
such a way as to reduce harm, and “mitigate” means to alleviate the residual harm, to the 
extent possible).  Only then should they offset the residual, unavoidable impact of the project 
on biodiversity.  We believe that offsets, if they are firmly anchored within the context of this 
mitigation hierarchy, do not provide a “license to trash” the environment.  
Moreover, biodiversity offsets are no substitute for forgoing development projects that should 
not have taken place in the first place.  Finally, companies, industry associations and 
commentators such as Goodland (2003) are increasingly suggesting that the appropriate goal 
for offsets is to go beyond “no net loss” and seek to achieve “net benefit”. 
8.2.2 The Offset Spectrum 
One interesting observation from our work is that offsets fall within a very broad spectrum that 
ranges from one-off voluntary offsets designed to compensate for the residual damage of one 
particular project, through more regular voluntary offsets that are required by company policy, 
all the way to legally mandated compulsory offsets that could eventually be part of an 
emerging market in tradable “offset credits”. And there are other hybrid approaches in 
between these various points on the spectrum. 
At one end of the spectrum, law and policy in the US, Europe, Brazil and elsewhere require 
offsetting activities for damage caused by development projects to certain watersheds, 
species and ecosystems.  And in many other countries, legal processes for environmental 
impact assessment, planning and negotiation of the terms and conditions of concession 
agreements offer the context for discussions between regulators and companies to establish 
biodiversity offsets.  Similarly, companies seeking to raise capital for development projects are 
likely to face requirements to establish mitigation measures – some of which include off-site 
biodiversity offsets – in loan agreements from the IFC, and, since the advent of the Equator 
Principles, from a number of private banks.   
It is important to note that all parts of this spectrum have their advantages and disadvantages. 
Some of these are explored in chapter 4.4.  US interviewees were almost unanimous in their 
scepticism that biodiversity offsets would achieve the necessary scale and effectiveness in the 
long-term if they were only conducted on a voluntary basis.  Regulatory regimes, they argued, 
create legal certainty, clarify the expectations of companies on the design of biodiversity 
offsets, help ensure a level playing-field, and may help establish new markets.  
On the other hand, several interviewees pointed out that specific legal requirements for 
biodiversity offsets exist in so few countries that the voluntary approach would lead to a far 
greater contribution to global conservation than if developers were to wait for mandatory 
requirements.  Furthermore, existing regulatory regimes that require offsets are sometimes 
too prescriptive to allow for flexibility in the design of offsets in such a way as to ensure that 
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they make the best contribution to conservation.  Voluntary approaches sometimes give room 
for more flexibility and creativity.  
As with so many other things in this report, the right place in the spectrum will vary case by 
case, depending on a number of variables such as a country’s legal context, the nature of real-
estate markets, and even the specific circumstances of a given project.  In other words, where 
offsets should fall in this spectrum can only make sense when judged on a case-by-case basis. 
We recognise that, while there may be benefits to legally mandated and tradable offsets (such 
as those that are emerging in the USA), these will probably not be feasible in the short to 
medium-term in most of the countries that hold the majority of the world’s biodiversity.  For 
this reason, we believe that, among offsets, those that are voluntary (preferably those called 
for by clear company policies) and those that emerge from concession agreements or as result 
of existing regulation (e.g. EIA laws) will have a particularly important role to play in conserving 
a large part of the world’s biological resources.  
8.2.3 Flexibility  
Regardless of where offsets fall on the voluntary-to-mandatory spectrum, Leah Haygood – an 
environmental consultant who has worked on mitigation for Waste Management and other 
companies – voiced the view of many when she said that what is important is not to seek an 
unrealistic “one-size-fits-all” solution, but rather to develop a process that “will allow you to 
come up with site-specific solutions”.  Many other interviewees likewise stressed the 
importance of flexibility and case-by-case, site-specific responses to biodiversity impact as a 
pre-requisite for appropriate offsets.  The ground-rules for biodiversity offsets, many argued, 
need to be sufficiently flexible to allow site-specific solutions that find the best results and 
ensure that the relevant stakeholders are involved and satisfied. 
Notwithstanding the need for flexibility and a process-based approach, it is still possible to 
elicit some basic principles that we suggest could be applied in individual cases.  Several of 
these principles interact and some may conflict so as to require a degree of trade-off.  Drawing 
on the interviews and other sources, we arrive at the following general conclusions about 
designing offsets to achieve no net loss or net benefit to biodiversity: 
? Measuring “no net loss” is a challenge but not an insuperable barrier:  Limits to the 
current knowledge of biodiversity and its complexity mean that it is extremely difficult to 
establish a “currency” to measure both loss of biodiversity caused at a development site 
and the conservation that is needed to offset it elsewhere, so as to be confident that there 
is “no net loss”.  Much more work is needed in this area to develop socially acceptable and 
workable methodologies to measure both biodiversity loss and gain.  Developing such a 
“currency” may be a challenge, but some ecologists have indicated that it should be 
possible to identify measures that give a reliable indicator for no net loss.  Such 
approaches can also help show when a net benefit has been achieved. 
? Ecological equivalence and conservation priorities need to be balanced:  Given the 
difficulties inherent in measuring biodiversity, establishing equivalence between the 
affected and offset sites –sometimes referred to as trading “like for like”– appears to be a 
good basis for ensuring no net loss of biodiversity.  However, this bias toward equivalence 
should be tempered with sufficient flexibility to allow offsets to focus on agreed 
conservation priorities, whether informed by national strategies and international 
expertise or by local needs.  There is, nonetheless, an important caveat: the more the 
biodiversity involved in the offset differs from that affected by the development project, 
the harder it is likely to be to demonstrate “no net loss” and to secure stakeholder buy-in.   
 83
? Local benefits and conservation priorities need to be balanced:  In order to meet 
the needs of local stakeholders, offsets are normally implemented at a location that is 
sufficiently close to those who are most affected, so that they can, in turn, benefit from 
their outcome.  In some cases, however, flexibility may be needed to allow for the 
selection of locations that will make a greater contribution to biodiversity conservation, 
even if that means conducting offsets further afield.  In such cases, the consent of local 
people is essential. 
? Offsets should demonstrate real in situ conservation outcomes:  While financial 
support for taxonomic and other research and for capacity-building and training can make 
an important contribution to biodiversity, the conservation outcomes of activities such as 
training are often hard to demonstrate.  And when it comes to biodiversity offsets, these 
mechanisms are only likely to deliver the business benefits of risk management and license 
to operate if they can demonstrate practical conservation outcomes in the field.  
? Successful offsets require agreement among stakeholders:  As expanded below, the 
most fundamental determinant of the design of biodiversity offsets must be the 
satisfaction of key stakeholders such as local communities, government authorities and 
the companies involved. 
8.2.4 Depends on stakeholders 
The successful design and implementation of biodiversity offsets depends on satisfying key 
stakeholders including local communities, government authorities, environmental groups and 
the companies involved in a development project.  The support of local communities is of 
prime importance.  They may, for instance, reject a project that contributes to the country’s 
top conservation priority if they do not see any obvious benefits given the distant location of 
the offsetting project.  Or they may reject a project next door to the development site if it is of 
no conservation value.  Ideally, the stakeholders will, together, weigh up the various factors 
discussed in this report in order to select offset activities that optimise and balance a mixture 
of considerations.  In practice, it is not always easy to identify who has a legitimate place at the 
table.  Dialogue can be time consuming and expensive and stakeholders are not always able to 
reach consensus.  Notwithstanding these challenges, stakeholder involvement is vital. 
8.2.5 Offsets benefit from clear priorities  
Offsets, at their heart, involve a trade-off.  They are predicated on the notion that biodiversity 
in one place may be damaged (or even destroyed) in return for biodiversity protected and 
conserved elsewhere.  In order to make such trade-offs, however, it is essential to reach broad 
agreement on conservation priorities; to assign values that allow a determination of what can 
be damaged, what needs to be protected; and what can be traded for what.  
Given this fundamental nature of offsets, interviewees, time and again, stressed the need for 
those designing specific offset projects to inform themselves of the priorities for conservation 
in the country concerned; and to plan offsets with a view to making contributions at the 
ecosystemic, landscape or ecoregional levels.  Familiarity with national biodiversity strategies 
and action plans and contact with relevant authorities and experts can help make offsets more 
successful.  Companies interviewed frequently stated that they would like guidance on 
conservation priorities and described lack of clarity on this as a significant constraint in the use 
of offsets. 
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8.2.6 Further work is needed  
Many interviewees identified the need for further work to articulate the concepts involved in 
biodiversity offsets and to develop guidelines and methodologies, particularly on the issue of 
“currency”:  the basis for measuring the loss of biodiversity caused at a development site and 
the conservation outcomes needed to offset it elsewhere.  Some specific areas where further 
work is called for are described in the following section.  
8.3 What is needed for better biodiversity offsets? 
Our interviewees identified a number of issues that need to be resolved if biodiversity offsets 
are to be used more widely. These include the need to: 
8.3.1 Encourage more dialogue and develop a shared vocabulary 
Biodiversity offsets raise many scientific, social, political, legal and economic questions, to 
which there are no easy answers.  More open and informed debate is needed to develop a 
shared vocabulary on biodiversity offsets and to explore its various aspects.  Dialogue is also 
needed to articulate the concept, to share information and experience and to assess its 
political, scientific and commercial feasibility.  This would help to address the evident suspicion 
and distrust among some stakeholders that could become a barrier to further development of 
the approach.  The debate should involve those who are sceptical about biodiversity offsets, 
and those who have simply not given it much thought, as well as the more ardent supporters 
of offsets.  
8.3.2 Ensure all stakeholders play their part 
If they are to succeed, biodiversity offsets will need support from companies, governments, 
NGOs and local communities; first in exploring the general approach of “no net loss”, and then 
in the design of specific offset projects.  It has become clear through our research and 
interviews that, for any significant progress to be made on the issue, certain steps on the part 
of each of the main stakeholder groups are needed.  Some of these steps are outlined below: 
For Companies  
For companies, biodiversity represents both a business risk and an opportunity (Grigg and ten 
Kate, 2004). Biodiversity offsets are but one tool they can use to manage this risk and capitalise 
on the opportunity.  In doing so, companies should: 
? Clarify to external audiences and to staff and contractors their policy commitment on 
biodiversity, including reference to the mitigation hierarchy and to biodiversity offsets. 
? Communicate a clear strategy for how they plan to implement their policy commitments, 
preferably including specific, time-bound targets.  As part of this strategy, companies 
should set out how they propose to achieve any commitments to “no net loss” or “positive 
impacts on biodiversity”.  We recommend that this aspect should comprise two main 
elements:  (a) biodiversity offsets to be a routine part of project design for new projects in 
areas of high biodiversity value, where permitted by local authorities;  and (b) group-level 
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contributions to conservation. The latter might include capacity-building and research and 
would have the broad aim of offsetting the cumulative effect of the company’s other 
impacts on biodiversity, for instance in urban or other sites of lower biodiversity value. 
? Communicate their experience of designing and implementing biodiversity offsets. 
? Look for opportunities to participate in pilot projects to design and implement biodiversity 
offsets, working in collaboration with representatives from local communities and 
government and drawing on appropriate expertise. 
? Work with NGOs and other experts to develop guidelines and methodologies and 
consistent and transparent indicators for achieving “no net loss” that can satisfy the needs 
of stakeholders and be workable in practice. 
? Encourage governments, communities, NGOs and others to identify clear biodiversity, 
ecosystemic, and other conservation priorities needed to make offsets possible. 
Governments 
As described above, biodiversity offsets may be used in a variety of policy contexts, from the 
highly prescriptive regulatory regime of the US Clean Water Act to the more basic setting of 
environmental and planning law found in many parts of the world.  Governments seeking to 
test or encourage biodiversity offsets should: 
? Provide an enabling policy framework.  This will not necessarily require the introduction of 
new law mandating biodiversity offsets. On the other hand, offsets are unlikely to succeed 
without effective law and policy on conservation; environmental impact assessment and 
mitigation; land use planning and zoning; conditions for extractive and other industrial 
developments with biodiversity impacts; and clear national sustainable development goals 
and priorities with associated national biodiversity strategies and action plans. 
? Communicate clearly their national and local conservation priorities. 
? Collaborate with other stakeholders to develop guidelines on best practice on biodiversity 
offsets. 
? Engage, where appropriate, at the national or local level, in site-specific negotiations on 
the most appropriate design for biodiversity offsets. 
? Work with other government parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity to discuss 
biodiversity offsets under the auspices of the CBD under a suitable agenda item, such as 
implementation of Article 11 (Economic incentives) or as part of an endeavour to engage 
the business community in securing the objectives of the treaty. 
NGOs & conservation experts 
Many of our interviewees stressed the important role that conservation groups and experts in 
the natural and social sciences and in law and economics can play in developing the concept of 
biodiversity offsets, including the design of ground-rules and methodologies needed to move 
forward.  For companies, the support of members of the NGO community is critical to their 
motivation to implement biodiversity offsets voluntarily.  Several company representatives 
interviewed for this report posed a specific challenge to NGOs to co-ordinate their views and 
engage in discussions with government and companies to prioritise conservation efforts.  
NGOs and conservation experts prepared to engage constructively in this debate should: 
? Foster and contribute to dialogue on biodiversity offsets to explore their potential 
advantages and disadvantages. 
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? Contribute their expertise and engage with other members of the NGO and expert 
community to agree and communicate conservation priorities. 
? Contribute technical expertise and work with companies and governments to develop 
transparent guidelines and methodologies, as well as consistent and transparent 
measures and indicators for achieving “no net loss” of biodiversity that will satisfy the 
needs of stakeholders and be workable in practice. 
? Help to build the capacity of companies, governments and communities to discuss 
conservation priorities and to engage in fair and transparent discussions on offsets, both 
generally and in specific cases. 
? Help to monitor and evaluate biodiversity offset projects. 
Communities 
Communities affected by development projects are often those who stand to lose or gain the 
most from biodiversity offsets.  Their involvement is crucial.  Communities interested in this 
approach should: 
? At the political level, signal interest in biodiversity offsets to governments and companies.  
Fear that communities will not accept offsets is one of the greatest barriers to their use.  
? When biodiversity offsets are planned at the project level, engage with government, 
companies and seek independent expert advice.  This would help all concerned to select 
and design biodiversity offsets that ensure the original site is sufficiently rehabilitated 
while the offset project delivers the appropriate mixture of local benefits and contribution 
to biodiversity priorities. 
8.3.3 Gain more practical experience with offsets 
Perhaps the most effective way to address the many doubts that surround biodiversity offsets 
would be to point to projects on the ground that demonstrably improve the status of 
biodiversity.  Practical experience, for instance through pilot projects and case studies 
documenting the design, implementation and evaluation of biodiversity offsets, is an essential 
input to the debate, as well as the development of guidelines and methodologies.  As Geoff 
Burton of Environment Australia puts it, “If you can show the biodiversity outcome for both on-
site remediation and off-site conservation is better than if the site had not been disturbed in 
the first place, the biodiversity offset cannot be criticised.”  To achieve this, one needs well-
designed and adequately-funded projects that involve all appropriate stakeholders, that 
establish clear and transparent goals, and that have agreed and measurable indicators of 
success.  Published case studies describing the practical experience of biodiversity offsets and 
communicating the results of the projects against their goals, targets and agreed performance 
indicators would help enormously.  No such pilot projects have yet been established, although 
a project to do so is described below.  Nor are there many clear and comprehensive case 
studies on specific projects to offset biodiversity damage, with a few notable exceptions, 
particularly for projects related to wetland mitigation in the US.  
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8.4 Next steps for Insight and IUCN 
Insight Investment plans to use this report as the basis for engagement with companies in 
which it is invested, to encourage them to address the business risks associated with 
biodiversity to which they are exposed.  Insight also aims to contribute to discussions on 
biodiversity offsets taking place in groups such as the Energy and Biodiversity Initiative and the 
International Council on Mining and Metals.  
Insight Investment is collaborating with Forest Trends on a programme to establish a number 
of pilot biodiversity offset projects around the world.  
The authors plan to present this report and discuss the issues involved at the IUCN World 
Conservation Forum in Bangkok in November 2004. This and other venues will be used to 
explore the concept of biodiversity offsets by promoting dialogue with industry and debate 
among the conservation community. It is hoped that further stakeholder dialogue will help to 
clarify the concepts and practices involved and to develop appropriate policy frameworks and 
practical guidelines for equitable, sustainable and cost-effective biodiversity offsets. 
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Appendix 1: Interviewees and other informants 
Interviewees: Private Sector 
 
1. Stuart Anstee, Rio Tinto  
2. Steven de Bie, Shell  
3. Steve Botts, Antamina  
4. David Brand, Hancock Natural Resources Group 
5. Jessica Fox, Electric Power Research Institute  
6. Chris Herlugson, BP  
7. Dale Heydlauff, American Electric Power  
8. Leah Haygood, Consultant  
9. Rick Herd, Consultant 
10. Kathryn Shanks, BP 
11. Sachin Kapila, Shell 
12. Doug Lashley, Greenvest  
13. Rich Mogensen, Earth Mark Companies 
14. Bradley Raffle, Baker Botts LLP 
15. David Richards, Rio Tinto 
16. Candace Skarlatos, Bank of America  
17. Chris Spray, Northumbrian Water (now of the Scottish Environment Protection Agency) 
18. Ian Wood, BHP Billiton 
19. One interviewee preferred to remain anonymous 
Interviewees: Government & Intergovernmental Organisations 
 
20. Tina Bartlett, California Department of Fish and Game, USA 
21. Robert Brumbaugh, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Institute for Water Resources, USA 
22. Geoff Burton, Environment Australia  
23. José Carlos Fernández, National Ecology Institute, Mexico  
24. Habiba Gitay, Millenium Ecosystem Assessment  
25. Palmer Hough, Environmental Protection Agency, USA 
26. Deblyn Mead, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, USA  
27. Alice Ruhweza, National Environment Management Authority, Uganda 
28. Bob Watson, World Bank 
Interviewees: NGOs and Academic Organisations 
 
29. Andrew Balmford, Department of Zoology, University of Cambridge  
30. Michael Bean, Environmental Defense 
31. Robert Bonnie, Environmental Defense 
32. Assheton Carter, Conservation International 
33. Jason Coccia, Conservation Fund  
34. Ismid Hadad, Kehati, Indonesia  
35. Martin Hollands, Fauna and Flora International 
36. Dick Rice, Conservation International 
37. Julie Sibbing, National Wildlife Federation 
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Other informants* 
 
* These individuals contributed information on particular boxes and issues included in the 
report, but did not necessarily discuss the range of topics described in Appendix 2. 
 
Lidia Ahmad, BP Berau Ltd  
Ken Atkins, Department of Conservation and Land Management, Western Australia  
Tony Baird, Western Power, Australia 
Marc Carter, Department of the Environment and Heritage, Australia  
Jocelyn Davies, Adelaide University, Australia  
Ann DeVoy, Environmental Law Programme, IUCN  
John Finnie, English Nature 
Annelisa Grigg, Fauna and Flora International  
Ted Gullison, ParksWatch  
David Harrison, English Nature 
Toby Janson-Smith, independent consultant 
Yolanda Kakabadse, President, IUCN 
George Kelly, Environmental Banc and Exchange (EBX)  
James Marsden, English Nature  
Craig Mackenzie, Insight Investment 
Krystal Maze, South African National Biodiversity Institute  
Ann Neville, Kennecott Utah Copper Corporation 
Geoff Nickolds, Severn Trent  
Reyna Oleas, independent consultant 
Stuart Pudney, Northumbrian Water 
Juliana Rehfeld, Anglo American Brazil 
John Scanlon, Environmental Law Programme, IUCN 
Phil Tanner, Anglo American 
Sophie Williams, Shell 
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Appendix 2:  Issues discussed during the interviews 
One of the main sources of information for this report was a series of semi-structured 
interviews with knowledgeable individuals who have worked on issues related to biodiversity 
offsets.  A general list of questions – rather than a formal questionnaire – was prepared as the 
basis for the interviews.  Each interview followed a slightly different course, according to the 
experience and interests of the interviewee, as well as the time available.  The interviews were 
guided by the following questions and issues: 
What do you understand offset to mean? 
? Discussion of concepts such as: offset, no net loss, net positive effect, ‘replacement’ of 
what is lost 
? Distinction between biodiversity offsets and positive conservation measures 
? Distinction between biodiversity offsets and mitigation 
? Scope of activities that could legitimately be covered by biodiversity offsets other than on 
the ground conservation measures, e.g. taxonomic studies, capacity-building of 
institutions 
What is your experience with offset? 
? How the organisation has dealt with unavoidable environmental damage 
? Experience of the organisation with compensatory offsets and nature of social and 
environmental impact involved 
? Nature of any specific organisational policy on offsets 
? Any reference made by the organisation to offsets and related issues in publicly available 
documents, including any standard approaches, guidelines etc 
? Discussion of the perceived risks and rewards of biodiversity offsets 
? How interviewee has set about negotiating offsets and with whom 
Can you give us specific examples of biodiversity offsets? 
? Discussion of what was offset, where, when, how and by whom 
? Indication of the cost of the offset and how it compares to other remediation and 
conservation investments 
What is the motivation to conduct biodiversity offsets? 
? Whether (and, if so, what kind of) regulatory framework is needed for offsets to work or 
whether there is enough motivation to offset on a purely voluntary basis 
? Whether the organisation would engage in offsets only where required to do so by law (if 
so, which law?) or also voluntarily 
? In the case of voluntary offsets, discussion of motivation, including various components of 
the business case 
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What would be needed to make offsets work? 
? Discussion of whether the concept and approach is useful 
? Discussion of the perceived main challenges and opportunities 
? Discussion of methodologies for establishing equivalence of biodiversity gains and losses 
? Discussion of timelines and whether and how permanence of conservation outcomes 
could be ensured 
? Whether and how issues of lack of confidence concerning the concept and lack of trust of 
stakeholders could be overcome 
? What would be needed to make progress with biodiversity offsets  
? What would be needed to help the interviewee with his/her work in this area  
Where should the offsetting conservation activities take place?  
? Discussion of the range of possibilities from local to internationally traded offsets  
? Factors that would affect the decision on location of biodiversity offsets 
How should the offsetting conservation activities take place?  
? The range of options, including through the organisation's own projects, through 
partnerships and through contractors/third parties 
Who else should we talk to about offsets?  
? Request for additional useful contacts 
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